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ABSTRACT 
 
Close on twenty-five years have passed since the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). The division-of-powers provisions of the Constitution 
marked a move away from the previous vertical, centralised system of government towards a 
more horizontal, decentralised form of government. The foundation of the legal system shifted 
from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to a model based on constitutionalism, the rule of 
law, and the observance of human dignity, equality and freedom. This study examines the 
extent to which the division-of-powers provisions in the Constitution have been realised since 
the adoption of the Constitution from a local government perspective. This work contributes to 
earlier research by presenting a comprehensive review of state practice to date. The research 
was conducted via a review of published work including books, journal articles, dissertations, 
studies, and working papers. Sources for the investigation include legislation, policy 
documents, government commissioned reports, white papers, budgets and minutes of 
parliamentary committees. Using these sources, the judicial interpretation of the constitutional 
scheme for the allocation of powers is examined and compared with the legislative, fiscal, 
intergovernmental, and administrative practice of governance in democratic South Africa. The 
thesis draws together trends across a number of areas and presents a composite picture of the 
current status of government, comparing the constitutional vision for the division of powers 
between the spheres of government with current practice. In so doing, it aims to identify the 
manner in which the legislature, executive and judiciary envisage the constitutional division of 
powers; the extent to which the different approaches adopted by each branch cohere or conflict 
with one another and the manner in which they have been implemented over the past twenty 
years. In addition, the thesis also examines possible reasons for the challenges identified in the 
implementation process before concluding by suggesting interventions which could improve 
the efficiency and efficacy of current state administration. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The advent of the Constitution has brought a definitive shift in the system of governance in 
South Africa.1 This change is twofold. First, the principles of constitutionalism now underpin 
all aspects of governance. Human dignity, equality and freedom have been constitutionally 
enshrined as the foundational values of the Republic.2 The Constitution and the rule of law are 
supreme. All decisions and actions by government must now conform to the principles and 
provisions of the Constitution. Legislation or conduct which is inconsistent with the 
Constitution may be struck down as invalid.3 This represents a fundamental break with the 
system of parliamentary sovereignty that applied during the apartheid era and which ensured 
that Parliament was the ultimate authority regarding governance. Under this system, a positivist 
approach was adopted in terms of which all organs of state, including the courts, were expected 
to give effect to the letter of the laws enacted by Parliament; there was no obligation to promote 
human rights and Parliament wielded virtually unchecked powers.4  
 
Secondly, there has been a shift from a hierarchical form of government to a system where all 
spheres of government have a defined area of authority within which to exercise their 
administrative powers. This is a distinct change from the situation which prevailed under the 
previous system where national and provincial government exercised direct control over the 
various forms of local government. The division-of-powers provisions in the Constitution have 
created a system where legislative and executive authority is divided between the spheres in a 
way that affords local government an increased measure of autonomy compared to the system 
which previously existed.5 
 
                                                 
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
2 Ibid s 1. 
3 Ibid s 2. 
4 De Vos & Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context at 12. 
5 Constitution: s 40 read with s 43. 
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The Constitution establishes three spheres of government: national, provincial, and local. The 
three spheres are described as ‘distinct, interdependent, and interrelated’.6 The composition, 
functioning, internal arrangements, and powers and functions of these three spheres are set out 
in detail.7  In contradistinction to the previous system, local government is established as a 
fully-fledged sphere of government with powers and functions of its own – most notably – the 
power to draft original legislation in the form of by-laws.8  This power allows municipalities to 
exercise their executive authority over the areas which they administer in terms of the 
Constitution. The power to draft by-laws is limited to matters which municipalities have the 
right to administer under the Constitution or national and provincial legislation. Should a 
conflict arise between national or provincial legislation and a by-law, the by-law will, as a rule, 
be declared invalid.9  However, where national or provincial legislation is drafted in a way 
which hinders a municipality’s right to exercise its powers or perform its functions, the by-law 
will prevail. 10 
 
Similarly, national and provincial government have defined areas of functional authority, with 
residual powers vesting in national government. Their role with respect to local government is 
to strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs and perform their 
functions.11 The emphasis falls on assisting municipalities to manage their own affairs. This 
role of provincial government under the Constitution is in marked contrast to that which 
previously prevailed where provinces were directly responsible for administering the various 
local government bodies. From a legislative point of view, the executive authority enjoyed by 
the provinces was implemented via a system of Ordinances and Regulations applicable to the 
various forms of local government.12  
 
1.2 Research Question 
 
This thesis examines the extent to which the constitutional scheme for the division of powers 
has been realised since the adoption of the Constitution from a local government perspective. 
The investigation proceeds from the premise that decentralised local government is good for 
                                                 
6 Ibid s 40. 
7 Ibid ss 40–41, 43–44,103–104,126,139,146–148,150–151,154,156. 
8 Ibid s 156(2). 
9 Ibid ss 156(1), 156(2) and 156(3). 
10 Ibid s 151(4). 
11 Ibid s 154(1). 
12 Steytler & De Visser Local Government Law (2008) at 2.1 and 2.4. 
  
3 
 
development. The entrenchment of local government autonomy in the Constitution is an 
acknowledgement of the importance of local government in achieving democratic and 
accountable government. To an extent, it can be argued that the status and strength of local 
government reflects the relative strength of South African governance. If it is accepted that the 
constitutional entrenchment of developmental local government is central to service delivery, 
it follows that the state of local government is a measure of the health of democratic governance 
in the country. This is borne out by the fact that service-delivery protests are most often directed 
at local government. This shows that citizens, too, expect local governments to deliver on the 
constitutional mandate. Provincial and national governments appear to share the expectation 
that local government must deliver and implement all government programmes as they are 
closest to the people. This is the case even though the Constitution emphasises the 
interrelatedness and responsibility of all three spheres and distributes functions accordingly. 
The question of whether this constitutional division of powers is effective is vitally important. 
It is hoped that this thesis will provide further insight into this question. 
 
The study examines the areas of competence of the three spheres of government, their inter-
relationship, and how they function in practice. Examples from the legislative and executive 
spheres are considered in order to evaluate the implementation of the Constitution’s division-
of-powers provisions. The emphasis is on how these constitutional provisions have been 
implemented in the local government sphere. The focus of the investigation is on the efficacy 
of the system. Leonardy and Brand frame the enquiry in the following terms: 
 
[T]he question in the well-tested British approach to the evaluation of constitutional concepts and institutions 
should be whether this...system works. Only if that cannot be answered in the affirmative, the need arises to rethink 
the foundations of the arrangement....and this would seem to apply even if one would have to come to the 
conclusion that those functions are inconsistent with or do not otherwise meet the demands of legal and/or 
theoretical logics. If and as long as the arrangement fulfils its function, such inconsistencies or other defects would 
thus have to be left aside as irrelevant.13 
 
This thesis considers the implementation of the division of powers provisions by examining 
the following elements: 
 
                                                 
13 Leonardy & Brand (2010) 4 TSAR 657. 
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• The institutional design in the Constitution and the division-of-powers provisions.  
• The administrative practice of government.  
• The practice of intergovernmental relations in the state.  
• Judicial interpretation of the constitutional division of powers. 
• The legislative practice of the state. 
• The fiscal practice of the state. 
• Political considerations. 
 
This study contributes to existing research by reviewing the elements enumerated above over 
a twenty-year period. It draws together trends across a number of areas, and draws a composite 
picture of the current status of government, comparing the constitutional vision for the division 
of powers between the spheres with current practice. In so doing, it attempts to answer the 
following related questions: 
• Is the constitutional vision for the division of powers being realised in practice? If not, 
what are the reasons for this? 
• Is there a need to intervene in order to improve the functionality and efficacy of the 
constitutional system?  
• What interventions could improve the efficiency and efficacy of the administration? 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
The ideas which culminated in the writing of this thesis were precipitated by questions the 
writer encountered during the early phases of implementing South Africa’s local government 
system whilst working as a research consultant at the Department of Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs in KwaZulu-Natal. Subsequent work experience in national, provincial, and 
local government has awakened a keen interest in the potential of local government to 
transform society. This experience has opened up invaluable opportunities for observation and 
interaction with the constitutional system – the topic of this study. Case studies are drawn from 
the local, provincial, and national spheres of government.  
 
The thesis draws on the work of De Visser (2003) and Mathenjwa (2017), together with a 
number of theses on the topic. It evaluates a variety of national studies conducted by academics, 
the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), the Department of Planning, 
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Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), MunicipalIQ, and the former Department of 
Constitutional Development.14 
 
The research for this work was conducted via a review of published work on the subject area 
of the study. This includes books, journal articles, dissertations, studies, and working papers 
prepared by academics, legislation, and the policy documents of government departments. 
Given that the research focuses on public law issues, reliance is also placed on government 
commissioned studies and reports, white papers, budgets, and the like. 15 The minutes of 
parliamentary committees have also been consulted in certain instances.16  
 
                                                 
14 De Visser Developmental Local Government; Mathenjwa Supervision of Local Government; Mathebula 
Intergovernmental Relations Reform; Mafilika Impact of the National Council of Provinces available at 
etd.uwc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11394/3613/Mafilka_LLM_2013_pdf?sequence=1; Mettler ‘The legislative 
powers of local government’ (2000) Local Government Working Paper Series No 1 Community Law Centre 
University of the Western Cape available at www.mlgi.org.za. De Visser  ‘Assignment of powers to local 
government’ (2002) Local Government Working Paper Series No 1 Community Law Centre University of the 
Western Cape available at www.mlgi.org.za; Mettler J ‘The legislative powers of local government’ (2000) LG 
Working Paper Series No 1 at 10 Community Law Centre University of the Western Cape available at 
www.mlgi.org.za; De Visser ‘Powers of local government’ (2002) Local Government Working Paper Series No 
2 Community Law Centre University of the Western Cape available at www.mlgi.org.za; Steyler ‘The powers of 
local government in decentralized systems of government : Dispelling “the curse of common competencies”’ 
(2003) Local Government Working Paper Series No 2 Community Law Centre University of the Western Cape 
available at www.mlgi.org.za; Steytler N & Fessha Y ‘Defining local government powers and functions: The 
management of concurrency’ (2007) Research Paper Local Government Project Community Law Centre 
University of the Western Cape available at www..mlgi.org.za; Local Government Project Community Law Centre 
University of the Western Cape  Paper I ‘Developmental local government: Determining appropriate functions 
and powers’ (2007) available at www.mlgi.org.za; ‘Community Protest: Local Government Perceptions’ available 
at https://www.salga.org.za/.../Community% 20Protest%202016%20without%20BLEED.pdf accessed on 23 
September 2017.; ‘The state of basic service delivery in South Africa: In-depth analysis of the Community Survey 
2016 data’ available at www.statsa.gov.za/ publications/Report%2003-01-22/Report%2003-01-222016.pdf, 
accessed on 23 September 2017; ‘Public Protest in Democratic South Africa’ available at http://sahistory.org.za/ 
article/public-protest-democratic-south-africa, accessed on 23 September 2017; Allan K & Heese K 
‘Understanding why service delivery protests take place and who is to blame’ available at www.municipaliq.co.za 
accessed on 23 September 2017. 
15 Department of Provincial and Local Government ‘The Intergovernmental Relations Audit: Towards a Culture 
of Co-operative Government (1999); Layman T ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South 
Africa: A ten-year review commissioned by the Presidency” (2003) available at http://sarpn.org/documents/ 
d000078751docs/Layman%20Tim.pdf at 207, accessed on 23 September 2017; Parliament of RSA ‘Report of the 
Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament’ (2008) available at https://pmg.org.za/policy-document/63/ 
accessed 23 September 2017; DPSA ‘White Paper on Local Government’ (1997); Department of Constitutional 
Development 'Discussion Document on Strategic Issues and Options for Policy on Cooperative Government and 
Intergovernmental Relations' (1999); Department of Monitoring and Evaluation ‘Twenty-year Review South 
Africa 1994-2014 Background Paper: Local Government; National Planning Commission ‘National Development 
Plan’ (2012). 
16 PSA Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee Meeting of 25 October 2017 available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/, accessed on 17 July 2019 Public Accounts (SCOPA) Committee 
Meeting of 28 November 2018 available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/27688 accessed on 17 July 2019 
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During the data-evaluation phase, a broad framework for the thesis was developed and the 
thematic areas were refined and slotted into potential chapters and sections in the body of the 
work. Literature relating directly to the central research question was summarised and captured 
into a coding book, setting out the relevant findings chronologically to facilitate legal analysis. 
During the process of reading and analysis, data was evaluated in terms of author, type – e.g., 
government sponsored study v peer reviewed journal – findings, audience, research funding, 
and any other relevant factor. In this section, the primary works relevant to the research area 
are surveyed. Less relevant literature identified through this process has been included under 
the thematic subject areas in each chapter. 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
 
During the period following the adoption of the Constitution, aspects of the constitutional 
design were considered by Simeon.17 Simeon examined the federal and unitary elements of the 
South African Constitution in the context of the values and purposes which may have 
influenced the choice of one constitutional design element over another. He examined  whether 
or not the institutional design of the South African Constitution meets Wheare’s strict definition 
of federalism.18 The reality is that South Africa has chosen a multi-sphere system of 
government. This system incorporates many elements found in other constitutions, for example 
that of Germany, but also responds, as do all federal systems, to the unique cultural, political, 
and economic dynamics of its peculiar setting.19 
 
As the constitutional system matured, so too academic commentary on local government 
developed. Steytler and De Visser have done a considerable amount of work in the area of 
constitutional and local government law, as has the Community Law Centre20 at the University 
of the Western Cape.21 Steytler’s work on concurrency has been particularly insightful and is 
discussed in Chapter 4. In 2005, De Visser’s PhD thesis, supervised by Steytler, was 
                                                 
17 Simeon (1998) SA Public Law 42. 
18 Wheare’s test for federalism asks whether a system of government embodies predominantly a division of powers 
between general and regional authorities each of which with its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the others and 
independent in their respective spheres? If it does, then it is federal in nature. Subject to the qualification that a 
system which leaves residual powers to central government is quasi-federal and not strictly federal in nature (see 
Wheare Federalism at 11).  
19 Simeon (1998) SA Public Law 42 at 71. 
20 The Community Law Centre has been renamed as the Dullah Omar Institute. 
21 Steytler & De Visser Local Government Law (2008). 
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published.22 De Visser’s Developmental Local Government, is premised on previous negative 
experiences with centralisation in other African countries. The argument put forward is that the 
institutional design for local government in the Constitution is premised on the assumption that 
decentralisation is good for governance. Accordingly, the Constitution adopted the concept of 
decentralisation and local government was empowered as the key agent for development. De 
Visser examines the South African local government system in order to answer what 
institutional choices a transitional state must make to facilitate developmental local 
government.  
 
De Visser proposes three principles for the developmental role of government and analyses the 
merits (and demerits) of decentralised local government, using South Africa as a case study, in 
order to devise an institutional model for developmental local government. He concludes that 
although decentralisation can contribute significantly to development, it also harbours 
dangers.23 In response to these dangers De Visser proposes three institutional principles: 
(1)  Autonomy – for decentralisation to be effective in the context of local government, local 
government must be equipped with real and sufficient powers. Interference by what the 
author calls ‘senior governments’ (referred to as ‘national’ or ‘central’ government in 
this thesis) is discussed. It is argued that a sufficient degree of financial autonomy is 
necessary for powers to have any meaning. 
(2) Supervision – is discussed as a principle to limit the danger of fragmentation inherent 
in decentralisation. De Visser argues that supervisory elements in the institutional 
framework are an essential requirement for developmental local government. 
(3)  Cooperation – is proposed as a third principle, based on the inclusion of cooperative 
governance in the institutional design of the South African Constitution. The 
complexities of governance require a normative framework and instruments to guide 
intergovernmental dialogue. It also requires a normative framework for the vertical and 
horizontal integration of policies.24 
 
De Visser concludes that the South African local government system performs reasonably well 
on all three principles, but most notably on the principle of autonomy. He notes that in 2003, 
when the study was conducted, there were signs that local government could be under threat. 
                                                 
22 De Visser Developmental Local Government. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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As a result, he underlines the importance of a political will committed to implementing the 
constitutional vision for developmental local government. Although the study concludes that 
the system performs relatively well, this should not undermine its underlying message – it could 
perform still better on all three principles.  
 
In 2007, De Visser developed a working paper on local government functions assisted by the 
National Treasury Conflict and Governance Facility with funding from the European Union.25 
In this paper he argued that there are significant shortcomings in how the Constitution 
distributes powers and functions between the spheres of government, and how the allocation 
of powers to local government is interpreted and implemented. In keeping with the principle 
of subsidiarity, he proposed that those functions that have the most immediate developmental 
impact on citizens should be performed at the local level.26 This study applies principles 
discussed in De Visser’s PhD thesis to four ‘high-impact’ powers – housing, local economic 
development, public transport, and planning but does not cover the entire ambit of the 
Schedules. 27 
 
Mathenjwa’s recently-published work, Supervision of Local Government, examines the 
constitutional obligation to monitor local government by reviewing the law and practice of 
supervision.28 The work covers the role of provincial government as well as that of the 
institutions supporting democracy, including the Public Protector, the South African Human 
Rights Commission and the Auditor-General. He argues that the general trend in the 
supervision of local government indicates that provincial governments are acting outside of the 
constitutionally-defined limits of supervision and in a manner which usurps municipal 
authority. Mathenjwa contends that this trend is particularly prevalent in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal.29 
 
The literature review yielded rich material which covers important areas related to the division 
of powers under the Constitution.30 The earlier work of Simeon dealt with the period following 
the adoption of the Constitution when there were no established practices or judicial decisions 
                                                 
25 De Visser J ‘Powers of Local Government’ (2002) LG Working Paper Series No 2 at 6 Community Law Centre 
University of the Western Cape’ available at www.mlgi.org.za accessed on 14 March 2016. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Constitution: Schedules 4 and 5. 
28 Mthenjwa Supervision of Local Government. 
29 Ibid at 178. 
30 Constitution. 
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and academic analysis was accordingly limited to a consideration of the institutional aspects of 
the Constitution. The later works by Steytler, De Visser, and Mathenjwa dealing with advances 
in local government, are particularly insightful.  It is fortuitous that both De Visser and 
Mathenjwa’s studies rely on case studies drawn from KwaZulu-Natal, as many of the examples 
in this thesis are also drawn from that province.  
 
This thesis differs from earlier literature in a number of important respects: in the first instance, 
as much as twenty years has passed since the time of writing of certain of the works, and fifteen 
since De Visser completed his study. In that time there have been important developments. For 
example, intergovernmental legislation has been adopted31 and the courts have had an 
opportunity to consider and interpret the constitutional provisions allocating powers to local 
government.32 These and other developments have had important consequences for the 
development of the constitutional vision of the division of powers. The study addresses the 
question of whether these developments have had a positive or a negative impact on the 
autonomy of local government. This thesis seeks to contribute to the existing discourse by 
examining the manner in which the legislature, the executive and the judiciary have sought to 
realise the constitutional division of powers between the three spheres of government over the 
past twenty years, from a local government perspective. In addition, it attempts to address some 
of the challenges the system has given rise to by making recommendations aimed at improving 
legislative and administrative practices affecting the division of powers provisions. 
                                                 
31 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. 
32 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) (Wary Holdings); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development 
Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC) (Gauteng Development Tribunal); Swartland Municipality v Louw NO 
& others 2010 (5) SA 314 (WCC) (Swartland WCC); Minister for Mineral Resources v Swartland Municipality 
& others 2012 (7) BCLR 712 (CC) (Swartland CC); MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2012 (4) 
SA 181 (CC) (Maccsand); Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of 
the Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) (Lagoonbay); Tronox KwaZulu-
Natal Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal & others 2016 (3) SA 160 
(CC) (Tronox); Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (Le Sueur); 
Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) (Joseph); City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) (Blue 
Moonlight). 
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1.5 Chapter Breakdown 
 
Chapter 2 establishes the background for the evaluation of the system of governance 
established under the Constitution. It begins with a treatment of theoretical models of 
government. First, the classic tests used to classify governmental systems are discussed in 
relation to the South African Constitution. Next, various factors are proposed as a framework 
within which to evaluate the South African system of government.33 These factors are used to 
evaluate both the design and the practice of the state. 
 
The chapter sets out the history of constitutional governance in South Africa and its influence 
on the evolution of our government. This historical overview examines the background to 
South Africa’s history of a unitary government and administration premised on parliamentary 
sovereignty. The debates which shaped the division-of-powers discussions at the Convention 
for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) are compared with similar discussions following the 
Anglo-Boer War in 1909. The main features of the Constitution’s division of powers are set 
against this historical background. 
 
From a comparative perspective this thesis compares how other countries have dealt with the 
constitutional division of powers. The constitutions of Germany and Canada, which were used 
as ‘models’ by the drafters at Codesa, are examined in greater detail. 
 
In order to situate the constitutional provisions in their interpretative context, the thesis 
examines how the Constitutional Court interpreted these provisions in the Certification 
Judgments. 34 The reasoning followed by the Constitutional Court is analysed in some detail 
on the basis of its importance under the precedent doctrine.  
                                                 
33 See Chap 2: 
(a) The constitutional design for government; 
(b) The division of powers between national and sub-national governments; 
(c) The Fiscal practice of the state; 
(d) Intergovernmental relations; 
(e) The administrative practice of the government; 
(f) Political considerations; and 
(g) Judicial decisions. 
34 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (First Certification Judgment); Certification of the Amended Text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) (Second Certification Judgment). 
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Chapter 3 opens by explaining the terminology of ‘cooperative governance’ and 
‘intergovernmental relations’. It traverses the evolution of the practice in intergovernmental 
relations from 1994 to the present. This discussion considers both the period prior to and the 
period following the adoption of legislation governing intergovernmental relations.35 Important 
institutions for intergovernmental relations are evaluated, including the National Council of 
Provinces, the Intergovernmental Forum, and the President’s Coordinating Council. The 
Cabinet Cluster System and its operation are examined as an example of state practice in the 
area of intergovernmental relations (IGR).  
 
How IGR have evolved in the financial and fiscal spheres is addressed in some detail in order 
to evaluate whether state fiscal practice aligns with the constitutional division of powers. 
Judicial interpretation of the cooperative governance provisions in the Constitution is 
considered before a number of case studies are presented. Finally, the phenomenon of service-
delivery protests and their causes are considered. The investigation in this chapter concludes 
by identifying a number of areas in the practice of cooperative governance which could benefit 
from reform. 
 
Earlier, the unique status of local government as an autonomous sphere under the Constitution 
was introduced.36 The legislative power of local government to pass original legislation is an 
important feature of the division of powers in the new dispensation. In Chapter 4 the legislative 
practice of the state with regard to legislation impacting on local government is surveyed.  
 
This chapter first details the scheme for the division of powers provided for in the Constitution. 
The ambit of national, provincial, and local governments’ legislative authority is set out 
together with the conflict-of-laws provisions which apply in legislative disputes. The operation 
of concurrent legislative mandates is outlined. A number of case studies which illustrate state 
practice in local government functional areas are presented and various problematic areas are 
identified. The final part of this chapter reviews the case studies and makes recommendations 
based on the findings. 
 
                                                 
35 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. 
36 See s 1.1. 
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In Chapter 5, the thesis investigates the issue of concurrent powers discussed in a number of 
the case studies in Chapter 4 in greater detail. The issue of concurrency is emphasised by 
examining the manner in which the Constitution allocates the powers over development 
planning between the three spheres of government. In terms of the Constitution, ‘municipal 
planning’ and ‘building regulations’ are areas of local-government competence.37 The 
functional areas of ‘regional planning and development’ and ‘urban and rural development’ 
fall within the national and provincial governments’ areas of competence,38 while the 
Constitution assigns the functional area of ‘provincial planning’ to the provinces.39 Various 
challenges have arisen in implementing the division of responsibilities and have resulted in the 
body of case law analysed in this section. This section of the thesis examines the case law in 
order to establish the jurisprudential interpretation of the status of local government.  
 
Chapter 6 highlights the practical challenges associated with the implementation of the 
constitutional allocation of powers. The High Court’s interpretation of the division-of-powers 
provisions in the Constitution in Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others is 
analysed.40 This case revolved around the role of local government in the related functional 
areas of ‘planning’ and ‘environment’. It is argued that this case illustrates the complexities of 
the constitutional allocation of powers and responsibilities between the three spheres of 
government. 
 
In the current chapter – Chapter 1 – the supremacy of the Constitution and the shift from 
parliamentary sovereignty to constitutionalism as the constitutional basis for the Republic have 
been introduced. In terms of this shift, the state is constituted as a democratic republic founded 
on the rule of law and a commitment to human dignity, equality and freedom. The Bill of Rights 
in Chapter 2 of the Constitution is the bedrock of this new order. It has been pointed out that 
this shift carries with it the requirement that all law and state practice must meet the standards 
set by the Constitution. However, no examination of the division-of-powers provisions of the 
Constitution would be complete without a consideration of their relation to the Bill of Rights. 
 
                                                 
37 Constitution Schedule 4B. 
38 Ibid Schedule 4A 
39 Ibid Schedule 5A. 
40 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6. 
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Chapter 6, therefore, considers the impact of the Bill of Rights on the constitutional allocation 
of powers between the three spheres of government. Recent cases in which the Constitutional 
Court has considered the impact of the constitutional right to housing on the constitutional 
allocation of powers and responsibilities within the three spheres, are discussed. 41 It is argued 
that litigation founded in the Bill of Rights will continue to impact the constitutional allocation 
of powers. This adds further complexity to this area of law and impacts on the assessment of 
the efficacy of the constitutional system.  
 
In Chapter 7, the efficacy of the division-of-powers provisions in the Constitution is examined 
through the lens of state administrative practice. The thesis examines the constitutional 
provisions governing the public administration. The importance of the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) and the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in the 
constitutional scheme is set out. The powers of the PSC are examined in the light of the 
Constitutional Court’s evaluation of the constitutional text’s compliance with Constitutional 
Principle XXIX.42 This principle provides for the safeguarding of the independence and 
impartiality of the PSC, the Reserve Bank, and the Auditor General. These institutions play a 
vital role in maintaining professional ethics in the public sector. Accordingly, the thesis 
considers whether the protection afforded to the PSC by the Constitution is adequate.  
 
Whether the Constitution and public service legislation and policies have instilled 
constitutional values in the practice of the administration is examined. It is argued that the 
culture and ethos in the public service fall short of the values enshrined in the Constitution for 
a number of reasons. It is further argued that there is a link between dysfunctional human- 
resource practices in government departments and the erosion of good governance in the public 
sector overall. Finally, the thesis suggests that certain challenges related to concurrency are 
linked to service delivery and human-resource challenges in the public sector. The concurrent 
power of health is used to illustrate this point. It is submitted, therefore, that reforms aimed at 
clarifying the division of powers provisions in the Constitution must be accompanied by 
attendant changes in the management of the public administration. A number of areas of state 
administrative practice that could benefit from reform are identified.  
                                                 
41 Government of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2001 (1) SA 46; Joseph & others 
v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
42 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) 
para 204. 
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In the final chapter the investigation in the preceding chapters is drawn together. Observations 
and findings based on this investigation are presented. The thesis concludes by offering a 
number of recommendations to address the findings.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIVISION OF POWERS IN HISTORICAL, 
THEORETICAL, AND COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The 1996 signing into law of the Constitution of the newly-democratic South Africa at 
Sharpeville marked a shift in the country’s legal history.43 It signaled a break with the legal 
tradition of positivism and the system of parliamentary sovereignty which had provided the 
impetus for the functioning of the apartheid state. In its place, the Constitution established a 
democratic system built on the foundations of constitutional supremacy and a justiciable Bill 
of Rights. This democratic constitutional system provided an opportunity for all citizens to 
participate in the governance of the country.44 The governance model in the Constitution 
ushered in a shift from the hierarchical, vertical system which prevailed under the previous 
regime, to a democratic, participatory scheme of shared competencies among the three spheres 
of government. This required the division of constitutional powers and responsibilities between 
the national, provincial, and local governments.  
 
The division-of-powers provisions of the constitutional model were the subject of much debate 
and contestation during the negotiating and drafting of the new Constitution. Initially, this 
discussion revolved around the preliminary question of whether South Africa would choose to 
reconstitute itself as either a unitary or a federal state. The process of drafting the Constitution 
required agreement to be reached between parties with vastly differing political ideas. The 
discussions leading up to the adoption of certain sections in the Constitution shed light on the 
provisions which emerged, often as a result of contestation and compromise. 
 
This chapter traverses some of the debates surrounding the drafting of the division-of-powers 
sections in the Constitution. Whether the South African constitutional system of governance is 
unitary or federal in nature is discussed. Common characteristics of unitary and federal design 
                                                 
43 President Nelson Mandela signed the final draft of the Constitution into law at Sharpeville, Vereeniging on 10 
December 1996. See sahistory.org.za/dated-event/mandela-signs-sa-constitution-law accessed on 11 September 
2019. 
44 Constitution: s 1provides that: ‘The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign, democratic state founded on the 
following values…(d) [u]niversal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-
party system of democracy, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.’ 
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are considered and provide the background for the analysis of the system which has emerged 
in South Africa after two decades of constitutional governance.  
 
2.2 Local Government in Theoretical Context 
 
2.2.1 The unitary v federal debate 
 
In the section which follows, some of the debates which informed the drafting of the division- 
of-powers provisions in the Constitution are discussed. However, it is first necessary to 
consider the preliminary matter of whether the drafters opted for a unitary or a federal model 
of government. It must be noted that the terms ‘unitary’ or ‘federal’ appear nowhere in the 
Constitution.45  
 
In theory, governments may be classified as either unitary or federal. This general classification 
must give way to the nuances of practice which result in governmental systems which are 
varied and unique in character.46 This has resulted in the categories being further sub-divided 
in an attempt to categorise governments falling into the main categories. The discussion set out 
below provides a broad theoretical structure within which the discussion of the constitutional 
division of powers in subsequent chapters may be located. 
 
There appears to be a fair amount of disagreement among academics as to whether the South 
African Constitution is unitary, federal, or quasi-federal in nature. There is the view that the 
South African Constitution establishes a unitary state with three spheres of government.47 It is 
also argued that the Constitution establishes a unitary system coupled with a fiscally 
decentralised system of intergovernmental fiscal relations.48 Another view holds that the 
Constitution establishes a ‘federal-type dispensation’, while in Malherbe’s opinion, South 
Africa is a composite state with federal features.49 Simeon argues that the Constitution 
establishes an integrated federal dispensation similar to that of the German Lander.50 Devenish 
                                                 
45 Simeon (1998) 13 SA Public Law 42 at 45. 
46 Ibid at 50. 
47 Ibid at 45. 
48 Calitz & Essop (2013) 17(3) South African Business Review 131 at 132. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Simeon (1998) 13 SA Public Law 43. 
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agrees that the system is similar to that of Germany, but argues that the end result is a quasi-
federal system ‘which involves co-operative government.’51 
 
Much of what has been said was written in the period directly following the adoption of the 
Constitution. This means that analysis was limited to the content of the division-of-powers 
provisions in the Constitution itself. Although the constitutional division of powers is the 
primary indicator of whether a system is federal or unitary, it is submitted that the question is 
not resolved on that basis alone. Although it is important to consider the constitutional design, 
the institutional practices which have arisen over time must also be examined.52 This is 
supported by the fact that in established democracies such as Australia, Canada, Germany and 
the United States of America, the original provisions of the Constitution have been 
substantially altered over time by administrative practice and judicial decisions. The result of 
this gradual evolution is that the resulting system often bears little resemblance to that which 
was originally conceived when a particular constitution was drafted.53 
 
2.2.2 Unitary government 
 
A unitary government is one in which legislative authority is vested in the national government 
which is the centre of authority.54 Under this system, Parliament is supreme. Powers and 
responsibilities are devolved to sub-national government via an Act of Parliament. This 
devolution of powers can just as easily be revoked by Parliament. The 1983 Republic of South 
Africa Constitution Act is an example of such an Act.55 The classic example of a unitary state 
is the United Kingdom.56 This form of government is characterised by a high degree of fiscal 
and administrative centralisation.57 Sub-national governments are merely an adjunct or branch 
of central government and implement policy and programmes determined at the centre. 
Legislative authority is concentrated in central government and sub-national governments, 
                                                 
51 Devenish (1993) 4 South African Human Rights Yearbook 42. 
52 Ibid at 46. Simeon refers to Riker who lists party systems and social structures as some of the factors which 
influence the evolution of federal systems.  
53 Ibid at 44. 
54 Devenish (2006) 17 Stell LR 129 at 132. 
55 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 (Tricameral Constitution). 
56 Devenish (2006) 17 Stell LR 132. 
57 Ibid at 140. 
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generally have limited power to legislate, mainly through the adoption of subordinate 
legislation. 58 
 
2.2.3 Federal government 
 
A basic definition of a federal system of government is one in which political authority is split 
between two levels of government – central or national government, and regional (or sub-
national) government. 59 
 
Wheare postulates the following test: 
 
[T]he test I apply for federal government is simply this. Does a system of government embody predominantly a 
division of powers between general and regional authorities each of which with its own sphere, is co-ordinate 
with the others and independent in their respective spheres.60 
 
Wheare qualifies this test by stating that a system which leaves residual powers to central 
government is quasi-federal and not strictly federal in nature.61 An alternative test is advanced 
by Venter who identifies the following characteristics of a federation: 
 
(a)  a permanent federal bond; 
(b)  an inflexible written Constitution, deemed the highest law, which is protected against unilateral 
dissolution; 
(c)  justiciability of the Constitution through a Constitutional Court or Supreme Court; 
(d)  the constituent states have constitutionally-entrenched functional powers and are therefore deemed to be 
autonomous in their relationship with the federal state; 
(e) the boundaries of the constituent states are constitutionally protected and permanent; 
(f)  a two-chamber legislature in which the second chamber is generally dedicated to the constituent states; 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid 133–5. Devenish explains that the terms ‘federation’ was first used by the founding fathers of the United 
States of America in 1787. ‘The definitive aspects of a federation are: 
(a) two orders of government, each acting directly on their citizens, 
(b) a formal distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources between 
the two orders of government, including some areas of autonomy for each order; 
(c) provision for representation of regional views within the federal policy making institution; 
(d) a written supreme Constitution not unilaterally amendable and requiring the consent of all or a majority 
of the constituent units; 
(e) an umpire (courts or referendums) to rule on disputes between governments; andprocesses to facilitate 
inter-governmental relations for those areas where responsibilities are shared or overlap’. 
60 Ibid at 133, para 3.  
61 Ibid. 
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(g) a constitutional and democratic state that was formed through a sacred contract or agreement with the 
people; and 
(h) a constitutional federation is symbolised by the concept of one nation with dual loyalties: loyalty to the 
federation, and loyalty to the constituent states.62 
 
It has been said that there are as many types of federal government as there are federations.63 
This is partly due to design differences in the constitutions of various countries, but also to 
national differences, the evolution of administrative practices, intergovernmental relations, 
judicial decisions, and the like. Two models of federalism are discussed below: the Canadian 
and the German. These two models were selected as the drafters of the South African 
Constitution looked to these two countries for guidance during the drafting process.  
 
2.2.4 The principle of subsidiarity 
 
According to Aristotle, local autonomy is important for human welfare. He believed that the 
smaller communities which make up the polis – such as families, villages, and the like – should 
enjoy the autonomy they require to perform their functions.64 In this way, they would 
participate in governance to the benefit of the community. Some of the benefits of the 
participatory function are that it:  
(a) acts as a check on the central executive; 
(b) results in the harnessing of local knowledge;  
(c) prevents any single group from dominating the community; and 
(d)  ultimately contributes to the efficient delivery of local services.65 
 
The concept of participatory justice has found expression in the Constitution, and in particular 
in the sphere of local government with its emphasis on public participation. The constitutional 
entrenchment of local government is an interesting feature of the model of government in the 
Constitution. This scheme creates three, as opposed to only two levels of government. The 
Constitution establishes national, provincial, and local spheres, and describes these spheres as 
distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated.66 The description of local government as a 
                                                 
62 Venter (2005) 40 Journal of Public Administration 484 at 485. 
63 Simeon (1998) 13 SA Public Law 50. 
64 Budhu & Wiechers (2003) 18(2) SA Public Law 468. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Constitution: s 40. 
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‘sphere’ as opposed to a ‘tier’ signals a move away from an hierarchical towards a cooperative 
arrangement based on equality. The inclusion of local government as an independent sphere of 
government is a unique development in Devenish’s view. He proposes that the Constitution 
effects a form of government which is not merely ‘double government’ but ‘triple 
government’.67 This creates a system in which the three spheres can act independently of one 
another in certain areas.68 
 
In post-modern discourse, a view similar to that espoused by Aristotle has found expression in 
the ‘principle of subsidiarity’. The subsidiarity principle provides that governance should take 
place as close as possible to the citizens.69 It requires that functions and responsibilities should 
be located at lower levels of government whenever possible. It further aims to protect lower 
levels of government against undue influence by higher levels.70 
 
The Constitution does not explicitly refer to the principle of subsidiarity but it has clearly been 
influenced by this principle in that it provides for the protection of the status of local 
government.71 In addition, a number of provisions are aimed at preventing undue influence on 
local government by higher levels of government.72 Not least of these are the provisions 
relating to the assignment of powers and the conditions attached to these in the Constitution 
and the Municipal Systems Act.73 
 
Section 156(4) of the Constitution provides that:74 
 
The national and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by agreement and subject to any 
conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily 
relates to local government, if – 
(a) that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and 
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer it.  
 
                                                 
67 Devenish (2006) 17 Stell LR 129. 
68 Budhu & Wiechers (2003) 18(2) SA Public Law 468. 
69 De Visser (2008) 10(1) Local Government Bulletin 16. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
74 Constitution. 
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De Visser argues that this provision is not an express manifestation of the principle of 
subsidiarity, akin to that found in the European Union (EU) Charter.75 The standard subsidiarity 
principle provides that powers must go to local government unless the higher level can better 
perform the function. The section 156(4) formulation provides that additional powers can be 
added to local government if appropriate.76 He agrees, however, with the view that the scheme 
of the Constitution, particularly in relation to local government, gives expression to the 
principle of subsidiarity.77 
 
According to De Visser, the principle of subsidiarity applies in intergovernmental relations, the 
protection of competencies, and the allocation of competencies. He distinguishes between: 
(a)  protective subsidiarity, which holds that central government should not interfere unduly 
in the affairs of sub-national government; 
(b) participatory subsidiarity, which provides a rationale for participation by sub-national 
government in central government’s decision-making (echoing Aristotle’s view); and 
(c) allocative subsidiarity, which creates a bias towards sub-national government in the 
allocation of powers and functions.78 
 
Subsidiarity may play a role in the interpretation of the Constitution or in its amendment in that 
it demands preference for the decentralisation of powers and functions. It may also play a role 
in any discussions around the transfer of functions from central government to sub-national 
levels of government.79 
 
2.2.5  History of the Federal versus Unitary Debate in South Africa 
 
The talks at Codesa, the multi-party negotiations held at Kempton Park between 1991 and 
1992, were not the first time the federal/unitary debate had arisen in South African history. In 
the wake of the Anglo-Boer War, the National Convention of 1908/1909 was convened in order 
to settle matters of governance. The role of federalism in a unified South Africa was discussed 
in detail at the Convention.80 It is interesting to note that the debates on federalism at the 
                                                 
75 De Visser (2008) 10(1) Local Government Bulletin 16. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 De Visser (2010) 1 Stell LR 90 at 93. 
79 Ibid at 93–4. 
80 De Villiers (1993) 8 SA Public Law 87. 
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National Convention closely mirrored the discussions at Codesa. For example, arguments on 
national unity and the need to foster patriotism were raised by those favouring a unitary state 
on both occassions. The need to balance the distribution of resources between prosperous and 
poorly-resourced regions featured prominently at both the said National Convention and at 
Codesa.81 Similarly, it was argued at both Conventions that the shortage of skilled 
administrators to manage sub-national government militated against the devolution of powers 
to this sphere. At the National Convention, delegates expressed the fear that unelected judges 
would have excessive power if they were given the authority to assess the laws of the regions 
and national government for compliance with a constitutional division of powers.82 
 
Ultimately, the delegates at the National Convention decided to adopt a unitary form of 
government founded on the principle of a sovereign Parliament.83 In 1910, the South Africa 
Act was passed to give effect to the decisions of the Convention.84 It is important to note that 
because Parliament was sovereign, the Act and the system it established could be amended or 
revoked by Parliament at any time. It is widely accepted that the Union of South Africa founded 
in 1910 was essentially a unitary state. However, the apartheid government used what it argued 
was a ‘confederal design’ to establish its policy of separate development which created the 
Bantustans as ‘self-governing states’.85  
 
The foundation for apartheid was laid in 1913 with the adoption of the Native Land Act which 
identified separate geographical areas for occupation by black people only.86 This was followed 
by the Black Administration Act in 1927 in terms of which Parliament ceded control over the 
lives of black South Africans to the Governor General (State President), who assumed the title 
of ‘supreme chief’ of black people.87 When the National Party came to power in 1948, it set 
out to implement the policy of apartheid. The idea of granting ‘self-government’ to black 
                                                 
81 Ibid at 88. 
82 Ibid at 87; Simeon (1998) 13 SA Public Law 45. Simeon points out that: ‘The general historical position of the 
African National Congress has been to argue for a unitary state largely on the grounds that only it could secure 
majority rule, that only it could ensure the concentration of resources necessary to undertake the massive tasks of 
providing schools, housing, hospitals, and eroding economic disparities, and that only it could contain the 
potentially centrifugal tendencies of race and tribe.’ 
83 De Villiers (1993) 8 SA Public Law 88. 
84 South Africa Act 9 Edw VII c 9. 
85 The separate-development policy established the Bantustan states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and 
Ciskei. These ‘states’ were independent in theory. However, this independence was nominal as in practice they 
were largely controlled by the South African state on whom they relied for financial support. 
86 Native Land Act 27 of 1913. 
87 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
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people was given effect by the enactment of the Black Authorities Act and the Promotion of 
Black Self-Government Act which created the separate ‘homelands’ covering thirteen per cent 
of the country’s land mass.88 
 
The homelands were rejected by black South Africans. Located principally in rural areas, they 
had limited infrastructure and few economic resources.89 As a result, the homelands depended 
largely on South Africa for financial resources and were by-and-large under the control of the 
South African state.  
 
In an attempt to resolve the problem of black political rights, the National Party adopted a 
policy which required all ‘homelands’ to become independent states. In furtherance of this 
objective, Parliament adopted the National States Citizenship Act which provided that every 
black person would henceforth be a citizen of one of the homelands.90 The unfortunate history 
of the establishment of the independent homelands as ‘federal’ states by grand apartheid 
weighed heavily against the adoption of federalism as a model of government for a democratic 
South Africa.91 In reality, the system was not strictly speaking federal in character due to the 
fact that the homelands had limited independence and amounted to nothing more than vassal 
states of South Africa. At Codesa, fears of ethnic factionalism, together with the need to 
centralise resources in order to deal with the structural inequalities created by apartheid, were 
raised by the African National Congress (ANC) which initially strongly favoured a unitary 
state.92 
 
Due to the racially divisive and emotive history of federalism in South Africa, debate around 
the issue is often clouded by political considerations and approaching the issue dispassionately 
is problematic. As has been mentioned above, the ANC was opposed to the adoption of a 
federal system whereas the smaller parties favoured it.93 Indeed, the National Party’s sudden 
and new-found affection for true federalism was viewed with deep suspicion by the ANC. 94  
                                                 
88 Black Authorities Act 68 of 1959 and the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act 48 of 1959. 
89 De Villiers (1993) 8 SA Public Law 90. 
90 National States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970. 
91 Simeon (1998) 13 SA Public Law 45. 
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During Codesa, however, the unitary/federal discussions gradually began to move towards a 
more nuanced position. There were a number of reasons why political parties began to change 
their initial positions on this question. The nature of politics is such that some of these reasons 
related to voter support. So, for instance, the ANC may have altered its approach in light of the 
strong grassroots support for independent local government and the existence of a negotiating 
forum devoted exclusively to local government issues.95 The need to incorporate tribal 
structures and to gain the support of traditional leaders may also have been factors.96 
 
According to Devenish, who was part of the technical drafting team for the interim 
Constitution, a change in the ANC’s approach to regional government occurred after an ANC 
constitutional delegation embarked on a study tour to examine the German federal system. This 
was confirmed by news reports following the study tour in which Dr Zola Skweyiya, chair of 
the ANC constitutional committee, was quoted as saying that federalism ‘is not practised as we 
thought it was’.97 According to Devenish, Dr Joe Slovo, Secretary General of the South African 
Communist Party, proposed that the question whether to adopt a federal or a unitary system of 
government should be disregarded; instead he proposed the incorporation of ‘decentralised 
local government’ as a pillar of the new constitutional order. Dr Skweyiya emphasised the 
democratic advantage of ‘being closer to the people’ inherent in federalism when he stated that 
the ANC sought a unitary government with some federal characteristics.98 This paved the way 
for agreement between the main political parties on the principle of some form of regional 
government and formed the basis for the inclusion of the division-of-powers provisions in the 
Constitution.99 
 
2.3 History of Local Government in South Africa 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the South African government was highly centralised. 
The provinces acted as provincial branches of national government departments with no real 
authority. The Bantustans were the ‘home’ of black South Africans whose movements were 
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controlled by influx control laws.100 From 1910, provincial governments controlled local 
authorities. There was no consistent system of local government in place; local authorities 
varied according to location and the race group they served. The apartheid government 
reinforced the policy of apartheid through spatial separation.101  
 
The apartheid government attempted to establish parallel local government structures through 
a policy of ‘own management for own areas’ in an attempt to bolster its policy of racial 
exclusion and separate development.102 These ‘own management structures’ consisted of the 
following forms of local government:103 
(a)  In Bantustans traditional leaders were given authority over land allocation and 
development. Some rural areas, called R293 towns, were given their own 
administrations.104 
(b) ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ management committees were set up as advisory bodies to 
white municipalities.105 
(c) The Bantu Affairs Administration Act established Administration Boards, which 
removed responsibility for townships from white communities. 
(d) In 1977 Community Councils were introduced. 
(e) In 1982 Black Local Authorities replaced Community Councils. As with the 
Community Councils, the Black Local Authorities had no exclusive sources of revenue. 
They were rejected as illegitimate by popular uprisings in the mid-1980s.106 
 
Local government structures in white areas were able to draw on the property rates and service 
charges of the wealthier white communities. As a result they were better resourced than the 
structures in black areas. The lack of resources in black areas was compounded by the legal 
                                                 
100 Ibid at 90. The presence of black people in urban areas was strictly controlled by influx control laws. These 
laws aimed to prohibit the presence of black people in urban areas save for limited categories of people. The 
exceptions related in the main to persons whose presence in the cities was desirable for economic reasons.  
101 DPSA ‘White Paper on Local Government’ (1997) Section A. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 However, in reality the R293-towns lacked any real powers.  
105 These bodies had few decision-making powers. For instance, they were excluded from decisions on the 
allocation of revenue. In reality, the provincial and central government administrators controlled most 
responsibilities through the Regional Services Councils which were set up at the same time as the Management 
Committees. Most coloured and Indian people rejected these structures and refused to register as voters. See  
www.thejournalist.org.za/thecraft/the-historical-factors-that-shaped-local-governance accessed on 17 July 2019.  
106 DPSA ‘White Paper on Local Government’ (1997) Section A. 
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prohibition of retail and industrial developments in these areas.107 Dissatisfaction with this state 
of affairs led to popular resistance to the system which culminated in a coordinated consumer 
boycott of rents and service charges led by the United Democratic Front.108 The boycotts 
precipitated the collapse of the apartheid local government system and crisis talks were initiated 
between white municipalities (experiencing the impact of the organised consumer boycotts) 
and township representatives. These talks were the precursor to local negotiations which paved 
the way for the establishment of a national Local Government Negotiating Forum.109 The 1997 
White Paper on Local Government credits the crisis in local government as a major driving 
force behind the national reform process which began in 1990.110 
 
Codesa laid the basis for the future of government in South Africa. Parallel to the discussions 
of national reform, the Local Government Negotiating Forum met to develop a roadmap for 
the transformation of local government.111 The Forum worked out a framework for the 
transition process which was encapsulated in the Local Government Transition Act and the 
interim Constitution.112 The agreement included the principle that arrears owed by black local 
authorities would be written off.113 The participation of local government in the process of 
reform may be one of the reasons why strong local government emerged as an important feature 
of the Constitution.  
 
The interim Constitution was silent on the detail of how the transformation of the local 
government system was to be achieved; it merely provided that local government would be 
restructured in accordance with the Local Government Transition Act (the LGTA).114 The 
LGTA set out three distinct stages for the restructuring and transformation process. The pre-
interim phase began with the commencement of the LGTA and ended with the first democratic 
local government elections.115 In the pre-interim stage, negotiating forums set up by the Act 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
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109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
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112 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (interim Constitution); Local Government 
Transition Act 209 of 1993; DPSA ‘White Paper on Local Government’ (1997) Section A. 
113 White Paper ibid. 
114 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council & others 
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were mandated to establish temporary councils to fulfil local government responsibilities. After 
the elections, the ‘interim phase’ began. During this phase, a number of transitional local 
structures were established by provincial proclamation. These structures were given powers to 
administer specific functional areas set out in the Premier’s proclamation for each respective 
province.116 
 
The third phase in the transformation of local government required the enactment of legislation 
to give effect to the constitutional vision of developmental local government.117 To do so, the 
Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development began an extensive process of 
consultation and research which culminated in the White Paper on Local Government. The 
White Paper sets out the framework for the current local government system.118 
 
A plethora of new legislation has been enacted in order to give effect to the White Paper’s 
policy proposals – beginning with the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act.119 This 
legislation regulates all aspects of the functioning of local government. It covers institutional 
aspects such as the categories of municipality, governance matters, political oversight, and 
financial and administrative systems. The adoption of this legislation marked the end of the 
transition process and the beginning of a new chapter for democratic local governance. Certain 
aspects related to the content, scope, and impact of this legislation on local government are 
revisited in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.4 Local Government Powers and Functions in Comparative Context 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
In the discussion above, the impact of the study tour which the ANC constitutional drafting 
group undertook to Germany during Codesa was discussed.120 It is important to consider the 
German Constitution in this light as the drafters drew on aspects of German constitutional and 
administrative practice as the South African constitutional and administrative order, 
                                                 
116 Premiers Proclamation 24 of 1994 enacted under s 10 of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1994. 
117 Ibid para 4. 
118 DPSA ‘White Paper on Local Government’ (1997) Foreword by Valli Moosa, Minister of Provincial Affairs 
and Constitutional Development. 
119 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.  
120 Section 2.3 above. 
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established under the interim Constitution began to take shape. In addition, but perhaps to a 
slightly lesser degree, the Canadian Constitution and practice were used as a model in the 
drafting of the South African Constitution. This section considers the division-of-powers 
provisions in other constitutions, most notably those of Germany and Canada.  
 
Most early federal constitutions do not include local government as a sphere of government; 
local government is simply controlled by the regional or central government. This was the case 
in the United States of America (1787); Switzerland (1848); Canada (1867); and Australia 
(1901).121 During the last fifty years, however, local government has been increasingly 
recognised, and has emerged as a fully-fledged and constitutionally recognised form of 
government in countries with federal features.122 
 
Local government was recognised in the constitutions of Germany (1949); Spain (1978); Brazil 
(1988); India (1992 constitutional amendments); and Nigeria and Switzerland (1999).123 In 
these countries, the constitutional allocation of powers to local government takes various 
forms. The 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Indian Constitution provide long lists of functions 
and powers. The states may decide which of these powers and functions to devolve to local 
government.124 Similarly, the Nigerian Constitution assigns powers to local government in 
terms of two lists. The first details broad areas in which local government must participate in 
state activities. Steyler refers to this form of concurrency as participatory common 
competencies. The second list contains more specific local government functions.125  
 
A contrasting approach to defining local government powers is found in the Constitutions of 
Germany, Brazil, and Spain.126 In terms of this approach local government is guaranteed the 
powers to manage its own affairs but the precise ambit of those powers is not spelt out.127 For 
instance, the German Basic Law states: ‘The municipality shall be guaranteed the right to 
manage all the affairs of the local community on their own responsibility.’128 In all of the 
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examples discussed, how local government powers are allocated results in differing degrees of 
overlap and concurrency.129 
 
2.4.2 Canadian Federalism 
 
The Canadian Constitution of 1867 established Canada as one of the oldest federal 
governments. Wheare describes the Canadian model as quasi-federal.130 However, it has 
evolved over time and certain commentators opine that it now reflects the divided model of 
federalism.131 In the divided model, two or more separate entities or states interact with each 
other in a manner which resembles two virtually independent countries. This form of 
federalism is often referred to as ‘competitive executive federalism’ or ‘federal-provincial 
diplomacy’. 132 
 
In this model, there is a clear division of responsibilities with minimum overlap or concurrency. 
As regards the division of powers, the Canadian model resembles the classical federal division 
of powers – with each level of government having defined and distinct areas of responsibility. 
Only two areas of concurrent power were contained in Canada’s original Constitution – 
agriculture and immigration.133 Although the design is one of distinct areas of responsibility, 
areas of concurrency have evolved in practice.134 
 
In the divided model, the sub-national units have considerable fiscal autonomy with each level 
of government having independent taxing powers.135 Intergovernmental transfers – termed 
equalisation payments – respect provincial autonomy and are subject to few conditions. As a 
result, the provinces are able to determine policy with minimal intervention by the central 
government. To a great extent, the provinces have relatively independent revenue systems.136 
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Intergovernmental relations in Canada have evolved through practice; they are not set out in 
any legislation but are conducted between high-level Ministers and officials.137 There is no 
formal mechanism for the interests of the sub-national units or provinces to be presented at 
national or central government level. In addition, there is separation between national and 
provincial politics. 138 
 
The courts in Canada have played a significant role in transforming the Canadian system 
initially envisioned in the 1867 Constitution into a classic federal system by limiting federal 
powers and asserting provincial authority in provincial areas of competence. Judicial decisions 
have consequently assisted in the creation of a divided federal state in Canada.139 
 
2.4.3 German Federalism 
 
In marked contrast to the divided model, the integrated model is, as the name suggests, 
designed to integrate or draw together the central and sub-national parts of government at all 
levels.140 With respect to the division of powers, the integrated model makes use of wide areas 
of concurrency or shared responsibilities.141 In Germany, a limited number of powers are 
allocated to the central government; the remaining powers are devolved to the Lander. In cases 
of conflict, federal law prevails.142 In terms of article 72, the federation may legislate in cases 
where regulation might prejudice the interests of individual Lander or the country as a whole, 
in matters that cannot be effectively regulated by individual Lander, or where legislation is 
necessary for the maintenance of economic unity.143 
 
The model is primarily one of shared powers with the Constitution setting out a number of 
areas of joint responsibility.144 There are few exclusive powers. Matters such as higher 
education, regional economic structures, and agriculture are joint tasks where the federal 
government may participate in Land tasks which are relevant to the country as a whole.145 The 
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central government has broad powers to act to shape Land legislative and administrative 
discretion. In practice, the extensive powers of the central government in legislative matters 
are balanced by the control which the Lander enjoy in the administrative sphere.146 
 
The fiscal model centres around shared revenues and taxing powers based on negotiated 
formulae.147 Taxes accrue jointly to the Lander which have an equal claim on revenue to meet 
their expenditure.148 Planning and budgeting follow a multi-year format and only a limited 
number of revenue sources are allocated exclusively to either sphere.149 In the area of 
intergovernmental relations, Germany has a formalised and institutionalised set of 
intergovernmental institutions.150 
 
In marked contrast to the Canadian system, the Lander participate directly in the decision- 
making processes of the federal government.151 The second house of Parliament, the Bundesrat, 
consists of Land Ministers who represent the interests of the Lander in federal matters.152 In 
many areas central powers are limited by the need to obtain Land approval on matters. The 
German Constitutional Court has full power to interpret the law.153 Finally, Germany has an 
integrated public service which is unified across state and federal lines.154 
 
2.4.4 Unitary versus Federal Systems 
 
What, then, are the advantages and disadvantages of choosing either a unitary or a federal 
system of government? In the discussion of unitary government, some of the arguments 
advanced in favour of unitary government during the drafting of the South African Constitution 
were discussed. These factors include the limitation of ethnic factionalism; an emphasis on 
democratic and negotiated outcomes; consensus policy-making; and the benefits of a 
centralised revenue and fiscal management system in order to finance government programmes 
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and equalise service delivery across the geographic territory of a country.155 Many of these 
considerations apply equally to integrated federal systems.  
 
Divided federalism, on the other hand, is associated with democratic respect for the rights and 
autonomy of sub-national governments.156 Perhaps the greatest advantage associated with 
divided federalism is that it promotes accountability and transparency in that it clearly 
demarcates functions. This means that citizens are able to hold governments directly to 
account.157 
 
As regards policy-making, the advantage of integrated federalism is its emphasis on consensus 
between the spheres which minimises the possibility of conflicting legislation and policy.158 
The downside is that it increases the possibility of compromise and the adoption of lowest-
common-denominator solutions to policy formulation. Competitive or divided federalism, 
however, is positively associated with innovation and a multiplicity of policy outcomes.159  
 
From the discussion above, it is important to note that the determination of whether or not a 
constitution establishes a federal system cannot be decided solely by reference to the provisions 
of the constitution. Factors surrounding the constitution’s implementation may have the result 
that a constitution intended at the time of drafting to introduce a particular model, once 
implemented develops into a totally different model through practice.160 An example is Canada 
which is one of the world’s oldest federal states. The original 1867 design of the Canadian 
Constitution has changed considerably over time through societal political changes, changes in 
the size and role of government, and judicial decisions.161 A thorough examination of the nature 
of South African government requires an analysis of factors exterior to the text of the 
Constitution. Factors such as evolving administrative, fiscal, and political practice of 
government, as well as emerging jurisprudence must be weighed. 
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2.5 Introduction to the Division-of-Powers provisions in the South African 
 Constitution 
 
The constitutional scheme for the allocation of powers is examined here. This discussion is 
introductory and serves to provide a framework for the legislative scheme adopted in the 
Constitution. In subsequent sections the administrative practice of government and judicial 
interpretation of the division-of-powers provisions are addressed in greater detail.162  
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter, the Constitution establishes three spheres of 
government – national, provincial, and local – and describes these spheres as ‘distinctive, 
interdependent, and interrelated’.163 Legislative authority is divided between these three 
spheres of government.164 The National Assembly (NA) may pass legislation amending section 
1 of the Constitution with a 75 per cent majority and a supporting vote of at least six of the nine 
provinces. The other sections may be amended by two thirds majority, with a supporting vote 
of six provinces.165 It may also adopt legislation on any matter listed in or inextricably 
connected to Schedule 4 to the Constitution.166. National government may not legislate on 
Schedule 5 matters unless one of the conditions set out in section 44(2) of the Constitution is 
met. 167 
 
The legislative authority of provincial government includes the power to enact a provincial 
constitution and to legislate with regard to any functional area listed in Schedules 4 or 5 to the 
Constitution. It may also legislate on those matters that have been expressly assigned to the 
provinces either by the Constitution or national legislation as well as those matters that are 
reasonably necessary for or incidental to the Schedule 4 and 5 matters.168 The legislative 
                                                 
162 See Chaps 4 and 5. 
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authority of provinces must be read subject to the power of the local sphere to legislate on 
Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B matters. 
 
Local governments’ powers are set out in section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution which confers 
legislative and executive authority over the local government matters listed in Part B of 
Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5. The right of a municipality to administer the matters 
assigned to it is subject to the power of provincial and national government to monitor and 
support local government and, by regulating the municipalities’ exercise of their executive 
authority, to ensure that municipalities perform their functions effectively.169 However, 
national and provincial governments may not compromise or hinder a municipality’s ability or 
right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.170 In addition to the functions allocated to 
local government by Schedules 4 Part B and 5 Part B of the Constitution, the national and 
provincial spheres have the authority to assign powers and functions to local government. In 
this regard both national and provincial governments may assign the power to legislate over a 
matter to the local sphere.171 
 
The drastic changes broadly outlined above have resulted in a number of challenges at the level 
of implementation.172 At times, the provinces have battled to understand the relative autonomy 
of local government bodies under the new system as opposed to the old. The role of the 
provinces and municipalities in respect of the administration of specific functional areas has 
also created practical difficulties and, unfortunately, where this has happened service delivery 
has often been negatively impacted.173 To some extent, a number of these difficulties were 
anticipated. Accordingly, a complex regulatory system embodying principles of cooperative 
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challenges may be compounded by the incomplete transition from one from constitutional system to another. In 
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governance was enacted to manage the interfaces between the spheres of governance. This 
system is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
2.6 The Drafting and Certification of the South African Constitution 
 
2.6.1 Introduction 
 
The history of the drafting of the South African Constitution and the process followed in 
arriving at the final text has provided fertile material for constitutional scholars. The drafters 
of the Constitution faced an unprecedented task. Not only had they to craft the covenant which 
would form the basis for the newly democratic state, but also to simultaneously create 
legitimacy for the constitutional project. To this end the process of drafting the social compact 
embodied in the Constitution gained in significance. Both in the process of drafting the 
Constitution, and in the content of its final provisions, the need for constant engagement and 
dialogue with communities was accorded pre-eminence. In this the drafters largely succeeded 
and in the process created a Constitution accepted by the people of South Africa as legitimate 
and lauded throughout the world. 
 
This Constitution was required to embody a break with the past and, in particular, the system 
of parliamentary sovereignty which had supported the apartheid state. In the area of local 
government, the apartheid ideology informed a racially-based system which allocated 
resources based on racial classification.174 The White Paper’s vision for local government in 
the Constitution was in part a response to and a desire to address this inequality. This vision 
aimed to strengthen local government and address the disparities between well-resourced white 
local authorities and the impoverished black townships and informal settlements.175  
 
The adoption of the 1996 Constitution was the final step in a long process which began with 
the negotiation of the interim Constitution via a multi-party negotiating process. The interim 
                                                 
174 Kriegler J in Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
& others1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) described the situation as follows: 
[T]he results are tragic and absurd: sprawling black townships with hardly a tree in sight, flanked by 
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and streetlit suburbs and parks, and running water, and convenient electrical amenities....we find white 
suburbs… . 
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Constitution provided a framework for the first democratic election in South Africa. It also set 
out the constitutional principles which were to form the basis for the drafting of the provisions 
of the Constitution, and against which the Constitutional Court would test the content of the 
final draft. Some of the difficulties inherent in reaching consensus between the political parties 
on the question of the model of government to be adopted in the Constitution were traversed 
above. The process of negotiation leading up to the adoption of the Constitution was fraught 
with difficulties. Two issues caused deadlock – one was the status of the negotiating parties 
who had not been elected to their positions through free and fair elections; the other related to 
the fear that any constitution adopted by the existing regime might not adequately address the 
interests of all South Africans. A balance had to be struck which would allow both sides to 
satisfy their constituencies.176 
 
It was decided that instead of an outright transfer of power from old to new, there would be a 
two-phase transition. A coalition government in the form of a Government of National Unity 
(GNU), elected in terms of an interim Constitution, would govern the country (for a maximum 
of five years) until a final Constitution could be drafted and adopted. Key to this agreement 
was provision for a set of constitutional principles (CPs) – a set of guidelines agreed to in 
advance by the negotiating parties which would inform the final text. In December 1993, the 
negotiating parties reached a political settlement and shortly after that, Parliament adopted the 
interim Constitution.177 
 
The agreement set out in the interim Constitution provided for 34 CPs against which the final 
text of the Constitution would be tested for compliance by an independent arbiter (the 
Constitutional Court). The drafting of the final Constitution was to be undertaken by the 
Constitutional Assembly (CA) made up of the NA and the Senate sitting jointly as a ‘drafting 
chamber’. After the elections, the CA was given two years in which to draft the final 
Constitution. A constitutional committee consisting of 46 members appointed on the basis of 
proportional representation was established to assist with the drafting.178 
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The committee was mandated to draft a constitution based, inter alia, on democracy, the rule 
of law, and a Bill of Rights. It was tasked by the then Deputy-President to establish ‘a balanced 
horizontal and vertical division and devolution of powers and functions’.179 Despite the 
division of powers receiving considerable and close attention – but not surprisingly given the 
differing views of the majority and smaller parties on this matter – the clauses in the draft 
Constitution dealing with the powers of the provinces presented to the Constitutional Court for 
certification during the first certification process, were found not to comply with the CPs.180 
The grounds on which the Constitutional Court arrived at this decision are discussed below. 
 
2.6.2 First Certification Judgment 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
The Certification Judgment is discussed in some detail.181 It is important to note that under the 
doctrine of precedent, the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution by the 
Constitutional Court binds all future Courts. The Constitutional Court explained that ‘a future 
Court should approach the meaning of the relevant provision of the New Text (NT) on the basis 
that the meaning assigned to it by the Constitutional Court in the certification process is its 
correct interpretation and should not be departed from save in the most compelling 
circumstances’.182 For this reason it is necessary to revisit sections of the judgment as the 
analysis proceeds in subsequent chapters.  
 
The vast majority of the CPs deal with or are related to the division of powers. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that much of the argument presented during the nine days over which the 
certification of the final text of the Constitution was heard before the Constitutional Court dealt 
with this issue. For ease of reference the CPs are set out fully in table form below.  
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181 The Constitutional Court used the acronym NT to refer to the new text (the Constitution) and the acronym IC 
to refer to the interim Constitution.      
182 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 43. 
  
38 
 
Number Constitutional Principle 
CP I The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishment of one 
sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system 
of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and 
people of all races. 
 
CP II Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and 
civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and 
justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having 
given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 
3 of this Constitution. 
 
CP III The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all other forms of 
discrimination and shall promote racial and gender equality and national unity. 
 
CP IV The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. It shall be binding on all 
organs of state at all levels of government. 
 
CP V The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable 
legal process. Equality before the law includes laws, programmes or activities 
that have as their object the amelioration of the conditions of the disadvantaged, 
including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race, colour or gender. 
 
CP VI There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
 
CP VII The judiciary shall be appropriately qualified, independent and impartial and 
shall have the power and jurisdiction to safeguard and enforce the Constitution 
and all fundamental rights. 
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Number Constitutional Principle 
CP VIII There shall be representative government embracing multi-party democracy, 
regular elections, universal adult suffrage, a common voters' roll, and, in 
general, proportional representation. 
 
CP IX Provision shall be made for freedom of information so that there can be open 
and accountable administration at all levels of government. 
 
CP X Formal legislative procedures shall be adhered to by legislative organs at all 
levels of government. 
 
CP XI The diversity of language and culture shall be acknowledged and protected, and 
conditions for their promotion shall be encouraged. 
 
CP XII Collective rights of self-determination in forming, joining and maintaining 
organs of civil society, including linguistic, cultural and religious associations, 
shall, on the basis of non-discrimination and free association, be recognised and 
protected. 
 
CP XIII 1. The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
indigenous law, shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution. 
Indigenous law, like common law, shall be recognised and applied by the 
Courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution and to 
legislation dealing specifically therewith. 
2. Provisions in a provincial constitution relating to the institution, role, 
authority and status of a traditional monarch shall be recognised and protected 
in the Constitution. 
 
CP XIV 
 
Provision shall be made for participation of minority political parties in 
legislative process in a manner consistent with democracy. 
 
CP XV Amendments to the Constitution shall require special procedures lying special 
majorities. 
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CP XVI Government shall be structured at national, provincial and local levels. 
 
CP XVII At each level of government there shall be democratic representation. This 
principle shall not derogate from the provisions of Principle XIII. 
 
CP XVIII 
 
1. The powers and functions of the national government and provincial 
governments and the boundaries of the provinces shall be defined in the 
Constitution. 
2. The powers and functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution, 
including the competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a Constitution for 
its province, shall not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those 
provided for in this Constitution. 
3. The boundaries of the provinces shall be the same as those established in 
terms of this Constitution. 
4. Amendments to the Constitution which alter the powers, boundaries, 
functions or institutions of provinces shall in addition to any other procedures 
specified in the Constitution for constitutional amendments, require the 
approval of a special majority of the legislatures of the provinces, alternatively, 
if there is such a chamber, a two-thirds majority of a chamber of Parliament 
composed of provincial representatives, and if the amendment concerns specific 
provinces only, the approval of the legislatures of such provinces will also be 
needed. 
5. Provision shall be made for obtaining the views of a provincial legislature 
concerning all constitutional amendments regarding its powers, boundaries and 
functions. 
 
CP XIX 
 
The powers and functions at the national and provincial levels of government 
shall include exclusive and concurrent powers as well as the power to perform 
functions for other levels of government on an agency or delegation basis. 
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CP XX 
 
Each level of government shall have appropriate and adequate legislative and 
executive powers and functions that will enable each level to function 
effectively. The allocation of powers between different levels of government 
shall be made on a basis which is conducive to financial viability at each level 
of government and to effective public administration, and which recognises the 
need for and promotes national unity and legitimate provincial autonomy and 
acknowledges cultural diversity. 
CP XXI  
 
The following criteria shall be applied in the allocation of powers to the national 
government and the provincial governments: 
1. The level at which decisions can be taken most effectively in respect of the 
quality and rendering of services, shall be the level responsible and accountable 
for the quality and the rendering of the services, and such level shall accordingly 
be empowered by the Constitution to do so. 
2. Where it is necessary for the maintenance of essential national standards, for 
the establishment of minimum standards required for the rendering of services, 
the maintenance of economic unity, the maintenance of national security or the 
prevention of unreasonable action taken by one province which is prejudicial to 
the interests of another province or the country as a whole, the Constitution 
shall empower the national government to intervene through legislation or such 
other steps as may be deemed in the Constitution. 
3. Where there is necessity for South Africa to speak with one voice, or to act 
as a single entity - in particular in relation to other states powers should be 
allocated to the national government. 
4. Where uniformity across the nation is required for a particular function, the 
legislative power over that function should be allocated predominantly, if not 
wholly, to the national government.  
5. The determination of national economic policies, and the power to promote 
inter-provincial commerce and to protect the common market in respect of the 
mobility of goods, services, capital and labour, should be allocated to the 
national government. 
6. Provincial governments shall have powers, either exclusively or concurrently 
with the national government, inter alia – 
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(a) for the purposes of provincial planning and development and the rendering 
of services; and 
(b) in respect of aspects of government dealing with specific socio-economic 
and cultural needs and the general well-being of the inhabitants of the province. 
7. Where mutual co-operation is essential or desirable or where it is required to 
guarantee equality of opportunity or access to a government service, the powers 
should be allocated concurrently to the national government and the provincial 
governments. 
8. The Constitution shall specify how powers which are not specifically 
allocated in the Constitution to the national government or to a provincial 
government, shall be dealt with as necessary ancillary powers pertaining to the 
powers and functions allocated either to the national government or provincial 
governments. 
 
CP XXII 
 
The national government shall not exercise its powers (exclusive or concurrent) 
so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of 
the provinces. 
 
XXIII 
 
In the event of a dispute concerning the legislative powers allocated by the 
Constitution concurrently to the national government and provincial 
governments which cannot be resolved by a Court on a construction of the 
Constitution, precedence shall be given to the legislative powers of the national 
government. 
 
XXIV 
 
A framework for local government powers, functions and structures shall be set 
out in the Constitution. The comprehensive powers, functions and other features 
of local government shall be set out in parliamentary statutes or in provincial 
legislation or in both. 
 
XXV 
 
The national government and provincial governments shall have fiscal powers 
and functions which will be defined in the Constitution. The framework for 
local government referred to in Principle XXIV shall make provision for 
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appropriate fiscal powers and functions for different categories of local 
government. 
 
XXVI 
 
Each level of government shall have a constitutional right to an equitable share 
of revenue collected nationally so as to ensure that provinces and local 
governments are able to provide basic services and execute the functions 
allocated to them. 
 
XXVII 
 
A Financial and Fiscal Commission, in which each province shall be 
represented, shall recommend equitable fiscal and financial allocations to the 
provincial and local governments from revenue collected nationally, after 
taking into account the national interest, economic disparities between the 
provinces as well as the population and developmental needs, administrative 
responsibilities and other legitimate interests of each of the provinces. 
 
XXVIII Notwithstanding the provisions of Principle XII, the right of employers and 
employees to join and form employer organisations and trade unions and to 
engage in collective bargaining shall be recognised and protected. Provision 
shall be made that every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. 
 
XXIX The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve 
Bank, an Auditor-General and a Public Protector shall be provided for and 
safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of effective 
public finance and administration and a high standard of professional ethics in 
the public service. 
 
CP XXX  
 
1. There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-orientated public service 
broadly representative of the South African community, functioning on a basis 
of fairness and which shall serve all members of the public in an unbiased and 
impartial manner, and shall, in the exercise of its powers and in compliance 
with its duties, loyally execute the lawful policies of the government of the day 
in the performance of its administrative functions. The structures and 
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functioning of the public service, as well as the terms and conditions of service 
of its members, shall be regulated by law. 
2. Every member of the public service shall be entitled to a fair pension. 
 
XXXI Every member of the security forces (police, military and intelligence), and the 
security forces as a whole, shall be required to perform their functions and 
exercise their powers in the national interest and shall be prohibited from 
furthering or prejudicing party political interest. 
 
XXXII The Constitution shall provide that until 30 April 1999 the national executive 
shall be composed and shall function substantially in the manner provided for 
in Chapter 6 of his Constitution. 
 
XXXIII The Constitution shall provide that, unless Parliament is dissolved on account 
of its passing a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet, no national election shall 
be held before 30 April 1999. 
 
CP 
XXXIV 
1. This Schedule and the recognition therein of the right of the South 
African people as a whole to self-determination, shall not be construed as 
precluding, within the framework of the said right, constitutional provision for 
a notion of the right to self-determination by any community sharing a common 
cultural and language heritage, whether in a territorial entity within the 
Republic or in any other recognised way. 
2. The Constitution may give expression to any particular form of self-
determination provided there is substantial proven support within the 
community concerned for such a form of self-determination 
3. If a territorial entity referred to in paragraph 1 is established in terms of 
this Constitution before the new constitutional text is adopted, the new 
Constitution shall entrench the continuation of such territorial entity, including 
its structures, powers and functions. 
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(b) Provincial powers 
 
CP XVIII.2 provides that the powers and functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution, 
including the competence of a provincial legislature to adopt a constitution for its province, 
shall not be substantially less than or substantially inferior to those provided for in this 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s approach to the evaluation of provincial powers was 
to analyse the particular provisions in order to determine whether the powers and functions of 
the provinces could be said to be ‘substantially less than or substantially inferior to’ the powers 
and functions of the provinces under the interim Constitution.183 This entailed comparing like 
with like in order to determine whether any changes had resulted in a material extension or 
reduction in powers. If it found that powers had been reduced, the next step would be to 
determine whether the reduction was substantial.184 
 
Using this approach, the list of provincial legislative functions in Schedule 6 to the interim 
Constitution were compared with Schedules 4 and 5 to the NT. In the Constitutional Court’s 
view more powers accrued to provincial governments under the new Constitution in that a new 
category of exclusive powers was included under Schedule 5 as national government was not 
permitted to legislate at all without the conditions set in section 44(2) having been met.185 This 
section allows Parliament to legislate on Schedule 5 matters if this is necessary to maintain 
national security, economic unity, essential national standards, to establish minimum standards 
for the rendering of services, or to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is 
prejudicial to the country as a whole.186  
 
In respect of concurrent powers, the Constitutional Court found that the national government 
had gained an advantage through the inclusion of the presumption of necessity in NT section 
146(4).187 Section 146(3) provided that national legislation would prevail over provincial 
legislation if the national legislation is aimed at preventing any unreasonable action by a 
province that is prejudicial to the economic, health, or security interests of another province or 
                                                 
183 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 316. 
184 Ibid para 317. 
185 Ibid paras 256–7. 
186 Ibid para 257. 
187 Ibid para 336. 
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the country as a whole; or which impedes the implementation of national economic policy. 
Section 146(4) stated that if a dispute regarding the need for national legislation comes before 
a court, the court must have due regard to the approval or rejection of the legislation in the 
National Council of Provinces (NCOP). In terms of the original formulation of section 146(4), 
if the NCOP had approved the legislation, then it was presumed that it was necessary for 
national security and economic unity.  In the view of the Constitutional Court, it would be very 
difficult to rebut this presumption.188 The Court further found that an added advantage accrued 
to national government through the inclusion in the NT of the override in section 146(2)(b) 
which resulted in the extension of the grounds on which provincial legislation could be 
overridden.189  
 
The Constitutional Court’s exercise in directly comparing the powers in Schedule 6 to the 
interim Constitution with those contained in Schedules 4 and 5 to the NT showed that there 
had been a marginal increase in powers. But, after weighing the areas in which this had 
occurred against the areas in which there had been some reduction, it found that the provinces 
had less powers.190 The next leg in the enquiry required the Court to determine whether the 
powers were substantially less. This entailed an examination, inter alia, of the provisions 
dealing with the powers of local government.191 
 
(c) Local government legislative authority 
 
While section 175 of the interim Constitution conferred the legislative authority to establish 
local government and to determine its powers, functions, and structures on both national and 
provincial government, Schedule 6 to the interim Constitution conferred the power to make 
laws for local government on provincial government.192 The interim Constitution also provided 
that local government is autonomous and entitled to regulate its own affairs within the limits 
prescribed by law.193 The Constitutional Court found a completely different set up in section 
155 of the NT (new text), which provided: 
 
 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid para 337. 
190 Ibid para 341. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid para 359. 
193 Ibid. 
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(1)  National legislation must determine – 
(a) the different categories of municipality that may be established; 
(b) appropriate fiscal powers and functions for each category; and 
(c)  procedures and criteria for the demarcation of municipal boundaries by an independent 
authority. 
(2)  Provincial government, by legislative and other measures, must – 
(a)  establish municipalities; 
(b)  provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the province; and 
(c) promote the development of local government capacity to perform its  functions and   its ability 
to manage its own affairs. 
(3)  Subject to the provisions of sections 44, 151 and 154, - 
(a) provincial government has the legislative and executive power to monitor the local government 
matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5; and 
(b)  national and provincial governments have the legislative and executive authority to see to the 
effective performance by municipalities of their functions in respect of those matters, by 
regulating the exercise of municipalities’ executive authority referred to in section 156(1).194 
 
Under the interim Constitution, national and provincial government enjoyed concurrent power 
in respect of local government, with the proviso that this power could not be exercised in a 
manner which compromised the status of local government. In the NT specific lists of local 
government competences were introduced.195 Schedule 4A to the NT set out matters of 
concurrent national and provincial competence, while Schedule 5A listed matters of exclusive 
provincial competence. Part B of both Schedules set out a list of local government areas of 
legislative competence.196 The extent to which national government could legislate on matters 
contained in Schedule 4A has been discussed above. In the Constitutional Court’s view this 
afforded greater autonomy to local government at the expense of provincial and national 
government. However, as the Court pointed out, for the purposes of certification only the 
reduction of provincial power was relevant.197 
 
The Constitutional Court divided its consideration of whether the NT complied with CP 
XVIII.2 into the following areas:198 
• the source and ambit of provincial legislative powers and functions; 
                                                 
194 Ibid para 361. 
195 Ibid para 356.  
196 Ibid para 362. 
197 Ibid para 364. 
198 Ibid para 365. 
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• direct provincial competence in respect of LG matters; 
• the executive powers of the provinces; and 
• exclusive or regulatory powers of the national legislature and executive. 
 
(d) The source and ambit of provincial legislative powers and functions 
 
The power of provincial government to legislate on matters listed in Schedules 4 and 5 is 
circumscribed by section 155(3).199 In the Constitutional Court’s view, the import of these 
sections was that the provinces’ role in respect of local government was limited to the 
supervision, monitoring, and support of municipalities.200 The Court’s interpretation is 
significant and binding, and because it is a seminal issue which arises again in our consideration 
of division of powers in later chapters and case law, the reasoning is examined in some detail. 
 
The Constitutional Court reasoned that the provincial supervisory function is fully captured by 
NT 139. In this context, ‘supervision’ means that provinces must review local government’s 
actions to establish whether they comply with the requirements of the relevant legislation. If a 
province is of the view that local government has not complied with its obligations, the 
province should prescribe corrective measures. This power of supervision may be exercised on 
an on-going basis subject to compliance with specific conditions and procedures set out in the 
law. The power of ‘supervision’ is used alongside the power to ‘intervene’ – i.e., the power of 
one sphere of government to intervene in the domain of another sphere. 201 
 
Considering the content of the provincial duty of ‘support’, the Constitutional Court found that 
the power to support must be interpreted as subject to the duty of provincial government to use 
its legislative and executive authority to promote the development of local government’s 
                                                 
199 Section 155(3) of the Constitution provides that: ‘National legislation must: 
(a) establish the criteria for determining when an area should have a single category A municipality or when 
it should have municipalities of both category B and category C; 
(b) establish criteria and procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries by an independent 
authority; and 
(c) subject to section 229, make provision for an appropriate division of powers and functions between 
municipalities when an area has municipalities of both category B and C. A division of powers and 
functions between a category B municipality and a category C municipality may differ from the division 
of powers and functions between another category B municipality and that category C municipality.  
200 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 367. 
201 Ibid para 370. 
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capacity to perform its functions and manage its affairs.202 The provinces may do this by 
regulating municipal executive authority to ensure the municipalities perform effectively. In 
the Court’s view, these provisions afford provinces a means of controlling how municipalities 
administer their legislative and executive authority regarding Schedule 4B and 5B functions.203 
 
The provincial power to ‘monitor’ LG (local government) was held to be a power underlying 
the obligation to promote, support, and supervise. The Constitutional Court stated: 
 
We do not interpret the monitoring power as bestowing additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on 
the domain of LG, beyond perhaps the power to measure or test at intervals LG compliance with national and 
provincial legislative directives or with the NT itself. What the NT seeks hereby to realise is a structure for LG 
that, on the one hand, reveals a concern for the autonomy and integrity of LG and prescribes a hands-off 
relationship between LG and other levels of government and, on the other, acknowledges the requirement that 
higher levels of government monitor LG functioning and intervene where such functioning is deficient or 
defective in a manner that compromises autonomy. This is the necessary hand-on component of the relationship.204 
 
On the question of whether provincial powers and functions had been reduced as regards local 
government matters, the Constitutional Court concluded that provincial legislative and 
executive power had been reduced in the NT when compared with the IC.205 It then turned to 
the second leg of the enquiry – whether this amounted to a substantial reduction in power.206  
 
In respect of the changes made to the allocation of powers in the Schedules, the Constitutional 
Court found that the provinces enjoyed control over a significant and extensive number of 
functional areas (excluding the local government functional areas in Parts B of Schedules 4 
and 5).207 As regards local government matters excluded by the NT, provinces had the power 
to monitor municipalities. In comparing the functional areas assigned to the provinces in the 
interim and final texts, nothing had been excluded, but the powers in a few areas – including 
police powers, education, local government, traditional leadership, lotteries, sport, and pools – 
had been limited. However, in the total context of the powers conferred on provincial 
                                                 
202 Ibid para 371. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid paras 372–3. 
205 Ibid paras 464, 471. 
206 Ibid para 443. 
207 Ibid para 475. 
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government, these changes were not sufficient for the Court to conclude that provincial powers 
in the IC were substantially less than in the NT.208 
 
However, the changes in respect of concurrent national and provincial powers were substantial. 
The Constitutional Court held that these changes weakened the position of the provinces 
relative to national government in the entire field of concurrent powers.209 Taken together, the 
combined weight of the curtailment of powers and the override-provisions in the context of the 
entire NT, the changes were substantial and the Court found that the NT failed to satisfy CP 
XVIII.2.210 In addition, the Constitutional Court found that the NT failed to comply with a 
number of other CPs and could therefore not be certified.211 
 
2.6.3 Second Certification Judgment 
 
After the Constitutional Court found that the text of the Constitution could not be certified, it 
remitted the text to the CA for amendment. The reconvened CA adopted an amended text (AT) 
which addressed the areas of concern raised by the Constitutional Court in the First 
Certification Judgment.212 The AT was duly transmitted to the Court to examine afresh whether 
it complied with the CPs as required by the interim Constitution.213 
 
In the Second Certification Judgment the scope of the inquiry before the Constitutional Court 
was not limited to a consideration of the areas in which the NT had been found to be deficient. 
Instead, the Court decided to err on the side of caution and to consider new areas raised by 
objecting parties irrespective of whether they had been considered in the first judgment.214 
Accordingly, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal, and eighteen private individuals and interest groups submitted written 
representations.215 These fell under the main categories of: the Bill of Rights; Amendments to 
the Constitution; Local Government; Transitional Provisions; Traditional Monarchs; 
                                                 
208 Ibid para 479. 
209 Ibid para 480. 
210 Ibid para 481. 
211 Ibid paras 482–4. 
212 The amended text was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 11 October 1996. 
213 The Constitutional Court used the acronym LG to refer to local government in its judgment. 
214 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) para 10. 
215 Ibid para 11. 
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Intervention permitted by AT 100; Public Protector; Auditor-General; Public Service 
Commission; and compliance with CP XVIII.2.216 For the purposes of this investigation, the 
discussion is confined to those categories which impact on the division of powers between the 
spheres of government in the Constitution.  
 
The main area of the First Certification Judgment relevant to this investigation concerned 
compliance of the NT with CP XVIII.2. To recapitulate, the CPs required that the powers and 
functions of the provinces defined in the Constitution should not be substantially less than or 
substantially inferior to those provided for in the IC. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning and 
decision are discussed extensively in the consideration of the First Certification Judgment 
above.217 Briefly, in the First Certification Judgment the Court found that the provinces’ 
powers in the NT were substantially less than the corresponding powers of the provinces in the 
IC based on its assessment of the differences between NT 146(4) read with 146(2)(b) and IC 
126(3). The AT made changes to these areas. It was therefore necessary for the Court to analyse 
the changes and to examine their importance. Schedule 6 to the IC set out the areas of 
concurrent national and provincial government legislative competence. If there was a conflict 
between a law passed by national government and a law passed by provincial government, the 
law passed by provincial government would prevail unless the conditions in section 126(3) had 
been met.218 
 
                                                 
216 Ibid para 3. 
217 See section 2.6.1 above.  
218 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) paras 148–150.  Section 126(3)-(5) of the IC provided as follows: 
 (3) A law passed by a provincial legislature in terms of the Constitution shall prevail over an Act of 
 Parliament which deals with a matter referred to in subsection (1) or (2) except in so far as:  
(a) the Act of Parliament deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by provincial legislation; 
(b) the Act of Parliament deals with a matter that, to be performed effectively, requires to be regulated 
or co-ordinated by uniform norms and standards that apply generally throughout the Republic; 
(c) the Act of Parliament is necessary to set minimum standards across the nation for the rendering of 
public services; 
(d) the Act of Parliament is necessary for the maintenance of economic unity, the protection of the 
environment, the promotion of interprovincial commerce, the protection of the common market in respect 
of mobility of goods, services, capital or labour, or the maintenance of national security; or 
(e) the provincial law materially prejudices the economic, health or security interests of another province 
or the country as a whole, or impedes the implementation of national economic policies. 
(4) An Act of Parliament shall prevail over a provincial law, as provided for in subsection (3), only if it 
applies uniformly in all parts of the Republic. 
(5) An Act of Parliament and a provincial law shall be construed as being consistent with each other, 
unless, and only to the extent that, they are, expressly or by necessary implication, inconsistent with each 
other. 
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The NT changed the allocation-of-powers provisions by introducing concurrent national and 
provincial powers in NT Schedule 4. A list of exclusive provincial functional areas was added 
in Schedule 5. Parts B of both Schedules listed areas in which local government was given 
legislative competence. The NT provided that a province could be assigned additional areas of 
legislative competence by an Act of Parliament. The final law-making power given to 
provinces in the NT was the power to adopt a provincial constitution.219 Where a conflict arose 
between an Act of Parliament and a provincial law dealing with a Schedule 5 matter, it fell to 
be resolved in accordance with the provisions of NT 146.220 
 
                                                 
219 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) para 151. 
220 Section 146 of the NT stated: 
(1) This section applies to a conflict between national and provincial legislation falling within a 
functional area listed in Schedule 4. 
(2) National legislation that applies uniformly with regard to the country as a whole prevails over 
provincial legislation if any of the following conditions are met: 
(a) The national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by legislation 
enacted by the respective provinces individually. 
(b) The interests of the country as a whole require that a matter be dealt with uniformly across the 
nation, and the national legislation provides that uniformity by establishing – 
(i) norms and standards; 
(ii) frameworks; or 
(iii) national policies. 
(c) The national legislation is necessary for – 
(i) the maintenance of national security; 
(ii) the maintenance of economic unity; 
(iii) the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital 
and labour; 
(iv) the promotion of economic activities across provincial boundaries; 
(v) the promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government services; or 
(vi) the protection of the environment. 
(3) National legislation prevails over provincial legislation if the national legislation is aimed at 
preventing unreasonable action by a province that – 
(i) is prejudicial to the economic, health or security interest of another province or the country 
as a whole; or 
(ii) impedes the implementation of national economic policy. 
(4) National legislation that deals with any matter referred to in subsection (2) (c) and has been passed 
by the National Council of Provinces, must be presumed to be necessary for the purposes of that 
subsection. 
(5) Provincial legislation prevails over the national legislation if subsection (2) does not apply. 
(6)(a) National and provincial legislation referred to in subsections (1) to (5) includes a law made in 
terms of an Act of Parliament or a provincial law only if that law has been approved by the National 
Council of Provinces. 
 (b) If the Council does not reach a decision within 30 days of its first sitting after the law was referred to 
it, the legislation must be considered for all purposes to have been approved by the Council. 
(7) If the National Council of Provinces does not approve a law referred to in subsection (6)(a), it must, 
within 30 days of its decision, forward reasons for not approving the law to the authority that referred 
the law to it.  
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In the First Certification Judgment the Constitutional Court compared IC 126(3) and NT 146 
and concluded that the grounds upon which national legislation could override provincial 
legislation had been extended in the NT. The advantage accorded national government by the 
presumption in NT 146(4) weighed heavily in the Court’s analysis in the first judgment. In 
terms of the presumption, if a law referred to in NT 146(2)(c) had been passed by the NCOP, 
it was presumed to be necessary in terms of NT 146(2)(c). This presumption tipped the balance 
in the Court’s analysis and led it to find that provincial legislative powers had been substantially 
reduced in the NT. 
 
The CA addressed the matters raised by the Constitutional Court with respect to these sections 
by reformulating the offending provisions. A stricter criterion for national legislation to prevail 
over provincial legislation was introduced by the inclusion of a requirement that the national 
legislation deal with a ‘matter that, to be dealt with effectively requires uniformity across the 
nation’. Most importantly, the CA removed the presumption in favour of national legislation 
in NT 146(4) and replaced it with an obligation framed in the following terms: 
 
When there is a dispute concerning whether national legislation is necessary for a purpose set out in subsection 
(2)(c) and that dispute comes before a Court for resolution, the Court must have regard to the approval or the 
rejection of the legislation by the National Council of Provinces.221 
 
The Constitutional Court found that the removal of the presumption had cured the defect in 
that any conflict was objectively justiciable by a Court tasked with deciding a dispute. It, 
consequently, held that the AT differed materially from the NT in the very areas which had 
influenced the Court’s finding of non-compliance in the First Certification Judgment. This led 
the Court to conclude that the amendments to the NT in AT 146(2) and (4) effectively restored 
the balance referred to in the preceding paragraph.222 
 
Having found that amendments to the AT 146(2) and (4) were significant, the Constitutional 
Court still had to consider the other relevant sections of the AT impacting on provincial powers 
and functions. The CA had made no significant amendments to the four areas of provincial 
powers, tertiary education, local government, and traditional leadership. In the result, the 
                                                 
221 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) para 154. 
222 Ibid para 157. 
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decision in the First Certification Judgment that there had been a reduction in provincial 
powers and functions in these areas which was not significant, stood.223 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The constitutional design for the allocation of powers between provincial and national 
governments had to be implemented in the context of a state experiencing a paradigmatic shift 
from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional democracy. In addition, the previous 
administration was unitary in nature, with a strong central government and four provinces 
which were merely administrative outposts of the centre. Against this background, the 
realisation of the constitutional vision required a dedicated effort to transfer powers and 
functions, assign national legislation on provincial functional mandates to provincial 
government, and build capacity in terms of the human resources and institutional capacity of 
the provinces. The political will to decentralise power assumed considerable importance. The 
prevailing culture within government departments accustomed to a system of parliamentary 
sovereignty and strict executive control also played a role. The ‘transformation’ of the civil 
service and the inculcation of democratic values and a human rights culture are intertwined 
with the realisation of the constitutional democracy which the division-of-powers provisions 
empower. The administrative practice of the government is examined in Chapter 7. 
 
In this context, it is necessary also to consider the political climate in which government 
operates. The functioning of day-to-day governance, and the relations between the spheres are 
influenced by the culture of the ruling party. The culture of the ANC is decidedly hierarchical 
in nature. The party-list system of proportional representation facilitates governance from the 
centre. In drawing up the party lists, it is the National Executive Committee which has the final 
say. Members of the legislature are beholden to the party for their seats: loss of party 
membership results in the loss of a seat in the legislature. This strengthens the ability of the 
party to dictate policy from the centre. 
 
All of these dynamics facilitate centralist rule. In the political realm and in the day-to-day 
government of the country, the ANC exercises power hierarchically.224 This has had a 
                                                 
223 Ibid paras 162–182. 
224 Venter (2005) 40 Journal of Public Administration 484 at 489– 90. 
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significant impact on the day-to-day operation of government in that the ANC policy of ‘cadre 
deployment’ has meant that high-ranking government officials are often members of the ruling 
party. It can be argued that this may impact decision-making and intergovernmental relations 
by favouring central government domination of policy even within areas of provincial and local 
government authority.225 In practice, for example, where the intergovernmental process set out 
in the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act has failed to resolve a matter, an ANC-led 
municipality or province may be reluctant to challenge the matter in Court.226 It is submitted 
that in some instances this factor may have prevented Court challenges against potentially 
unconstitutional local government legislation on the statute book. Of course, the 2016 local 
government elections, which resulted in three metropolitan municipalities falling to the 
opposition, may add an interesting dynamic to relations between national and local government 
in South Africa. The courts may increasingly become the arbiter of disputes involving the 
interpretation of the Schedules.227 It may be that in future, notwithstanding the constitutional 
obligation on the spheres to work together in a constructive and cooperative manner, we may 
see an increase in intergovernmental relations disputes reaching the courts. 
 
The discussion above has traversed the drafting, adoption, and early practice surrounding the 
constitutional division of powers. The discussions leading up to the adoption of the 
Constitution were addressed in order to provide context for the constitutional division of 
powers between the spheres of government. This discussion has shown that the advent of the 
Constitution brought with it a paradigmatic shift in the systems of governance in South Africa. 
This change is twofold. The principles of constitutionalism now underpin all aspects of 
governance. All decisions and actions by government must now be in line with the principles 
and provisions of the Constitution. Secondly, there has been a shift from an hierarchical form 
of government to a system where all levels of government have a defined area of authority in 
which to exercise their administrative powers. This is a distinct change from the situation which 
prevailed under the previous system, where national and provincial government exercised 
direct control over the various forms of local government which existed in the pre-
constitutional dispensation. 
 
                                                 
225 The intergovernmental relations practice of the state is discussed in Chapter 4. 
226 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005. 
227 Humphries (1995) 3 Indicator SA 7 at 10. 
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Local government has developed into a fully-fledged sphere of government with powers and 
functions of its own – most notably, the power to draft original legislation in the form of by-
laws.228 This power allows municipalities to exercise their executive authority over the areas 
which they administer in terms of the Constitution.  
 
Likewise, national and provincial government have defined areas of functional authority with 
residual powers vesting in national government. Their role with respect to local government is 
to strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs and perform their 
functions.229 The emphasis is on assisting municipalities to manage their own affairs. This role 
which provincial governments have under the Constitution, is in marked contrast to that which 
previously prevailed where provinces were directly responsible for administering the various 
local government bodies.  
 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the Constitution has given the provinces a significant 
voice in national legislative matters. The Constitution’s conception of spheres as opposed to 
tiers, the allocation of powers between the spheres, the existence of an upper house in which 
the provinces are given a considerable voice in legislative matters, all point to a federal design 
– or at the very least a quasi-federal design. It is submitted that the formal design of the 
Constitution exhibits the following characteristics indicative of federalism: 
(a)  South Africa is a democratic state founded on a Constitution which symbolises a sacred 
contract or agreement with the people; 
(b) a formal entrenched Constitution which cannot be easily amended; 
(c) a Constitutional Court as the highest Court and which has the authority to interpret the 
Constitution; 
(d) the division of powers between two or more spheres of government; and 
(e)  a second House of Parliament (the NCOP) which is dedicated to the sub-national 
government.  
 
In its design, the Constitution also displays many of the characteristics of the integrated model 
of federalism: a system which divides powers between the spheres of government in a manner 
which allows for concurrent or overlapping powers; a formalised system of intergovernmental 
                                                 
228 Constitution: s 156(2). See also Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional 
Metropolitan Council & others 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 2.  
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relations; the ability of the provinces and national government to raise their own revenue (at 
least in theory); and the integration of the provinces in the national legislative process via the 
NCOP. However, this is not conclusive of the matter – there are also many factors which point 
to a unitary system. The existence of both federal and unitary characteristics in the design of 
the Constitution gives it a unique character. These contradictory elements have influenced the 
evolution of constitutional law and administrative practice to varying degrees and have resulted 
in a type of ‘institutional schizophrenia’ in certain instances. This has contributed to the 
academic debate on the nature of the South African Constitution. As discussed earlier, the 
Constitution does not expressly use the terms ‘federal’ or ‘unitary’ – however, it is submitted 
that the Constitution is quasi-federal in nature. This quasi-federal character of the 
Constitution’s design, combined with the institutionalised autonomous features of local 
government, has influenced the development of the Constitution in a manner which supports 
the view that the Constitution establishes a quasi-federal system.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The functioning of government in decentralised states depends on effective cooperation 
between the spheres. Poor coordination between the spheres impacts negatively on 
government’s capacity to implement its policies and programmes. This, in turn, negatively 
affects the delivery of services to communities. In Chapter 2, the constitutional distribution of 
powers between the three spheres of government in South Africa was discussed. This chapter 
examines the evolution of the practice of cooperative government and intergovernmental 
relations and its impact on effective administration in South Africa. 
 
The coordination of government occurs daily across a multitude of institutions, government 
structures, and a complex web of relationships between officials and political representatives 
in all spheres of government. An examination of cooperative governance is a complex exercise 
– it involves the examination of institutional systems for cooperative governance together with 
the myriad relationships between the spheres. In a broad sense, all the chapters in this thesis 
involve an examination of different aspects of the relationship between the spheres. However, 
the current chapter focuses on the constitutional and legislative scheme for cooperative 
governance, the practice of government for managing intergovernmental relations, and a 
selection of cases in which intergovernmental disputes have come before the courts. The 
discussion is divided into cooperative governance practice before the enactment of the 
intergovernmental relations legislation envisaged by the Constitution, and practice following 
its enactment. The focus is on the efficacy of the system of intergovernmental relations and the 
institutions and systems through which it occurs. 
 
3.2 South African Cooperative Governance 
 
Intergovernmental cooperation may take place informally as in the Canadian tradition, or it 
may take place in a structured manner in governments where there has been an effort to 
formalise and institutionalise intergovernmental relations. As discussed earlier, under the 
influence of the German federal model the drafters of the South African Constitution opted for 
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institutionalised cooperation mechanisms. The division-of-powers provisions in our 
Constitution are complex. As a result, the complexities associated with governance in a 
decentralised system demand care and skill. Otherwise effecting coordination and cooperation 
of the spheres can be difficult. The model of cooperative governance can either promote 
integration or foster decentralisation. For example, practice has shown that the Canadian model 
of intergovernmental relations, which has no formal and institutionalised structures, favours 
decentralisation. On the other hand, the German model of institutionalised intergovernmental 
relations has distinct integrated elements. Over time, this has tended to influence 
intergovernmental relations in Germany in a manner which enhances central government’s 
dominance over policy and decision-making. 
 
A distinction can be drawn between cooperative government and intergovernmental relations. 
The former Department of Constitutional Development explained in its Discussion Document 
on Cooperative Governance, that cooperative government represents the basic values of the 
Constitution as set out in section 41(1) of the Constitution as well as the implementation of 
these values through the establishment of structures and institutions. Cooperative government, 
therefore, is a constitutional norm and represents a fundamental philosophy of government 
which governs all aspects and activities of government and includes de-concentration of power 
to sub-national spheres of government. It encompasses the structure of government as well as 
the organisation and exercise of political power.230 It is concerned with institutional, political, 
and financial arrangements for interaction between the spheres of government. Cooperative 
government is about partnership government and the values associated with it, such as national 
unity, proper cooperation and coordination, effective communication, and the avoidance of 
conflict. Intergovernmental relations is one of the means through which the values of 
cooperative government can be given both institutional and statutory expression.231 
 
The term intergovernmental relations refers to the complex and interdependent relationships 
between the different spheres of government and the coordination of public policies in national, 
provincial, and local governments through programme-reporting requirements, grants in aid, 
the planning and budgetary process, and informal communication between officials.232 It is 
                                                 
230 Department of Constitutional Development 'Discussion Document on Strategic Issues and Options for Policy 
on Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations' (1999) 4. 
231 Ibid at 12. 
232 Fox & Meyer Public Administration Dictionary 66. 
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important to distinguish between statutory bodies with legislative backing and non-statutory 
bodies which are constituted by government for a specific task.233 In his definition, Ile 
emphasises that intergovernmental relationships are directed towards achieving common goals 
through vertical and horizontal arrangements across all spheres of government. The primary 
goal, therefore, is to enable government activities, to sustain democracy, and to strengthen 
service-delivery capacity across all spheres of government for the common good.234 As pointed 
out in the introduction, the link between intergovernmental relations and service delivery is an 
important one as poor coordination can negatively impact on service delivery. The increase in 
service-delivery protests has rekindled interest in the debate around good governance. The 
increased service-delivery riots may be linked to poor coordination, institutional flaws, a skills 
deficit, poor management, ethical concerns in the public sector, and challenges in the 
interpretation and implementation of the division-of-powers provisions in the Constitution. 
 
Older foreign constitutions, such as that of the United States of America (USA/US), paid scant 
regard to the notion of intergovernmental relations. It was only in the 1930s that the theory of 
inter-state cooperation began to take shape in the US. This was prompted by an increase in 
federal activities and responsibilities.235 Since then, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, 
Switzerland and the USA have developed voluntary, legal, formal and informal networks to 
facilitate intergovernmental relations.236 The search by the Constitutional Assembly for case 
studies increasingly pointed to the German constitutional model of cooperative relations with 
the result that sections of the South African Constitution are based on provisions in the German 
Constitution.237 
 
In Germany, the relationship between the Bund and the Lander is based on the German concept 
of Bundestreue. The German Constitutional Court has described Bundestreue as ‘the 
constitutional obligation of trust and friendship that the Bund and the Lander have towards 
each other’.238 De Villiers describes this concept as an unwritten constitutional norm which is 
                                                 
233 Kuye, Thornhill & Fourie Critical Perspectives on Public Administration 45. 
234 Ile (2010) 7 Journal of US-China Public Administration 53 available at  
upan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN-DPADM/UNPAN044562.pdf accessed on 30 September 
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235 De Villiers (1994) 9 SA Public Law 430 at 431. 
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dynamic and given content by the German Courts on a case-by-case basis as new problems 
arise and need to be addressed.239 He cites the following practical examples of the application 
of the principle: 
 
(a)  the obligation of the economically stronger Lander to render support to the weaker Lander; 
(b)  the duty of the respective levels of government to cooperate on matters of common concern; 
(c) the responsibility to take each other into account in the exercise of constitutionally allocated powers, 
such as the right to enter into treaties and the way that this affects others; and 
(d)  to respect the interests of other Lander and/or of the Bund whenever a matter has implications wider than 
those affecting one particular Land – especially when the wider implications are financial.240 
 
Bundestreue requires both levels of government to cooperate and to consult one another on 
matters of common interest. De Villiers describes this as a philosophical and legal basis from 
which to conduct intergovernmental relations in a multi-tiered system. In Germany, the 
application of Bundestreue has given rise to a network of relationships and agencies operating 
in the complex area of intergovernmental relations.241 
 
The German concept of Bundestreue has been given expression in Chapter 3 of the South 
African Constitution, immediately following the Bill of Rights. Its position in the structure of 
the Constitution suggests its prominence as a definitive cornerstone of the institutional design 
of government. The Cooperative Government Chapter in the Constitution begins with the 
words: ‘In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of 
government which are distinctive, inter-dependent and interrelated.’242 As has been canvassed 
in previous chapters, this provision encapsulates a move towards a form of decentralised 
government with all three spheres having the powers required to operate with a degree of 
autonomy in their individual areas of jurisdiction. In addition, section 40(1) emphasises the 
interrelatedness and interdependence of the three spheres. Section 40(2) binds all spheres of 
government to observe and adhere to the principles of cooperative governance set out in the 
Constitution. 
 
The principles of co-operative government bind all spheres of government and all organs of state. They must: 
(a) preserve the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic; 
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(b)  secure the well-being of the people of the Republic; 
(c) provide effective, transparent, and accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole; 
(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic, and its people; 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers, and functions of government in the other spheres; 
(f) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, 
functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and 
(g) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by – 
(i) fostering friendly relations; 
(ii)  assisting and supporting one another; 
(iii) informing one another of, and consulting one another on, matters of common      interest; 
(iv) coordinating their actions and legislation with one another; 
(v) adhering to agreed procedures; and 
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings against one another.243 
 
The Constitution provides that an Act of Parliament must be passed which establishes 
structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations and to provide 
for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental 
disputes.244 Organs of state are discouraged from resorting to court proceedings against each 
other in an attempt to settle disputes. Section 41(3) provides that an organ of state involved in 
an intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by means 
of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose. The section requires that all possible 
remedies must be exhausted before resort is had to a court to resolve a dispute.245 In 
adjudicating any dispute between organs of state, a court must refuse to hear a matter where 
the parties have not exhausted all remedies in trying to resolve the dispute before approaching 
the court.246 The legislation envisaged by section 41(2) was not immediately passed by 
Parliament, leaving the courts to adjudicate intergovernmental matters by interpreting and 
applying the cooperative governance principles in the Constitution.  
 
During the period between the adoption of the Constitution and the adoption of the legislation 
required by it, courts’ only form of guidance was the interpretation of cooperative governance 
in the First Certification Judgment.247 In its judgment, the Constitutional Court considered the 
                                                 
243 Constitution: s 41(1). 
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meaning of the cooperative government provisions of the Constitution, and in particular the 
injunction that organs of state are to avoid legal proceedings against each other in section 
41(1)(h) which provides that: ‘All spheres of government and all organs of state within each 
sphere must cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by avoiding legal 
proceedings against one another.’ The Court pointed out that this section must be read in 
conjunction with section 41(3) which requires that an organ of state ‘involved in an 
intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by means of 
mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies 
before it approaches a Court to resolve the dispute.’ If, in the opinion of the Court, any organ 
of state has not complied with the requirements of section 41(3), it may refer the matter back 
to the organ of state involved. 
 
It was contended before the Constitutional Court that these provisions represented an undue 
limitation of the autonomous powers of the provinces. The Court found that the provisions bind 
all departments of government in the national, provincial, and local spheres. The requirement 
was interpreted to mean that where possible, disputes should be resolved at a political level 
rather than through adversarial litigation. In the Court’s view, this provision did not oust the 
jurisdiction of the Courts to adjudicate disputes between the three spheres, nor did it limit the 
powers of any government sphere as prescribed by the Constitution.248 
 
As discussed above, the general framework legislation envisaged by the Constitution was only 
passed by Parliament ten years after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. In the interim, 
various fora were created to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. Significant developments 
also occurred in the area of fiscal intergovernmental relations starting with the adoption of 
legislation in 1997.249 These developments impacted on the evolution of intergovernmental 
relations in a specific way. In the following section the development of intergovernmental 
relations during the period between the adoption of the interim Constitution and the 
promulgation of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act is considered.250 
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3.3 Early practice of Intergovernmental Relations 
 
3.3.1 Intergovernmental Relations Structures 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
As discussed above, before the adoption of the Intergovernmental Relations Act, cooperation 
between the three spheres of government was largely governed by the provisions of the 
Constitution. A number of intergovernmental relations (IGR) structures were established to 
manage the vertical and horizontal coordination of government activities. These structures can 
be divided into structures created by law (statutory or legislative IGR structures) and structures 
created by executive decision. Examples of statutory structures include the NCOP (National 
Council of Provinces), the Budget Council, the Financial and Fiscal Commission, the Local 
Government Budget Forum, and the Council of Education Ministers and the Heads of 
Education Department Committee. Executive (or non-statutory) IGR structures include the 
Intergovernmental Forum established by President Mandela, the President’s Coordinating 
Council (established by President Mbeki), the IGR Committees of Ministers and Members of 
Provincial Executive Councils (MinMecs), and the Forum for South African Directors-General 
(FOSAD). 
 
(b) National Council of Provinces 
 
Possibly the most important intergovernmental relations body created by the Constitution is 
the NCOP which is created by section 60 of the Constitution.251 The purpose of the NCOP is 
to provide a forum for the inclusion of provincial and local government interests in the national 
legislative process. Each province is represented by a delegation of ten members headed by the 
provincial Premier. The NCOP has a role in the approval of a national intervention in a province 
for failure to perform an executive function in terms of section 100(2) of the Constitution. The 
NCOP also plays a role when either national or provincial government intervene in a 
municipality in terms of section 139 of the Constitution. It must also review the halting of the 
transfer of funds to a province by Treasury in terms section 216(3) of the Constitution for 
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breaches of sound financial management by that province. Finally, it participates in the Judicial 
Services Commission in order to ensure that provincial interests are taken into account in the 
appointment of judges.252 
 
As regards the NCOP’s legislative oversight role, the Constitution provides different processes 
by which it may consider the following categories of legislation – Bills amending the 
Constitution; money Bills; ordinary Bills not affecting the provinces; and ordinary Bills 
affecting the provinces. The NCOP may consider, pass, amend, propose amendments to, or 
reject any legislation before it. It is empowered to initiate legislation falling within a functional 
area listed in Schedule 4 or other legislation referred to in section 76(3), but it may not initiate 
money Bills.253 
 
In terms of section 44(1)(b) of the Constitution, the support of six of the provinces in the NCOP 
is required in order to amend the Constitution. Two separate procedures are set for the adoption 
of legislation in sections 75 and 76. These procedures distinguish between ordinary Bills 
affecting the provinces and ordinary Bills not affecting the provinces. As regards ordinary Bills 
not affecting the provinces, the NCOP may consider the Bill and either pass it with or without 
amendments or reject it. On receiving the Bill from the NCOP, the NA may take the 
amendments proposed by the NCOP into account or reject them and pass the Bill in its original 
form. 
 
The NCOP has a greater say with regard to section 76 Bills – referred to as ordinary Bills 
affecting the provinces. Here an impasse between the two Houses of Parliament (NCOP and 
NA) is referred to the Mediation Committee (MC). The MC may agree to the Bill as passed by 
the NA, the amended Bill passed by the NCOP, or a different version of the Bill. If the MC 
cannot break the deadlock, the Bill lapses unless the NA again passes it. However, an increased 
majority of two thirds is required to pass the Bill in these circumstances.254 
 
The Constitution replaced the Senate with the NCOP. The Constitutional Court considered the 
impact of these changes and their compliance with the constitutional principles in the First 
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Certification Judgment. In the Court’s view the Senate ‘had not been constituted in a manner 
that is calculated to promote provincial interests’ because it had been put together to represent 
party political interests. In relation to the changes made to the Constitution and the powers of 
the provincial house, the Court stated that although it was satisfied that the structure and 
functioning of the NCOP was better suited to the representation of provincial interests than the 
structure and functioning of the Senate, it was not able to say that the collective interest of the 
provinces would necessarily be better served by the changes.255  
 
The question that arises is whether, in practice, the NCOP has contributed to provincial 
autonomy. There were early indications that the NCOP was not, in fact, living up to its potential 
to represent collective provincial interests in the legislative process. Writing in 1997, Devenish 
noted that the functioning of the NCOP had been sharply criticised in the media. He cited 
examples of the NCOP rubber-stamping Bills referred to it within a very short period – for 
example, in November 1997 some 30 Bills were sent to the NCOP and were passed in only 
three days.256 Early practice in the NCOP appeared to confirm this initial impression that 
proceedings in the upper house of Parliament had little effect on the legislation passed in the 
NA. Consequently, in 2008 the parliamentary assessment report found that the NCOP was not 
fulfilling its constitutional mandate to represent provincial interests in the law-making process. 
The report found a number of institutional weaknesses in the functioning of the NCOP which 
negatively impacted on its performance, including that its committees were not aligned with 
provincial mandates and interests under the Constitution.257 
 
In contradistinction to the findings in the parliamentary assessment report, Mafilika conducted 
a study of the legislation considered by the NCOP during the period of the third Parliament 
(2004 to 2009) and concluded that the NCOP remained relevant and had achieved its 
constitutional mandate of representing the interests of provinces.258 Mafilika’s study consisted 
of a quantitative and qualitative assessment of Bills considered by the NCOP during the period 
under review. In the study, Bills were divided into the constitutional categories for the passing 
of legislation – Bills amending the Constitution, ordinary Bills not affecting the provinces (s 
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75 Bills); ordinary Bills affecting the provinces (s 76 Bills); money Bills (s 77 Bills); and mixed 
Bills (Bills with aspects falling under both ss 75 and 76 and which were split by the State Law 
Advisor before entering the legislative process but reconstituted into a single piece of 
legislation after the public participation and legislature processes had been completed). She 
found that the NCOP frequently considered and passed section 75 Bills on the same day. One 
possible reason for this is that the NCOP’s powers insofar as section 75 Bills are limited. While 
it may delay the enactment of a section 75 Bill, it cannot prevent the enactment of such a Bill. 
 
The Constitution gives the NCOP a greater say in respect of section 76 Bills, but provides for 
two different procedures which allow such a Bill to be introduced either in the NA or in the 
NCOP. Although Parliament dealt with 38 section 76 Bills during the relevant period, only 
nine were introduced in the NCOP. The remaining 29 were all introduced in the NA. The study 
notes in this respect that the preference for introducing section 76 Bills in the NA, as opposed 
to the NCOP, was anonymously explained by a Cabinet Minister as the preferred option 
because of the likelihood that the NCOP would feel pressured to agree to a Bill which had 
already been passed by the NA. This has the added advantage of speeding up the passage of 
Bills through the legislature.259  
 
In her study, Mafilika also notes that all nine of the Bills that were introduced in the NCOP 
were amended by the House. As regards the quality of the amendments, while most changes 
were grammatical, ‘in some Bills there were both technical and substantive amendments’.260 
She states that the number of Bills introduced in the NCOP is insufficient to compare the quality 
of amendments between Bills introduced in the NCOP and those introduced in the NA. Only 
two Bills were referred to the Mediation Committee. The study found that: 
 
(a) Bills amending the Constitution comprised 2% of all Bills considered during the Third Parliament. The 
NCOP played a role in both Bills. 
(b) Section 75 Bills made up 69% of all Bills during the Third Parliament. The NCOP considered these Bills 
only superficially and passed them on the same day as they are introduced; and 
(c) Only 17% of Bills dealt with during the Third Parliament were section 76 Bills. Most were introduced in 
the NA as opposed to the NCOP. The NCOP proposed both grammatical and substantive changes. 
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Therefore the NCOP has fulfilled its constitutional mandate of representing the provinces interests in the 
legislative process.261 
 
On the basis of these findings, the study recommended that: 
 
(a)  the NCOP should assess whether it wants to use its limited resources to play a role on section 75 Bills; 
(b)  the NCOP’s role in respect of section 76 Bills should be strengthened by requiring the executive authority 
to introduce more section 76 Bills in the NCOP; 
(c) the electoral process should be reviewed with a view to granting the delegates in the NCOP greater
 political power to represent the electorate; 
(d) the NCOP should reprioritise its work and limit its committees to focus on issues of provincial 
competence; and 
(e) it would be useful to conduct research on the meaning of ‘provincial interests’ in order to assess whether 
the NCOP has indeed fulfilled its constitutional mandate.262 
 
While one may agree with Mafilika’s recommendations, it is submitted that the conclusion that 
the NCOP has achieved its constitutional mandate of representing the interests of the provinces 
is not supported by the evidence. In the first place, the reluctance of the Executive to introduce 
section 76 Bills in the NCOP needs to be addressed. The likelihood that this is done in order to 
subvert the legitimate right of the provinces to make an input in legislation affecting them is a 
cause for concern. In this regard, the fact that the members of the NCOP are de facto politically 
subordinate to the members of the NA may be the underlying issue. Indeed, the fact that a 
Cabinet Minister has anonymously stated that Ministers prefer to introduce Bills in the NA 
because the NCOP will not make changes once the NA has approved a Bill, is troubling. These 
difficulties could be what was envisaged by the Constitutional Court when it was not prepared 
to find that the composition and powers of the NCOP would ensure that provincial interests 
would trump party-political interests. It is submitted that in preferring to introduce section 76 
Bills in the NA, the Executive may not be complying with the spirit of the constitutional 
provisions regulating cooperative government. 
 
The conclusion that the NCOP is representing provincial interests is not supported by the study 
producing examples of substantive amendments introduced to section 76 Bills. In this regard, 
the fact that there were only two referrals to the Mediation Committee during the period under 
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review may be indicative of the fact that NCOP members are reluctant to make substantive 
changes. This may be because they are in practice politically subordinate to the members of 
the NA. Many authors have highlighted the fact that due to the manner in which the ANC list-
system works, the ‘best’ candidates have already been deployed by the time the NCOP 
composition is decided.263 This may contribute to a skills deficit in the NCOP which may in 
turn affect the quality of inputs made into the legislative process. Whatever the cause, the study 
fails to provide convincing evidence of substantive amendments to section 76 Bills considered 
by the NCOP. It is submitted that this omission detracts from the credibility of the finding that 
the NCOP is indeed fulfilling its constitutional duty to represent provincial interests.  
 
Furthermore, the author neither considers nor discusses the First Certification Judgment and 
the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to declare that the NCOP is constituted in a manner 
which will advance provincial interests. It must be borne in mind that the independent review 
of Parliament conducted in 2008 concluded that the NCOP was not fulfilling its constitutional 
mandate to represent the interests of the provinces. It is submitted that there is a difference 
between a finding that the representation of provincial interests in the legislative process is a 
legitimate constitutional aim, and a finding that the NCOP is actually fulfilling its purpose to 
represent provincial interests. If the NCOP is not fulfilling its role adequately, one must ask 
why this is so. Is it due to structural, institutional difficulties with the way in which the NCOP 
is constituted? Or is it a result of political factors such as a preference for centralised policy 
and law making within the ANC? Or perhaps a combination of these factors? It is submitted 
that this is an area which could benefit from reform. A sound argument can be made for 
strengthening the composition and functioning of the NCOP so as to enhance its participation 
in the legislative process. It is submitted that this review should seek to effect changes to the 
composition and functioning of the NCOP and the system should be revised in order to promote 
the advancement of provincial interests over party-political concerns. Also, the discretion to 
initiate legislation affecting the provinces in the NA as opposed to the NCOP should be 
removed from the Constitution so that all section 76 legislation is introduced in the NCOP.  
 
 
 
                                                 
263 De Vos ‘Don’t say goodbye to the NCOP yet’ available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/dont-say-
goodbey-ncop-yet/ accessed on 6 September 2019. 
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(c)  Intergovernmental Forum 
 
The Intergovernmental Forum (IGF) was formally established after the implementation of the 
interim Constitution as a forum for national Ministers and Premiers (and sometimes the 
President) to meet. It was institutionally located in the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (although Intergovernmental Relations matters had previously been dealt with by 
the former Department of Constitutional Development). The IGF was South Africa’s first 
attempt at an inclusive IGR structure where officials and politicians could meet to discuss 
strategically important matters. The terms of reference of the IGF were: 
 
(a)  to promote consensus between spheres of government; 
(b) to ensure implementation of identified programmes; 
(c) to provide a multilateral, intergovernmental, policy planning and implementation directive platform; 
(d)  to provide a strategic political platform for policy dialogue, intergovernmental consultation, co-
ordination, consultation and joint decision making between political executive office bearers and the 
bureaucracy across all three spheres of government; and 
(e) to facilitate interaction at the highest political level.264 
 
Initially the IGF met monthly, changing later to bi-monthly as its workload decreased. 
Mathebula states that the IGF operated like an ‘un-elected Parliament’ because there was no 
limit on the issues it discussed. This led to its eventual demise.265 The last mention of IGFs in 
the literature noted that participants in the IGF had expressed frustration with the body’s 
functioning due to its want of a clear mandate.266 This, together with its unwieldy size 
eventually led to its failure. It was replaced by the President’s Coordinating Council. 
 
(d) President’s Coordinating Council 
 
The President’s Coordinating Council (PCC), which replaced the IGFs, emerged from 
discussions during the 1999 Intergovernmental Forum Conference. It consisted of the 
President, the Minister of Provincial and Local Government, and provincial Premiers. 
                                                 
264 Department of Provincial and Local Government ‘The Intergovernmental Relations Audit: Towards a Culture 
of Co-operative Government’ (1999). 
265 Mathebula Intergovernmental Relations Reform 162. 
266 Layman T ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South Africa: A Ten year review 
commissioned by the Presidency’ (2003) available at http://sarpn.org/documents/d000078751docs/ 
Layman%20Tim.pdf 207 accessed on 23 September 2017. 
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Organised local government attends by invitation. The PCC was intended to have a more 
limited focus than the IGF by concentrating on provincial governance and providing national 
government with a forum for oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of provincial government. 
It was retained when the intergovernmental relations legislation was enacted and is discussed 
further below. 
 
(e) MinMecs 
 
MinMecs were set up for all functional areas in which national and provincial governments 
have concurrent powers under the Constitution as a forum for the national Ministers and 
provincial MECs to meet. The MinMecs were set up on the instruction of Cabinet by individual 
national departments. Cabinet provided no directives for the establishment and functioning of 
the MinMecs; this was left to national departments’ discretion.267 The generic terms of 
reference for MinMecs are: 
 
(a)  the provision of mutual advice on sectoral issues; 
(b)  anticipating potential areas of inter-governmental conflict; 
(c)  co-ordinating the policy and legislative development process; 
(d)  determining long and short term priorities within a national framework; 
(e) discussion of fiscal and budgetary matters affecting the provincial sphere of government; and 
(f) exchanging information and discussing any matter referred to it by participating executives.268 
 
Only the financial and education sectors have formalised their structures into statutory 
bodies.269 The SALGA represents local government when local government matters are 
discussed. 
 
One of the early areas of concern regarding the functioning of MinMecs was the overlapping 
of functional areas between departments – especially provincial departments. De Villiers notes 
that:  
 
                                                 
267 Ibid at 210. 
268 Department of Provincial and Local Government ‘The Intergovernmental Relations Audit: Towards a Culture 
of Co-operative Government’ (1999) 36. 
269 Layman T ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South Africa: A ten-year review 
commissioned by the Presidency’ (2003) at 13 available at http://sarpn.org/documents/d000078751docs/ 
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[I]n some provinces functional areas such as health, welfare and culture are combined in one department, while 
at the national level there are three separate departments. Some of the consequences of this asymmetry are that 
provincial departments in many cases do not have the know-how to provide policy inputs that equal those of 
national departments; that policy initiatives are de facto under the control of national departments; and that 
provincial departments are stretched to their limits to attend and prepare for all the monthly meetings with their 
national counterparts.270  
 
This problem was meant to be addressed to some extent by the introduction in 1999/2000 of 
the new cluster system in Cabinet in terms of which the work of ministries and departments in 
related functional areas is ‘clustered’ together. This system also provides for the inclusion of 
provincial directors-general to allow for provincial participation.271  
 
(f)  Cabinet Cluster System 
 
In the South African system, the Cabinet consists of the President, the Deputy President, and 
the minsters of the various government departments. Historically, the South African Cabinet 
operated as a committee system. However, a review to evaluate government’s performance 
commissioned by President Mandela, recommended that the twelve inter-ministerial 
committees operating at that stage be rationalised and clustered into more manageable service-
delivery areas.272 Under the Mbeki administration, a Cabinet system similar to the British super 
ministerial cabinet system was adopted.273 Six Cabinet cluster committees were established, 
chaired by the President or Deputy President and managed by the Cabinet Office located in the 
Presidency (later revised to five Cabinet clusters). Cabinet committees meet at least once, but 
not more than twice a month. The clusters are replicated by meetings of Directors General 
(DGs) which act as a clearing house for policies and submissions intended for submission to 
the Cabinet cluster meeting. ‘Working groups’ of lower level officials, in turn constitute 
another committee for each cluster which clears documents intended for the cluster DGs' 
meeting. Through its managing committee, the Forum of South African Directors General 
(FOSAD) sits as the coordinating and oversight structure of the DG cluster committees. 
 
                                                 
270 Ibid at 208. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Mathebula Intergovernmental Relations Reform 177. 
273 Mathebula Intergovernmental Relations Reform 177. 
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(g)  Operation of the Cabinet Cluster system274 
 
 
Figure 1 Cabinet Cluster System 
 
What follows is an example of how the system works in practice. 
 
                                                 
274 SPHCD - Social Protection, Community and Human Development; ICTS – International Co-operation, Trade 
and Security; JCPS – Justice, Crime Prevention and Security; G&A – Governance and Administration; and ESEID 
- Economic Sectors, Employment and Infrastructure Development. 
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The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development wishes to initiate a policy on courts 
to deal with sexual offences. The policy is first introduced in the Justice, Crime Prevention, 
and Security (JCPS) Officials’ working meeting. The officials representing the various 
departments in the cluster examine the proposal and either send it back to the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development for amendment, or agree that it may proceed to the 
next level. Once cleared, the policy is submitted to the JCPS DGs meeting. The JCPS DG’s 
meeting then scrutinises the document and either sends it back to the initiating department for 
amendment, or agrees that it may be tabled at the Cabinet Cluster Committee by the relevant 
DG. If given the go-ahead, the DG presents the proposed policy at the next ministerial Cabinet 
Committee meeting for recommendation and onward transmission to Cabinet. The diagram 
above illustrates the structure of the cabinet cluster system and how work advances through the 
system.   
 
According to Mathebula, the value of the cabinet cluster system is that it increases collective 
control of Ministers and the President over policy matters.275 However, it is submitted that the 
system has a number of disadvantages.  
(a)  There is duplication of work – the same policy has to be submitted to three different 
committees consisting of increasingly senior officials, and each committee conducts 
exactly the same inquiry. 
(b) The process is time consuming and cumbersome – it can take months for a single policy 
to reach Cabinet. 
(c) The responsibility of individual Cabinet Ministers over their portfolios is diluted. 
(d)  The expertise of subject specialists is diluted and policies are subjected to changes 
introduced by officials who may not be subject experts in the particular area under 
discussion. 
(e)  There is an inherent risk of ‘lowest-common-denominator’ outcomes on policy matters 
as there are many ‘decision makers’ to satisfy. 
(f)  Democratic consultation processes followed by the initiating departments during the 
drafting process may be subverted by policy changes introduced at the last minute by 
the various officials who have authority to make an input as the policy traverses the 
system. 
                                                 
275 Ibid at 178. 
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(g) The difficulty of coordinating meetings especially for senior officials means that lower-
level officials are often delegated work which ought to have been attended by DGs. 
This is seen especially at DG cluster meetings. 
(h) Costs are multiplied because of the multiplicity of meetings officials must attend. 
(i) There is a great deal of coordination required to comply with the technical and 
procedural aspects of the process as well as to coordinate the administrative and 
political centres which are based in Pretoria and Cape Town respectively. 
(j)  A policy with a subject matter that straddles several clusters will have to be processed 
through each of these clusters, a cumbersome and time consuming exercise, which 
tends to be repetitive for the line department proposing the policy. The increase in the 
number of officials who must ‘approve’ the policy carries with it the risk of multiple 
amendments. 
(k) Interactions in the various committees are often coloured by a competitive and 
adversarial spirit as opposed to one of cooperation. 
(l) Finally, sub-national government in the form of local government, is not represented at 
any time – not even where policies affecting these levels are discussed. 
 
It is submitted that there may be a need to review how the cluster system functions in order to 
address the issues identified above. Of particular concern is the reduction in accountability, the 
dilution of expertise, the possibility of lowest-common-denominator outcomes, and the lack of 
effective representation of sub-national governments in the process of adopting policies and 
legislation. It is submitted that this is an area that could benefit from reform.  
 
The area of accountability is also important as it is linked to the democratic ideals expressed in 
our Constitution. This, in turn, is linked to the way in which the current process subverts the 
policy choices of the responsible department as regards collective decision making. Finally, 
the issues of duplication and coordination need to be addressed in order to develop a more 
streamlined and cost effective process while still realising the goal of cooperative governance.  
 
(h) Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD) 
 
The various technical fora are meetings of the administration which come together to 
implement the decisions of the political intergovernmental relations structures. The most 
important of these is the Forum of South African Directors-General (FOSAD) which consists 
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of national and provincial DGs.276 How the FOSAD participates in cooperative governance via 
the cluster system has been described in the preceding section. 
 
(i) Fiscal and Financial Commission 
 
The Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC) was established by the interim Constitution to 
advise government on the financial and fiscal requirements of the provincial, national, and local 
spheres of government. Its functions included advice on fiscal policy, ensuring equitable 
distribution of resources, and setting criteria for the allocation of financial and fiscal 
resources.277 After its establishment on 25 August 1994, the FFC took at least eighteen months 
to begin to impact on the system.278  Unlike other intergovernmental relations bodies such as 
the Commission on Provincial Government whose significance waned with the adoption of the 
Constitution, the FFC’s continued existence was ensured by its inclusion in section 220 of the 
Constitution. In addition, in order to clarify its role, the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act 
was adopted in 1997.279 This Act confirms the role of the FFC as a consultative body which 
makes recommendations and advises organs of state and the local, provincial, and national 
spheres of government on financial and fiscal matters.280 
 
The Act further mandates that the FFC must first be notified of any decision to assign a power 
or functions to an organ of state in a different sphere of government. The FFC must be informed 
as regards the implications of the proposed assignment of power for the division of revenue 
raised nationally, any transfer of employees which may result, and, in the case of an assignment 
to a provincial or local body, information on the fiscal power, fiscal capacity, and efficiency of 
the relevant province or municipality. The organ of state wishing to assign the power must 
request the recommendation or advice of the commission on the assignment of power.281  
 
                                                 
276 Layman Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South Africa: A ten-year review commissioned 
by the Presidency’ (2003) at 14 available at http://sarpn.org/documents/d000078751docs/ Layman%20Tim.pdf  
accessed on 23 September 2017. 
277 Interim Constitution: s 199. 
278 De Villiers (1997) 12 SA Public Law 197 at 206. 
279 Financial and Fiscal Commission Act 99 of 1997. 
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During the period immediately following the adoption of the Constitution, most developments 
in the area of cooperative governance involved financial matters. Consequently, the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act (the Fiscal Relations Act) was enacted in 1997 with 
the aim of promoting cooperation between the national, provincial, and local spheres of 
government on fiscal, budgetary, and financial matters. In the result, the area of fiscal 
intergovernmental relations evolved at a fast rate and impacted on developments in other 
functional areas. A study of the early development of intergovernmental relations would 
therefore be incomplete without an examination of fiscal intergovernmental relations.282 
 
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act established a Budget Council consisting of the 
Minister of Finance, and the MEC for finance of each province.283 The Budget Council is a 
consultative structure in which national and provincial government consult on fiscal, 
budgetary, and financial matters affecting provincial government as well as proposed 
legislation and policy with financial implications for the provinces.284 The Act also establishes 
a Local Government Budget Forum consisting of the Minister of Finance, the MEC for finance 
for each province, five representatives from the SALGA, and one representative from each of 
the provincial local government associations.285 The Local Government Budget Forum 
performs similar functions to the Budget Council but with a focus on local government 
financial matters. Part 3 of the Fiscal Relations Act sets out the process for revenue-sharing 
between the national, provincial, and local spheres of government. 
 
The extent to which the administrative practice of government has supported the constitutional 
design for the division of powers can in part be reviewed by an examination of the fiscal 
practice of government. The recognition of the provinces as ‘spheres’ is given further support 
in the fiscal provisions of the Constitution.286 In line with its status as an equal partner with 
national government, the national government no longer ‘grants’ funds to the provinces but 
rather ‘transfers’ their share of revenue.287 The remainder of the constitutional provisions 
suggest provincial autonomy in fiscal matters. Provinces are accorded the freedom to allocate 
their resources as they see fit in section 226(1). In terms of section 217 of the Constitution, 
                                                 
282 Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997. 
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provinces may determine their own policy for the procurement of goods and services, whilst 
national government’s power is limited to determining a framework for the implementation of 
the policy. Section 227 guarantees provinces an equitable share in revenue raised nationally 
and contains provisions which protect provinces from arbitrary deprivation of funds allocated 
by the national government.288 Provinces are given the power to raise provincial taxes, levies, 
and other duties (with the exception of income tax, value-added tax, rates on property, or 
customs duties).289 Surcharges on national taxes are also permitted. In addition, provinces are 
granted authority by the Constitution to raise loans for capital or current expenditure (but loans 
for current expenditure may only be raised when necessary for bridging purposes).290 Read 
together, these provisions provide the provinces with the framework for a great deal of 
autonomy in financial administration. However, it appears that many of the laws and policies 
which have been adopted facilitate central government control of provincial government, 
including the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, the Division of Revenue Act, and the 
budget process and measures for expenditure control.291 
 
The Budget Council was established in terms of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act in 
order to coordinate financial relations between provincial and national government. The 
council operates by consensus and is permanently chaired by the Minister of Finance. Its 
recommendations go directly to the national Cabinet. Van Zyl describes the existence of a 
‘team spirit’ culture where the broader national impact takes precedence over regional matters. 
The Budget Council does not discuss the vertical split which determines the total amount of 
                                                 
288 Section 216 of the Constitution provides that: 
(2) The national treasury must enforce compliance with the measures established in terms of subsection 
(1), and may stop the transfer of funds to an organ of state if that organ of state commits a serious or 
persistent material breach of those measures. 
(3) A decision to stop the transfer of funds due to a province in terms of section 214(1)(b) may be taken 
only in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2) and- 
(a) may not stop the transfer of funds for more than 120 days; and 
(b) may be enforced immediately, but will lapse retrospectively unless Parliament approves it 
following a process substantially the same as that established in terms of section 76(1) and 
prescribed by the joint rules and orders of Parliament. This process must be completed within 
30 days of the decision of national treasury. 
(4) Parliament may renew a decision to stop the transfer of funds for no more than 120 days at a time, 
following the process established in terms of subsection (3). 
(5) Before Parliament may approve or renew a decision to stop the transfer of funds to a provinces – 
(a)the Auditor-General must report to Parliament; and 
(b) the province must be given an opportunity to answer the allegations against it, and to state 
its case, before a committee. 
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287 Van Zyl (2003) 22 Politeia 22. 
291 Ibid at 26. 
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money to be divided amongst the provinces, neither does the explanatory memorandum give 
any real basis for the allocation.292 
 
The annual Division of Revenue Act is used by national government to set conditions for 
certain categories of revenue and expenditure such as the ‘supplementary allocations’. This 
incentivises the desired provincial behaviour. A system of sectoral review teams established 
by national Treasury monitor and influence programme allocations within the social sector 
departments.293 National government in this way secures indirect control over provincial 
government programmes and activities.294 Finally, the system of centralised wage bargaining 
has robbed provinces of a large measure of control over their budgets.295 The creation of a 
single public service further serves to increase central control of the provinces.  
 
Van Zyl argues that the non-implementation of certain constitutional provisions and the manner 
in which others have been implemented, have facilitated central control over provincial revenue 
and expenditure.296 He advances four hypotheses to explain why this pattern has emerged.297 
The first relates to the lack of administrative capacity on the part of provinces. The process of 
rationalising disparate administrative systems has further constrained administrative capacity. 
Differing skill levels, a shortage of skilled professionals, and difficulty in attracting skilled 
professionals further exacerbates the situation. Capacity shortages have often manifested as 
failed service delivery and failure to pay creditors.298  
 
Secondly, Christiansen argues that the organisational culture of many provincial departments 
lacks any distinct ‘provincial identity’. This culture has resulted in provincial departments 
easily buying into the centralised system espoused by national Treasury.299 Thirdly, the system 
of cooperative governance subordinates provincial priorities to national imperatives.300 
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The final factor driving central dominance in fiscal policy is a global shift in thinking on the 
relationship between budgets and policy towards a strategy which puts the budget and macro-
economic balance before other policy considerations.301 In terms of this school of thought, the 
macroeconomic framework drives decisions regarding expenditure, revenue, and borrowing in 
the annual budget. This results in top-down decisions based on whether or not expenditures are 
affordable which, in turn, results in rigid expenditure limits for line ministries and provinces.302 
Fiscal decentralisation is reduced in this model of thinking and sub-national governments are 
only free to fit into the spending limits set by the national Treasury. At provincial level, the 
model is again repeated with provincial treasuries setting the limits for provincial line 
departments. In this way provincial policy and autonomy are subordinated and rendered 
subservient to national policy.303 
 
Calitz and Essop304 conducted a study of fiscal data to establish whether the constitutional and 
public-law argument that government in South Africa was becoming increasingly centralised 
could be established on an empirical basis. In their analysis three indicators were used: the 
grant dependency ratio which indicates the extent to which sub-national government is 
dependent on grants for revenue purposes; the tax coverage ratio which reflects the ability of 
sub-national government to finance its expenditure from its own tax revenue; and the tax-wage 
coverage ratio which measures the ability of sub-national government to fund salaries and 
wages from its own tax revenue.  
 
The grant dependency ratio and the tax expenditure coverage ratio are mirror images under a 
balanced budget, while as regards the tax-wage ratio, data indicated that provinces were able 
to foot less than 3,5 per cent of their wage bills.305 The study concludes that over time, 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa have become increasingly centralised, 
leading to the de facto erosion of the quasi-federal state and a deviation from the Constitution. 
The study does not consider the implications of these findings in detail, but does note an 
analysis of 55 countries in two studies by Oates and Panizza which respectively found that 
country size and income per capita correlate negatively to fiscal centralisation. Panizza, in 
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addition, found that democracy and ethnic fractionalisation are negatively correlated with fiscal 
centralisation (although they have unstable coefficients).306 
 
This section has considered the early development of intergovernmental relations. The 
discussion of fiscal intergovernmental relations above showed a tendency towards 
centralisation in the area of fiscal relations with national priorities trumping those of the other 
spheres of government. It is submitted that over time there has been a reduction in the role of 
the provinces. The discussion points to an emphasis on intergovernmental fiscal relations in 
early practice. A tendency towards centralisation in fiscal matters emerges from an examination 
of fiscal practice in the Budget Forum and the division-of-revenue process.  
 
3.3.2 Judicial Interpretation 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
It was noted above that while the Constitution provided for the enactment of legislation to 
create structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations, the 
envisaged legislation was only enacted a decade later. In the interim, the Constitutional Court 
decided intergovernmental disputes on the basis of the principles set out in the Co-operative 
Governance Chapter of the Constitution.307 In this section, three key judgments handed down 
prior to the enactment of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act308 are considered, 
namely: Premier, Western Capev President of the Republic of South Africa & Another;309 
National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal & others;310 and Uthukela District 
Municipality & others v President of the Republic of South Africa& others.311  
 
 
 
                                                 
306 Ibid at 137. 
307 Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa & another 1999 (3) SA 657 (CC); National 
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311 Uthukela District Municipality & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others 2003 (1) SA 
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(b)  Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa & another312 
 
(i)  The facts 
 
This case concerned a dispute between the Western Cape provincial government and the 
national government over the constitutionality of amendments to the Public Service Act.313 
This case is important for a number of reasons – it addresses cooperative government and 
interprets the Chapter 3 requirements of the Constitution, but also has important implications 
for provincial autonomy and cooperation and coordination in the provinces in that it dealt with 
the structure of provincial administrations and the powers of Premiers. It is submitted that the 
decision in this case has had an inordinate impact on provincial autonomy and on the evolution 
of cooperative governance. For this reason, the facts of the case are considered in some detail. 
 
Before the amendment to the Public Service Act, the public service was divided into the 
national government and provincial administrations. The provincial administration, headed by 
the provincial Director-General (DG), exercised administrative control over the provincial 
administration. The provincial administration was, in turn, further subdivided into departments. 
The new legislative scheme elevated provincial departments to the status of national 
departments, giving provincial heads of department (HODs) the same status, functions, and 
responsibilities as heads of national departments. This meant that provincial HODs would no 
longer fall under the administrative control of the provincial DG. The provincial DG’s powers 
were amended so as to make him or her responsible for the administration of the Office of the 
Premier, intergovernmental relations, and cooperation between the various departments of the 
provincial administration, including coordination of their actions and legislation.314 In addition, 
the provincial DG was to become the Secretary to the Executive Council of the province.315 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
312 Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa & another 1999 (3) SA 657 (CC). 
313 Public Service Laws Amendment Act 86 of 1998. 
314 Public Service Act 103 of 1994: s 7(3) (c), (d). 
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(ii)  The Western Cape Government’s argument 
 
The Western Cape government contended that the amendment was unconstitutional because it 
infringed on the executive power of the provinces to structure their administrations.316 
Although there was much argument before the Constitutional Court regarding whether the new 
scheme was substantively better or worse than the old scheme, the Court declined to enter into 
this area. Instead it confined itself to a consideration of ‘whether Parliament has the competence 
to prescribe how provincial administrations in the public service are to be structured. It also 
considered whether the new legislative scheme falls foul of the cooperative governance 
provisions of the Constitution’.317 
 
(iii)  The Judgment 
 
The executive powers of provinces are set out in section 125 of the Constitution which 
provides: 
 
(1) The executive authority of a province is vested in the Premier of that province; 
(2) The Premier exercises the executive authority, together with the other members of the  Executive 
Council, by – 
(a)  implementing provincial legislation in the province; 
(b)  implementing all national legislation within the functional areas listed in Schedule 4 or 5 except 
where the Constitution or an Act of Parliament provides otherwise; 
(c)  administering in the province, national legislation outside the functional areas listed in 
Schedules 4 and 5, the administration of which has been assigned to the provincial executive in 
terms of an Act of Parliament; 
(d)  developing and implementing provincial policy; 
(e)  co-ordinating the functions of the provincial administration and its departments; 
(f)  preparing and initiating provincial legislation; and performing any other function assigned to 
the provincial executive in terms of the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. 
(3)  A province has executive authority in terms of subsection 2(b) only to the extent that the province has 
the administrative capacity to assume effective responsibility. The national government, by legislative 
and other measures, must assist provinces to develop the administrative capacity required for the effective 
exercise of their powers and performance of their functions referred to in subsection (2). 
(4) ... 
(5) ... 
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(6) The provincial executive must act in accordance with – 
(a)  the Constitution; and 
(b)  the provincial constitution, if a constitution has been passed for the province. 
 
The Constitutional Court noted that section 125 does not deal specifically with the power to 
structure the public service. The Western Cape government argued that the power to establish 
a structure for the provinces is implicit in section 125.318 The Court then considered section 
197 of the Constitution dealing with the structuring of the public service. Section 197 provides: 
 
(1) Within the public administration there is a public service for the Republic, which must function, and be 
structured, in terms of national legislation, and which must loyally execute the lawful policies of the 
government of the day; 
(2) The terms and conditions of employment in the public service must be regulated by national legislation. 
Employees are entitled to a fair pension as regulated by national legislation; 
(3) No employee of the public service may be favoured or prejudiced only because that person supports a 
particular political party or cause; and 
(4) Provincial governments are responsible for the recruitment, appointment, promotion, transfer and 
dismissal of members of the public service in their administrations within a framework of uniform norms 
and standards applying to the public service. 
 
The Constitutional Court reviewed section 197 in the First and Second Certification Judgments 
and noted that between the two judgments, the text of the Constitution had been amended to 
vest the power to ‘recruit, appoint, promote, transfer and dismiss’ employees in provinces. The 
text retained the power of national government to make laws for the structure and functioning 
of the public service.319 This, in the Court’s view, supported the constitutional vision for a 
single public service. This ideal had to be balanced against provincial autonomy resulting in a 
compromise ‘that the framework set for the public service must be set by national legislation, 
but employment, transfers etc. are the responsibility of the various administrations of which 
the public service is composed.’320 
 
With respect to the principle of cooperative government established by section 40 of the 
Constitution, the Constitutional Court noted that Chapter 3 of the Constitution is ‘designed to 
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ensure that in fields of common endeavour the different spheres of government co-operate with 
each other to secure the implementation of legislation in which they all have a common 
interest.’ This requires that all reasonable efforts be made to settle a dispute before a Court is 
approached.321 
 
The need to cooperate in the area of law making was particularly emphasised by the 
Constitutional Court in order to avoid possible legislative conflicts and to settle matters related 
to implementation such as budgeting and the assignment of powers of enforcement.322 Section 
41(g) requires that: ‘All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must 
exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on the 
geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere.’ This 
provision reflects CP XXII, namely that ‘[t]he national government shall not exercise its 
powers (exclusive or concurrent) so as to encroach upon the geographical, functional and 
institutional integrity of the provinces.’ 
 
In the Constitutional Court’s view, section 41(1)(g) is concerned with the way in which a power 
is exercised. The purpose of the section  
 
seems to be to prevent one sphere of government from exercising its powers in ways which undermine other 
spheres of government or prevent them from functioning effectively. The functional and institutional integrity of 
the different spheres of government must, however, be determined with due regard to their place in the 
constitutional order, their powers and functions under the Constitution, and the countervailing powers of other 
spheres of government.323 
 
Turning to a consideration of whether the scheme contravenes section 41, the Constitutional 
Court noted that the scheme was adopted after comprehensive investigations which included 
the opportunity to make representations concerning the draft legislation. The scheme included 
amendments made to accommodate objections raised by the Western Cape government. The 
Court found that this government had not been deprived of any constitutional powers. The 
Premier retained the right to appoint members of the Executive Council, to establish 
departments, and to assign functions to departments. This, according to the Court, meant that 
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‘political direction and executive responsibility for the functions of provincial Governments 
remain firmly in the hands of the Premier and the Executive Council’.324 Members of the 
Executive Council appoint and give instructions to ensure that policy is implemented and that 
the department is administered efficiently.325 The scheme was found to be rational and 
consistent with the structure of government contemplated in the Constitution.326 
 
The rationale for the Constitutional Court’s decision can be found in the First Certification 
Judgment’s consideration of the PSC provisions in the NT. The interim Constitution had 
provided for the establishment of provincial PSCs, a right which was removed in the 
Constitution which provides for the establishment of a single PSC. In the First Certification 
Judgment, this change was one of the reasons why the Court refused certification. It held that 
the effect of the change could not be adequately measured because the powers and function of 
the proposed single, national PSC were not set out. When the amended text was considered in 
the Second Certification Judgment, the Court found that ‘there had been a small diminution in 
the powers of the provinces arising out of the alteration in the functions of the PSC, the change 
in composition, and the disestablishment of the provincial service commissions.’327 A fuller 
discussion of the reasoning of the Constitutional Court on this issue is set out in 2.6 above.  
 
(iv)  Analysis 
 
It is submitted that the acceptance by the Constitutional Court of this reduction in provincial 
powers in the Second Certification Judgment contributed to the erosion of provincial 
autonomy. In the Premier Western Cape case, the Court carried this reasoning further – in its 
view, the creation of a single public service implied that the power to structure the 
administration did not necessarily lie with provinces. It is submitted that the power of the 
provinces to administer themselves and to coordinate their functions and provincial 
administration and its departments contained in section 125 of the Constitution, should be 
interpreted to include the power to structure the provincial administration. It is further 
submitted that the substantive changes which were effected following this decision have led to 
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fragmentation in provincial administrations and weakened the role and powers of provincial 
Premiers. This has, in turn, contributed to the erosion of provincial autonomy.  
 
The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the cooperative governance provisions in the 
Constitution points to deference towards the executive – the Court avoided an evaluation of 
executive actions, and was careful to observe the separation of powers. Although considerable 
argument on the substance of the amendments and how they were better or worse than the 
previous scheme was presented, the Court declined to make a pronouncement. Instead it 
confined itself to a consideration of the legal question of whether Parliament had the power to 
structure provincial administrations.328 Secondly, the Court emphasised the duty of the spheres 
to cooperate with each other. It stressed the requirement that all reasonable efforts had to be 
made to settle disputes before a Court is approached.329 It is noteworthy that the Court 
considered and remarked upon the fact that the Western Cape government had been given an 
opportunity to make representations on the draft law, and that the law had been amended in 
order to accommodate certain of the objections raised.330 Finally, in its consideration of the 
cooperative governance provisions, the Court noted in relation to section 41(1)(g), that the 
section is primarily concerned with the manner in which a power is exercised – powers must 
not be exercised by one sphere in such a manner as to prevent another sphere from functioning 
effectively or in a manner which undermines the other sphere.331 
 
(b) National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal & others332 
 
In this case, the Constitutional Court had to consider a dispute between the National Gambling 
Board (NGB) and the Premier of KwaZulu-Natal. The dispute concerned whether there may 
be only one central electronic monitoring system (CEMS) in the Republic, or whether 
provinces are permitted to have their own monitoring systems. According to the facts, a process 
to identify a monitoring system suitable for South African needs was begun soon after the 
establishment of the NGB in terms of the National Gambling Act.333 This process was regularly 
discussed with members of the various provincial executive councils at MinMec meetings. At 
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the MinMec meeting on 30 August 1999, it was agreed that one centralised system might be 
more effective and efficient. A member of the KwaZulu-Natal executive was present at that 
meeting and did not object to the decision. Regulations providing for a single CEMS for the 
whole country were drafted in terms of the National Act. On 6 November 2000, the Premier 
wrote to the NGB, informing it that KwaZulu-Natal did not intend participating in a single 
CEMS, but would rather establish its own provincial system.334 
 
On 11 February 2000, the regulations promulgated under the KwaZulu-Natal Gambling Act 
were amended by the addition of regulation 58(8) which provides that ‘the electronic 
monitoring system referred to in this Regulation, shall be a single one operated by the province 
or an entity contracted by the province which shall have no interest in respect of gaming in the 
province.’335 The amendment escaped the notice of both the Minister for Trade and Industry 
and the National Gambling Board.336 The NGB continued to invite proposals for the single 
CEMS. At two subsequent meetings where the matter was discussed, KwaZulu-Natal’s 
concerns about the single CEMS were noted. The Minister undertook to meet with the Premier 
to discuss his concerns but continued with the process which resulted in the awarding of the 
contract to the fourth respondent in April 2001. In May 2001, the Minister met with the Premier 
to discuss the CEMS. The Minister left the meeting with the impression that the Premier had 
agreed to the system, a view which the Premier claimed was incorrect.337 The KwaZulu-Natal 
Gambling Board then initiated a call for proposals to implement the KwaZulu-Natal CEMS. 
The NGB launched urgent proceedings to halt this process after sending a letter to the 
KwaZulu-Natal Gambling Board calling upon it to halt proceedings had been ignored.338 
 
The Constitutional Court had to decide whether the matter constituted ‘a dispute between 
organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional status, powers 
or functions of any of those organs of state’ within the meaning of section 167(4)(a) of the 
Constitution which provides that such matters may only be heard by the Constitutional 
Court.339 The Court found that although the parties were organs of state in the national and 
provincial spheres, the dispute did not concern the power to make the legislation but rather the 
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effect of the legislation. It was accordingly not a dispute within the meaning of section 
167(4)(a) and did not fall within the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.340 
 
Turning to the application for direct access, the Constitutional Court considered the obligation 
placed on all spheres of government by section 40(2) in Chapter 3 of the Constitution to observe 
and adhere to the principles of cooperative governance. The Court referred to the duty of organs 
of state to make every reasonable effort to settle disputes and ‘exhaust all other remedies before 
it approaches a Court to resolve the dispute’.341 It referred to section 41(4) which provides that: 
‘If a Court is not satisfied that the requirements of subsection (3) have been met, it may refer a 
dispute back to the organs of state involved.’ 
 
The Constitutional Court then reviewed the conduct of the parties and found that they had made 
no meaningful effort to comply with their constitutional obligation of cooperative government. 
It emphasised that the obligation on organs of state to avoid litigation entails much more than 
an effort to settle a pending Court case. It requires each organ of state to re-evaluate its position 
fundamentally. In the present context, it required of each of the organs of state to re-evaluate 
the need or otherwise for a single CEMS, to consider alternative possibilities and compromises, 
and to do so with regard to the expert advice the other organs of state have obtained.342 The 
parties’ failure to comply with the obligations of Chapter 3 of the Constitution was considered 
sufficient ground for refusing direct access. As in the decision in Premier, Western Cape v 
President of the Republic of South Africa & another, this case indicates the importance of  
adherence to cooperative governance principles by government bodies engaged in 
intergovernmental relations. It is clear from the Court’s decision that at this stage, the Court 
was unwilling lightly to enter into the adjudication of matters with an intergovernmental 
character.  
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(d)  Uthukela District Municipality & others v President of the Republic of South Africa &  
others343 
 
In this case, three district municipalities (Category C municipalities) in KwaZulu-Natal 
challenged the failure of the 2001 Division of Revenue Act344 1 of 2001 to allocate funds to 
district municipalities. The applicant municipalities succeeded in the High Court which issued 
an order declaring section 5(1) of the Act unconstitutional and ‘invalid to the extent that it 
excludes Category C municipalities from sharing with Category A and B municipalities in the 
local government allocation of revenue raised nationally’.345 The applicants sought an order 
from the Constitutional Court confirming the High Court order as well as an order directing 
national government to pay them their respective equitable shares. 
 
During the course of the matter, the parties settled the matter on the basis that national 
government would pay the applicants a specified amount. The settlement was not made an 
order of Court and the applicants did not withdraw their application for confirmation of the 
High Court order. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court was still seized with the confirmation 
proceedings. The Court noted that although the Act had subsequently been repealed, if an order 
may have some practical effect, the Court has a discretion to decide whether or not to deal with 
the confirmation.346 As this matter concerned organs of state, the duty to foster cooperative 
government and to avoid legal proceedings against one another must be taken into account. 
The Court referred to the First Certification Judgment, which interpreted Chapter 3 to mean 
that ‘disputes should where possible be resolved at a political level rather than through 
adversarial litigation’.347 
 
The Constitutional Court stated that ‘it would rarely decide an intergovernmental dispute unless 
the organs of state involved in the dispute have made every reasonable effort to resolve it at a 
political level.’348 This required first that they make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute 
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by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for, and second, that they exhaust all other 
remedies before approaching a Court to resolve a dispute.349 It went on to state that a dispute- 
resolution mechanism was provided in Part 2 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act to 
cater for disputes between organs of state in the national and local spheres.350 Accordingly, the 
Court found that municipalities aggrieved by the omission of district municipalities from the 
2001 equitable share must make use of the dispute resolution procedures in the 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act. If this fails, they must approach the relevant Minister 
directly. The Court elected not to exercise its discretion to decide the confirmation issue in the 
circumstances and in the interests of cooperative governance.351  
 
The cases discussed reveal an unwillingness on the part of the judiciary to traverse the 
substantive merits of national government’s decisions (Premier of the Western Cape v 
President of the Republic of South Africa & another). The Constitutional Court emphasised the 
duty of the spheres to cooperate with each other and to make every effort to settle matters 
before approaching the courts (the First Certification Judgment; Premier of the Western Cape 
v President of the Republic of South Africa & another; National Gambling Board v Premier of 
KwaZulu-Natal & others). This reliance on political means to settle disputes is also found in 
the reasoning of the Court in the Second Certification Judgment. In this case the Court reasoned 
that weaker protection for the appointment and removal of PSC commissioners was justifiable 
on the basis that the PSC was concerned mainly with administrative functions.  
 
In the Constitutional Court’s view political considerations would be sufficient to restrain 
negative conduct. But what happens when political considerations trump the interests of the 
institution and of good governance? There is a real possibility that the fact that the same party 
controls all three spheres in most provinces, will prevent sub-national governments from 
declaring a dispute with national government. In such cases, it is submitted, a more balanced 
approach to IGR which strengthens institutional mechanisms to constrain power and to provide 
checks and balances benefits good governance. 
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3.4  The Practice of Cooperative Governance following the enactment of the 
Intergovernmental Relations Legislation 
 
3.4.1 The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 
 
In 2003 the Presidency commissioned a review of intergovernmental relations. The study noted 
the following key challenges for improving intergovernmental cooperation. 
(a)  Uncertainty and confusion about the roles and status of intergovernmental fora. Lack 
of clarity regarding the status of decisions of IGR structures was highlighted as an area 
requiring attention. In practice, decisions by MinMec were taken as binding on the 
executive of the provinces. Such a practice, however, undermined the executive 
authority of the provinces.352 
(b) The need to formalise the composition and functions of the President’s Coordinating 
Council.353 
(c) The exclusion of local government from full participation in existing IGR structures 
undermined participatory governance. It was recommended that the participation of 
local government be institutionalised.354 
(d) The complete absence of IGR fora and the ineffective functioning of IGR fora in 
provinces where they do exist. 
(e) Lack of coordination of information flowing between the PCC, MinMec, and provincial 
IGR fora.355 
 
A key recommendation of the study was that comprehensive legislation be adopted by 
Parliament to give effect to section 41(3) of the Constitution which requires an Act of 
Parliament to establish and provide structures and mechanisms to promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations, and to provide appropriate mechanisms and procedures to 
facilitate the settlement of intergovernmental disputes.356 The envisaged legislation, the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, was eventually passed in 2005 with the aim of 
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establishing a general legislative framework applicable to all spheres of government to ensure 
the conduct of intergovernmental relations in the spirit of the Constitution.357 
 
The stated objects of the Act are to provide for: 
(a) coherent government; 
(b) effective provision of services; 
(c) monitoring and implementation of policy and legislation; and 
(d) realisation of national priorities.358  
 
The Act gives statutory recognition to existing intergovernmental structures. The system it 
establishes creates a hierarchy of structures from the President’s Coordinating Council down 
to national intergovernmental fora, provincial intergovernmental fora, and municipal 
intergovernmental fora. The membership, powers, and functions of each structure are set out 
and recognition is afforded to existing MinMecs. The diagram below illustrates the structural 
framework created by the Act. 
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Figure 2: Structures created by the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 
 
A further objective of the Act is to set out a formal process for the settlement of 
intergovernmental disputes between the three spheres of government. Section 40(1) elaborates 
on the constitutional duty of government departments to avoid disputes and to settle matters 
without resorting to judicial proceedings. Various steps are set out which provide detail as to 
how a dispute must be escalated from one level to the next. These are as follows: 
Step 1:  Every effort, including direct negotiations, must be made to settle the dispute. 
Step 2: An intergovernmental dispute may be declared by notifying the other party in 
writing. 
Step 3:  Once a formal dispute has been declared, the parties must promptly convene a 
meeting to determine the nature of the dispute and the material issues. At this 
meeting they must identify mechanisms available to resolve the dispute (other 
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than judicial settlement) and must designate a person to act as facilitator. (The 
relevant Minister or MEC may convene this meeting if the parties fail to do so.) 
Step 4:  The parties must make every effort to settle the matter using the mechanism 
identified in Step 3. 
Step 5:  The facilitator must assist the parties to settle the dispute and must provide the 
relevant Minister or MEC with regular progress reports. 
Step 6:  The process above must be exhausted before any party may approach a court to 
settle the matter. 
 
It is important to note that in terms of the Act, no negotiations and discussions undertaken in 
terms of the Act to settle the dispute may be used as evidence in any judicial proceedings if the 
matter is not settled. 359 
 
It is strange that the Act provides that in cases of conflict with another Act, the provisions of 
that other Act will prevail. Cooperative government is of paramount importance in a 
decentralised state – an importance recognised in Chapter 3 of the Constitution – yet the Act 
which governs relations between the spheres of government is, in terms of its own provisions, 
subordinate to other Acts. This may have been included in light of the time-lapse before the 
Act was eventually adopted, during which intergovernmental processes had been included in 
other Acts. This points to the difficulty of fragmentation in the legislative framework for 
managing intergovernmental relations.  
 
The design of the Act appears to reflect a ‘top down’ approach to intergovernmental relations 
which is at odds with the approach required in a developmental state which has included 
decentralised features in its design. The Integrated Development Planning Process is designed 
to promote participatory democracy and ‘bottom up’ planning. It is not clear how the structures 
established in terms of the Act tie into this process which is set out in the Municipal Systems 
Act. The way in which local government is incorporated into the structures, mutes the voice of 
this sphere – for example, a single representative sits on the President’s Coordinating Council 
and is expected single-handedly to represent the diverse interests of local government as a 
whole. The diversity of interests would present a challenge to effective representation. This 
issue is compounded by the political superiority of the other representatives on the structure 
                                                 
359 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005: Chapter 4. 
  
96 
 
and the fact that they outnumber the local government representative. Such arrangements tend 
to foster the domination of national interests in discussions in the forum. 
 
Malherbe argues that the design of the Act facilitates national dominance. He finds it significant 
that the objects clause in the Act lists the realisation of ‘national priorities’ as an object of the 
Act.360 The development and implementation of national priorities is further addressed in 
sections 4(d), 7(a) and (b), 11(a) and (b), 18(a)(i), (iii) and (iv), 26(1)(a) and (b), 35(2)(a), and 
36(1)(a), whereas only a single provision – section 18(a)(v) and (vi) – deals with provincial 
policy and legislation.361 The trend towards national dominance continues with section 36 
which requires provincial governments to take account of national priorities in drafting any 
legislation and to consult with local government. It is notable that there is no equivalent 
provision compelling local government to consult with the other spheres (other than a general 
duty to cooperate set out in the objects). Malherbe argues that from this ‘the only logical 
explanation is that the Act’s primary purpose is not to regulate the relationship among the 
spheres of government, but to ensure the smooth feeding down of national policies and 
implementation by the other spheres’.362 
 
A further notable feature of the Act is that it does not apply to Parliament, the NCOP, or the 
provincial legislatures. The NCOP, as the primary forum representing provincial interests in 
the formulation of government policy, was surprisingly excluded from government’s review of 
intergovernmental relations which gave rise to the drafting of the intergovernmental relations 
legislation. Also notable is that although the review pointed to a lack of coordination in the 
national government and the province’s approach to the regulation of local government, the 
need to set up a ‘clearing house’ for legislation impacting on local government is not addressed 
by the Act. This is a significant oversight and one which is discussed further in the following 
chapter.  
 
In Minister of Police & others v Premier of the Western Cape & others, the Constitutional 
Court had to consider an intergovernmental dispute under the Act.363 The facts of the case were 
briefly that the Minister of Police and the National Commissioner of the South African Police 
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Service contested the power of the Premier of the Western Cape to appoint a provincial 
commission of enquiry with powers to subpoena members of the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) to appear before it regarding allegations of police inefficiency. The High Court upheld 
the power of the Premier to appoint the commission and dismissed the contention that the 
Premier had violated the principles of cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations 
set out in section 41 of the Constitution. However, in a minority judgment Saldanha J disagreed 
and stated that the parties had not exhausted their obligations under section 41 to find 
appropriate means to resolve the situation. He concluded that he would have granted the 
interdict and ordered the parties to take steps to resolve the conflict.364 
 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court dismissed the application. In the course of deciding the 
matter the Court noted that section 40(2) requires organs of state to comply with the principles 
of cooperative government, while section 41(3) requires that all reasonable efforts be made to 
settle the dispute using the mechanisms and procedures provided before approaching the Court. 
The Court noted that although it has a discretion to refuse to hear a dispute if it is not satisfied 
that the parties have made a reasonable effort to resolve it, it is not precluded from hearing the 
dispute in these circumstances.365 
 
The applicants advanced three bases for contending that the Premier had breached her 
cooperative governance obligations. First, that the establishment of the commission usurped 
the powers of the Minister and the commissioner in breach of section 41(e) which requires all 
spheres of government and all organs of state to respect the constitutional status, institutions, 
powers, and functions of government in the other spheres. The Constitutional Court held that 
there was no merit in this contention as the Premier had exercised the power given to her in 
terms of section 206(5) of the Constitution. Section 41 does not require the Premier to declare 
a dispute before exercising a power conferred on her by the Constitution.366 
 
The second contention was that although the Premier was acting in terms of powers conferred 
by the Constitution, she was still required by section 41(1)(h)(iii) and (iv) of the Constitution 
to inform other members of government and to consult them on matters of common interest as 
well as to coordinate her actions. The Constitutional Court held that the Premier was indeed 
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obliged to consult the Minister and the commissioner before appointing the commission, but it 
was clear from the facts that the Premier had over a nine-month period engaged in extensive 
correspondence with the provincial commissioner and that this correspondence had been 
copied to the Minister and the national commissioner.367 
 
The final contention was that the Premier had not made every reasonable effort to settle the 
matter while the Minister and the commissioner had made such efforts. The difficulty with this 
contention was that the dispute arose after the Premier had established the commission. It was 
only at this stage that that the Minister expressed his opposition to the commission. ‘Even so, 
the Minister and the Commissioner did not declare a dispute as required by the Framework 
Act; instead they approached the High Court.’368 Accordingly, the Constitutional Court found 
that it had not been shown that the Premier had failed to comply with the Constitution and the 
Act.369 
 
It is submitted that in this case the Constitutional Court appears to have moved away from its 
earlier position of executive deference. In this regard, although the facts demonstrated that 
efforts had been made to resolve the dispute, the Court referred to the fact that it enjoyed a 
discretion to hear disputes even when it is not clear that all reasonable efforts have been made 
to resolve the dispute. The fact that a number of municipalities are in opposition hands may 
contribute to an increase in the number of intergovernmental disputes ending up in Court. There 
are indications that even in ANC-led municipalities, there is greater willingness to approach 
the courts. For example, in the Ingonyama Trust case, the eThekwini Municipality instituted 
action in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court for an order that the property of the Trust which falls 
under its jurisdiction be declared rateable for the relevant period. This was a politically-charged 
case considering that the land in question (worth a huge amount in rates to the municipal fiscus) 
was owned predominantly by the Zulu king in the province.370 It can be argued that the fact 
that the case was brought, taken together with changes in the political control of municipalities, 
indicates a greater willingness to seek judicial adjudication of intergovernmental disputes. 
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3.4.2 The Role of Intergovernmental Relations in promoting Service Delivery 
 
In 2012 Harouvi conducted a study into the role played by intergovernmental relations in 
promoting effective service delivery in the Amathole District Municipality in KwaZulu-
Natal.371 The study sample consisted of 70 respondents including municipal officials, 
intergovernmental relations practitioners, representatives of community-based organisations, 
and residents from the district and local municipalities. The findings provide important insights 
into the functioning of the intergovernmental relations system at local government level. Only 
three of the seven local municipalities were found to be active in intergovernmental relations 
in the district. Reasons cited for this lack of participation included lack of coordination and 
lack of political will on the part of provincial and national government fully to support local 
government. 
 
Participants were asked to respond to the question whether there was a strong bond of 
cooperation between the Amathole District Municipality, its local municipalities, and the 
provincial and national governments. Sixty-nine per cent of respondents indicated that there 
was not such a bond between the three spheres of government. The following challenges 
impacting on intergovernmental relations were identified by the study:372 
(a)  Poor structural design of intergovernmental forums. 
(b) Government’s planning cycle is fragmented and disorderly (there are various and 
divergent planning cycles in the various government departments). 
(c)  Political infighting and factionalism manifest in intergovernmental forums and hamper 
the achievement of service delivery goals. 
(d) Local municipalities do not participate actively in intergovernmental relations. 
(e)  Sector forums and government departments do not actively participate in 
intergovernmental relations (non-attendance at meetings is widespread as is delegation 
to junior officials to attend). 
(f)  The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act is a paper tiger which exists only in 
theory. In practice there are many loopholes and failures. 
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(g)  Local government is not integrated into the intergovernmental relations system created 
by the Act. 
(h)  Intergovernmental relations is fragmented and the three spheres act in isolation. The 
spirit of cooperative government is not being respected and promoted. 
 
Harouvi makes the following recommendations based on the finding of his study:373 
(a)  The relevant stakeholders in intergovernmental relations should be fully dedicated to 
cooperation. 
(b)  The National Planning Commission should assume an oversight role in 
intergovernmental relations. 
(c)  The planning cycles for public entities need to be synergised. 
(d)  Legislation which includes a punitive clause for failure to cooperate in 
intergovernmental relations should be enacted. 
(e)  National, provincial, and local government should cooperate in prioritising access to 
basic services in communities. 
 
It is difficult to fault the findings based on the qualitative research in the study. In fact, the 
findings correlate with research conducted by the SALGA and the Department of Monitoring 
and Evaluation, as well as with the writer’s experience in more than ten years spent in the local 
government sector. However, it is submitted that apart from the recommendation to synergise 
planning cycles, the remaining recommendations would not result in positive improvements in 
cooperative governance. Recommendations (a), (d) and (e) lack substantive detail. As regards 
the ‘punitive clause’ recommended in (d) – one must ask against whom the action would be 
aimed. Would lowly officials be targeted? Or would punitive action be aimed at senior 
management and the political leadership of the department? As for oversight by the National 
Planning Commission, this is not the mandated function of the NPC. There is a need to oversee 
the implementation of intergovernmental relations, but it is submitted that this role is better 
suited to a government department with a sufficiently broad mandate and political backing to 
support its role in this cross-cutting and vitally important area of governance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
373 Ibid at 190-195. 
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3.4.3 The Practice of Supervision of Local Government 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the autonomy of local government and its power to administer the 
functional areas listed in Schedules 4B and 5B to the Constitution is constrained by the 
constitutional duty of provincial government to monitor and support local government in the 
province by legislative and other means.374 The provincial and national governments have the 
legislative and executive authority to ensure that municipalities perform their functions in 
respect of the matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B effectively, by regulating the exercise by 
municipalities of their executive authority,375 and the national and provincial government may 
not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform 
its functions.376 
 
In order to fulfil its duty to monitor and support, the Constitution has given provinces powers 
to intervene in circumstances where local government fails to carry out its constitutional 
mandate. The Constitutional Court considered this scheme in the First Certification 
Judgment377 and noted that the Constitution seeks to realise a structure for local government 
that on the one hand shows a concern for the autonomy and integrity of local government and 
‘prescribes a hands-off relationship between LG and other levels of government, and, on the 
other, acknowledges the requirement that higher levels of government monitor LG functioning 
and intervene where such functioning is deficient’.378 These provisions form an important part 
of the framework within which cooperation between the spheres must occur in order to ensure 
that service delivery is prioritised. In this section, the practice of supervision of local 
government is considered with particular reference to provincial interventions in local 
government.  
 
Mathenjwa’s 2017 study published as The Supervision of Local Government, examines a 
number of provincial interventions in local government in order to establish whether the 
practice of supervision corresponds to the legal framework for supervision of local 
government.379 He considered a number of case studies in order to establish whether or not 
                                                 
374 Constitution: s 155(6)(a). 
375 Ibid s 155(7). 
376 Ibid s 151(4). 
377 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC).  
378 Ibid para 373. 
379 Mathenjwa Supervision of Local Government (2017). 
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general trends could be identified from the practice of provincial governments. Most case 
studies were drawn from the province of KwaZulu-Natal. The author examined provincial 
interventions in the following municipalities: Utrecht, Imbabazane, Abaqulusi, 
Umhhlabuyalingana, Langeberg, and in Umvoti and Mnquma Local Municipalities, and 
Umgungundlovu and Overberg District Municipalities.  
 
From an analysis of the interventions in the cases mentioned above, Mathenjwa found that the 
exercise of the power of supervision by provincial government in some provinces points to an 
incorrect understanding by provincial government of its powers over local government. A trend 
in which provincial government disrespects the constitutional autonomy of local government 
was also discerned. The study found that party political considerations often marred provincial 
interventions and that this trend was particularly evident where the province was led by a 
political party other than the party leading the municipality. He argues that the failure of 
provincial government to conceptualise and understand the legal requirements when 
intervening in local governments requires the attention of national government.380 
 
While the influence of party-political considerations on the use of government powers is not a 
phenomenon confined to the South African context, the observations of this study are cause for 
concern – not least because of their negative impact on cooperative governance. Taken together 
with the findings in the Harouvi and the SALGA studies discussed above, they are indicative 
of an intergovernmental system in need of intervention. 
 
3.4.4 Institutional Location of responsibility for Cooperative Government 
 
In this section, the institutional location of responsibility for co-operative governance is 
discussed in order to examine whether this factor has impacted on the practice of co-operative 
governance. Before June 1999, the mandate to ensure cooperative government lay with the 
Department of Constitutional Development which was responsible for development and 
implementation of the Constitution. This portfolio included the administrative branches:  
(a)  Constitutional Development (management, cooperative governance, constitutional 
affairs, and provincial and traditional affairs).  
                                                 
380 Ibid at 24–215. 
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(b)  Administration (financial management, personnel and provisioning administration, 
legal support, office support, and policy formulation).  
(c)  Local Government Affairs (local government development and support, finance, 
infrastructure and planning, disaster management, equitable shares).  
(d)  Auxiliary and associated services (communication services, contributions to the 
Training Fund for Local Government Affairs and the Represented Political Parties 
Fund, and support for the Municipal Demarcation Board and the National House of 
Traditional Leaders).381 
 
The Constitutional Development Department oversaw much of the early policy development 
which produced the restructured local government system. This included the development of 
the White Paper on local government and the discussion document on cooperative government 
referred to earlier in this thesis.  
 
However, in June 1999 the Department of Constitutional Development was restructured and 
provincial and local government affairs and traditional affairs were shifted to a new department 
– Provincial and Local Government Affairs. Constitutional Affairs was shifted to the 
Department of Justice, which became the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development.  
 
Following the restructuring, the Department of Provincial and Local Government comprised 
of the following administrative components. 
(a)  Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (support, development of 
constitutional principles and practices surrounding intergovernmental relations, 
cooperative governance, and traditional affairs). 
(b)  Auxiliary and Associated Services (communication services, contributions to the 
Training Fund for Local Government Affairs and the Represented Political Parties 
Fund, and support for the Municipal Demarcation Board and the National House of 
Traditional Leaders). 
(c)  Development and Support (support to local government and the promotion of 
development). 
(d)  Administration (financial management, personnel, administration and legal services). 
                                                 
381 See www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/1999/ene/vote_04.pdf accessed on 4 March 2016.  
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It is submitted that the effect of this restructuring on the constitutional-development sector of 
the Department of Justice has been to hollow out the development and implementation 
functions of its mandate. Shackled to the justice portfolio, the goal of constitutional 
development was dwarfed by the administration of justice components of the newly 
constructed portfolio. The majority of its budget went the way of the Department of Local 
Government, and with its loss of status and identity, constitutional development in the 
overarching sense faded away. For the most part, the constitutional development branch busied 
itself with human rights advocacy funded by the European Union, and raising awareness of the 
Constitution. The ‘development’ part of its title exists in name only. Functionally, the branch 
has an organogram for a Constitutional Research and Review Chief Directorate, but no staff 
has been appointed. In the result, not much work of any policy significance regarding 
constitutional matters has emanated from the branch in recent years. Constitutional 
development has been swallowed whole by the Department of Justice.  
 
As a result of the institutional changes, the deliberate, coordinated, and planned development 
of the Constitution ceased. The unfortunate result of this is the disjointed and fragmented 
intergovernmental relations framework which has developed and its unfortunate tendency of 
silo planning. Another unfortunate result is that cooperative governance has come to be viewed 
purely in relation to the dynamic between provincial and local government. It is submitted that 
cooperative government entails more than the management of municipal oversight, monitoring, 
and support of local government. Its central importance to the constitutional scheme in the 
South African government structure has been negatively affected by assigning complete 
responsibility for it to the Department of Provincial and Local Government. The function of 
coordinating government functions and overseeing implementation and development of the 
Constitution, is an important objective. The negative consequences of the failure to apply 
resources and research in the development of our system of cooperative government are 
becoming evident. It is submitted that the institutional responsibility for co-operative 
government needs to be revisited urgently.  
 
3.4.5 Service Delivery Protests 
 
The increasing intensity of service delivery protest in South Africa is cause for grave concern. 
The SALGA noted 4 493 protest actions attributed to local service delivery between 2009 and 
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2013.382 Municipal IQ, a specialised local government data and intelligence organisation in 
South Africa, defines a ‘service delivery protest’ as ‘a protest which is galvanised by 
inadequate local services or tardy service delivery, the responsibility for which lies with the 
municipality’.383 Its research has found a five-fold increase in major service protests between 
2007 and 2017. Gauteng, the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, and the North West, collectively 
accounted for three quarters of all major protests in 2017.384 
 
Unpacking the reasons for service delivery protests is complex. Research has indicated that the 
reasons for service delivery protests are most often attributed to poor service delivery for 
housing, electricity, water, and sanitation centred mainly in informal settlements in the large 
metropolitan municipalities.385 But the data from the 2016 Community Survey conducted by 
Statistics South Africa, shows that the composite service delivery index was highest for 
Metros.386 If Metros deliver the best services, why are they also the site of most service delivery 
protests? Some researchers attribute the high rate of service delivery protests in urban areas to 
high levels of migration and the migrants’ proximity to informal settlements. It is argued that 
the perceived disadvantage of informal-settlement dwellers engenders feelings of 
dissatisfaction and anger creating a fertile environment for protest.387 This may be a compelling 
argument but it fails to take account of the high levels of dissatisfaction with municipal delivery 
across all sectors of South Africans – the 2016 Community Survey found that 75 per cent of 
all households surveyed nationally did not believe that municipalities were trying to solve the 
problems/difficulties they had identified. This indicates a high level of dissatisfaction with local 
government service delivery in all communities surveyed, and not solely in households within 
                                                 
382 ‘Community Protest: Local Government Perceptions’ available at https://www.salga.org.za/.../Community% 
20Protest%202016%20without%20BLEED.pdf accessed on 28 September 2017. 
383 See www.municipaliq.co.za/publications/press/2017/press/20171024101239784.pdf accessed on 28 
September 2017.  
384 Ibid.  
Allan K & Heese K ‘Understanding why service delivery protests take place and who is to blame’ available at 
www.municipaliq.co.za accessed on 28 September 2017. 
385 ‘Public protest in democratic South Africa’ available at http://sahistory.org.za/article/public-protest-
democratic-south-africa accessed on 28 September 2017. 
386 ‘The state of basic service delivery in South Africa: In-depth analysis of the Community Survey 2016 data’ 
available at www.statsa.gov.za/publications/Report%2003-01-22/Report%2003-01-222016.pdf accessed on 28 
September 2017. The composite service delivery index combines the individual index scores calculated for 
sanitation, water, refuse disposal, and electricity in order to create an overall measure of service delivery across 
municipalities. 
387 See www.municipaliq.co.za/publications/press/2017/press/20171024101239784.pdf  accessed on 28 
September 2017. See also Allan K & Heese K ‘Understanding why service delivery protests take place and who 
is to blame’ available at www.municipaliq.co.za accessed on 28 September 2017. 
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the informal settlements.388 The general conclusion is that South Africans are unhappy with the 
quality of service delivery. 
 
Many factors linked to institutional, governance, financial, and human capacity constraints 
limit service delivery, but the question is: Could the cause for poor service delivery lie partly 
in poor coordination between the three spheres of government? The SALGA appears to think 
so. In 2010 it published a study into local government perceptions of community protests which 
found that community protest bore limited relation to demanding service delivery. In the 
follow-up 2015 study, most interviewees stated that protest action was not primarily aimed at 
local government.389 The sample group included mayors, speakers, municipal managers, and 
senior officials in municipalities. In response to the statement: ‘Local government believes that 
these actions from other spheres of government would contribute to reducing protest action’, 
the overwhelming majority of respondents identified ‘improved coordination of shared services 
between spheres of government’ and ‘more strategic and thorough consultation with local 
government when establishing national priorities’.390 These responses indicate a widely-held 
perception of poor coordination by senior officials and politicians in local government.391  
 
Accordingly, the SALGA study makes the following recommendations related to improving 
coordination between the spheres:392 
 
(a)  Local government participation structures must be the primary structures through which redress activities 
occur. National and provincial spheres of government must assist and build capacity in public 
participation structures at local level, contribute to improvements in coordination between the spheres of 
government, and ensure that all spheres of government are accessible to communities at grassroots level. 
(b) Additional resources should be channelled into local government to enable it to perform its service 
delivery mandates in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. 
 
                                                 
388 ‘The state of basic service delivery in South Africa: In-depth analysis of the Community Survey 2016 data’ 
available at www.statsa.gov.za/publications/Report%2003-01-22/Report%2003-01-222016.pdf accessed on 28 
September 2017. 
389 ‘Community Protest: Local Government Perceptions’ 8 available at https://www.salga.org.za/.../Community% 
20Protest%202016%20without%20BLEED.pdf, accessed on 28 September 2017. 
390 Ibid.  
391 Ibid at 47. 
392 Ibid at 9.  
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The Twenty-Year Review of Local Government Paper released by the Department of 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation has highlighted the need to improve cooperative 
governance in its policy proposals.393 This finding is reinforced by the National Development 
Plan which has made the following recommendations for improving cooperative government: 
(a)  Improving the intergovernmental system, including strengthening intergovernmental 
protocols between district and local municipalities where there is conflict over the 
allocation of responsibilities and resources. 394  
(b)  Recognising the variance in capacity across municipalities and devolving more 
responsibilities where capacity exists while allowing only core functions along with 
capacity building in weaker municipalities.395 
(c)  Strengthening local government by improving systems of active support and 
monitoring by provincial and national government for local government, including 
improvements to mainstream citizen participation.396 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the practice of cooperative governance and intergovernmental 
relations during the period 1996 to 2017. It has argued that there are significant shortcomings 
in the area of cooperative government which require attention: 
(a)  Changes made to the composition and functions of the PSC/s between the interim and 
1996 Constitutions have negatively impacted on the independence of the PSC and on 
the autonomy of the provinces. 
(b)  The delay in passing the intergovernmental legislation required by the Constitution and 
the provisions of the IGRF Act has hampered the evolution of good practice in 
cooperative governance and led to fragmentation of the intergovernmental relations 
system. 
(c) Fiscal intergovernmental relations have had a significant impact on the evolution of 
cooperative government. A tendency towards centralisation is discernible in the 
practice of fiscal intergovernmental relations fora with national priorities taking 
                                                 
393 Department of Monitoring and Evaluation ‘Twenty-year Review South Africa 1994-2014 Background Paper: 
Local Government’ 5, 46. 
394 National Planning Commission ‘National Development Plan’ (2012) 385–386 available at 
https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 accessed on 30 September 2017.  
395 Ibid at 391.  
396 Ibid at 44-46, 74-75. 
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precedence over the other spheres. Over time this has resulted in a reduction in 
provincial autonomy. 
(d)  The NCOP is not fulfilling its constitutional mandate to represent provincial interests. 
This is in part due to the failure of the NA to introduce section 76 legislation in the 
NCOP. 
(e)  The Cabinet-Cluster system has significant shortcomings including duplication of 
work, time consuming and cumbersome processes, dilution of accountability and 
expertise, risk of lowest-common-denominator outcomes, and the exclusion of local 
government from the system. 
(f)  The institutional relocation of the cooperative governance function to the Department 
of Local and Provincial Government, and the reconstitution of the former Constitutional 
Development Department as part of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development has impacted negatively on the importance of cooperative governance to 
the detriment of good governance in the South African administration. 
 
In this light, it is submitted that the following areas require intervention: 
(a)  The Cabinet Cluster system must be reviewed in order to address the many problems 
with the system identified in this study. 
(b)  The legislative framework for intergovernmental relations needs to be reviewed. The 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act needs to be overhauled and the 
fragmented provisions which govern the area but are contained in other statutes need to 
be aligned. 
(c) Linkages between existing but fractured IGR institutions must be created. 
(d) The role of local government in existing IGR structures must be strengthened. 
(e) The ‘top-down’ nature of the current IGR structures must be reviewed and aligned with 
the requirements of developmental government which necessitates ‘bottom-up’ 
planning. The integrated development planning process needs to become a central focus 
in government’s coordination of its plans and programmes. 
(f) The community participation processes in municipalities must be strengthened. In this 
regard the poor level of functioning of ward committees requires particular attention. 
(g) The planning and budgeting cycles of local, provincial, and national government must 
be aligned. 
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(h) The fiscal intergovernmental relations framework and the manner in which allocations 
are made to provincial and local government need to be reviewed, and the participation 
of sub-national government in the allocation process must be strengthened.  
(i) The institutional arrangements at provincial level must be revisited and the Premiers’ 
Offices strengthened in order to align and synergise planning and address ‘silo-
planning’ in provincial departments. This will also improve monitoring and evaluation 
of provincial performance against national objectives. 
(j) There must be a concerted effort to move away from viewing cooperative government 
as an event. Cooperative government needs to be inculcated as a constitutional value 
across government departments, at the same time competitive and adversarial politics 
between government departments and between the three spheres need to be addressed. 
(k) The institutional responsibility for cooperative government and the constitutional 
development function in the administration must be revisited.  
(l) The possibility of reviewing certain aspects of the cooperative governance provisions 
in the Constitution must be investigated. For instance, the legislative process would 
benefit from a provision compelling the introduction of section 76 Bills in the NCOP. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE PRACTICE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTIONAL AREAS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3, the practice of cooperative government and intergovernmental relations was 
discussed. The discussion revealed that there is a disconnect between the principles of 
cooperative governance enshrined in the Constitution, and the day-to-day practice of 
intergovernmental relations in the state. A centralisation of power was evident in 
intergovernmental institutions together with a competitive and adversarial form of interaction 
between officials and government in all three spheres which has negatively impacted on policy 
coherence and implementation (service delivery). In the current chapter the focus is on the 
interaction between national and provincial law-making power and the legislative authority of 
local government. As has been pointed out, the constitutional power of national and provincial 
government to regulate local government is clear and undisputed.397 This regulation is intended 
to occur within the bounds defined by the Constitution and the Constitutional Court in the First 
Certification Judgment.398 This means that both national and provincial government retain 
authority to legislate in local government functional areas within defined parameters. As 
discussed above, there is broad consensus that the monitoring of local government by national 
government should not occur by passing overly prescriptive laws but rather by legislative 
frameworks or ‘norms and standards legislation’.399 In practice, however, the complexity of the 
constitutional framework for the allocation of powers means that different departments have 
differing understandings of their powers when it comes to local government matters. For local 
government this has translated into an increasingly complex web of legislation and policy 
which municipalities are required to navigate in order to fulfil their functions. 
                                                 
397 See Section 2.6 above. 
398 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) discussed in Section 2.7.1(a) above. 
399 Discussed in Section 2.7.1(a) above. 
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The lack of coordination of their regulatory programmes with respect to local government by 
national and provincial governments was highlighted in the Intergovernmental and Service 
Delivery Review: Ten Year Review. The Review found that:400 
 
The practice of regulation suggests that there is no consistency in approach to local government by line 
departments at both national and provincial level. National and provincial legislation are sometimes at odds. 
Furthermore, national government does not set integrated medium term policy priorities for local government as 
a sphere of government. Rather each national department has considerable discretion to determine its own strategic 
priorities for local government, which may or may not correspond with other sector priorities or the interests of 
the local sphere as a whole. 
 
There are currently no institutions which deal directly with the problem. There is no clearing house for national 
policy affecting local government. The MinMec on Local Government is not able to address multi-sectoral issues. 
In particular, the disjunction between financial budgeting and sectoral planning must be bridged. What is required 
is a ‘whole of government’ approach to local government.401 
 
The lack of coordination between national departments has resulted in the adoption of a large 
number of seemingly disconnected pieces of legislation by various national and provincial 
departments. In this chapter the design of the division-of-powers provisions in the Constitution 
is unpacked. Some key developments in legislative practice during the period under 
consideration are examined. The particular focus of this section is on the way in which the 
constitutional allocation of legislative authority between the spheres has been implemented 
with an emphasis on local government. First, the constitutional allocation of powers is 
examined together with the mechanism for resolving conflicts between laws. Next, some 
common problems associated with the concurrent allocation of powers and responsibilities are 
considered. In the final part of the chapter, four case studies which illustrate various aspects of 
state practice are considered. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
400 Layman T ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South Africa: A Ten-year review 
commissioned by the Presidency’ (2003) 24 available at http://sarpn.org/documents/d000078751docs/ 
Layman%20Tim.pdf accessed on 23 September 2017. 
401 Ibid at 22. 
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4.2  The Constitutional Division of Powers 
 
4.2.1 National Legislative Authority 
 
The Constitution establishes three spheres of government – national, provincial, and local – 
and describes these spheres as distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated.402 Legislative 
authority is divided between the national, provincial, and local spheres of government.403 
 
National government’s power to legislate is bound only by the Constitution. It must act within 
the limits of the Constitution.404 Only Parliament may pass legislation amending the 
Constitution. It may also pass legislation with respect to ‘any matter’ listed in Schedule 4 to 
the Constitution and with respect to matters which are incidental to Schedule 4 matters.405 In 
terms of this formulation, the residual powers vest in Parliament. The national legislature may 
assign any of its legislative powers, save the power to amend the Constitution, to another 
legislative body in another sphere of government.406 
 
National government is excluded from adopting legislation with respect to a matter within a 
functional area listed in Schedule 5 to the Constitution unless it is necessary:407  
 
(a)  to maintain national security; 
(b)  to maintain economic unity; 
(c) to maintain essential national standards; 
(d)  to establish minimum standards required for the rendering of services; or 
(e)  to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another 
province or to the country as a whole.408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
402 Constitution: s 40. 
403 Ibid s 43. 
404 Ibid s 44(4). 
405 Ibid ss 44(1) (a), 44(2), and 44(3). Schedule 4 to the Constitution sets out the functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial legislative competence. 
406 Ibid s 44(1) (a) (iii). 
407 Schedule 5 to the Constitution sets out the areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence. 
408 Constitution: s 44(2). 
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4.2.2 Provincial Legislative Authority 
 
The legislative authority of provincial government is vested in the provincial legislature and 
includes the power to pass a provincial constitution and to legislate with regard to any 
functional area listed in Schedule 4 or 5 to the Constitution. A province may legislate on matters 
which are reasonably necessary for or incidental to the effective exercise of a power concerning 
a Schedule 4 matter.409 It may also legislate on matters which have been expressly assigned to 
the province by national legislation.410 Provinces may also legislate on any matter for which 
the Constitution envisages the enactment of provincial legislation. A provincial legislature may 
assign any of its legislative powers to a municipal council in that province.411 
 
Provincial legislatures are accorded the ability to recommend legislation to the NA concerning 
any matter which falls outside of the legislative authority of the provinces.412 The provinces 
participate in the national legislative process by their participation in the NCOP. Each province 
sends a delegation of ten members headed by the provincial Premier to the NCOP.413 The 
NCOP may consider, pass, amend, propose amendments to, or reject any legislation before it. 
It is further empowered to initiate legislation falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 
4 or other legislation referred to in section 76(3) but it may not initiate money Bills.414 
 
In terms of section 44(1)(b) of the Constitution, the support of six of the provinces in the NCOP 
is required in order to amend the Constitution. Two separate procedures are set for the adoption 
of legislation in sections 75 and 76. This procedure distinguishes between ordinary Bills 
affecting the provinces and ordinary Bills not affecting the provinces. 
 
In respect of ordinary Bills not affecting the provinces, the NCOP may consider the Bill and 
either pass it with or without amendments, or reject it. Upon receiving the Bill from the NCOP, 
the NA may take the amendments proposed by the NCOP into account, or reject them and pass 
the Bill in its original form. 
 
                                                 
409 Ibid s 104(4). 
410 Ibid s 104. 
411 Ibid s 104(1) (c). 
412 Ibid s 104(5). 
413 Ibid s 60. 
414 Ibid s 68. 
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The NCOP has a greater say with regard to section 76 Bills – referred to as ordinary Bills 
affecting the provinces. Here an impasse between the two Houses is referred to the Mediation 
Committee. This committee may agree on the Bill as passed by the NA, the amended Bill 
passed by the NCOP, or another version of the Bill. If the Mediation Committee cannot break 
the deadlock, the Bill lapses unless the NA again passes it. However an increased majority of 
two thirds is required in the NA to pass the Bill in these circumstances.415 
 
4.2.3 Local Government Legislative Authority 
 
Section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution provides that a municipality has executive authority over 
and the right to administer the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part 
B of Schedule 5 to the Constitution. In terms of the Constitution, municipalities may exercise 
any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for or incidental to the effective 
performance of their functions.416 
 
Municipalities may make and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters 
which they have a right to administer.417 This is an original legislative power and confirms the 
status of local government as a fully-fledged sphere of government.418 Under the previous 
system, authority to make by-laws was delegated to municipalities under national legislation 
and provincial Ordinances.419 
 
The right of a municipality to administer the matters conferred upon it is subject to limitation. 
First, provincial government must provide for monitoring and support of local government in 
the province by legislative and other means.420 Second, the provincial and national 
governments have the legislative and executive authority to ensure that municipalities 
effectively perform their functions in respect of the matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B by 
regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority.421 However, the national 
                                                 
415 Ibid s 76. 
416 Ibid s 156(5). 
417 Ibid s 156(2). 
418 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd & others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council & others 
1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) para 2. 
419 Steytler & De Visser Local Government Law (2008) at 2.4. 
420 Constitution: s 155(6)(a). 
421 Ibid s 155(7). 
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and provincial governments may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to 
exercise its powers or perform its functions.422 
 
Section 156(4), which encapsulates a presumption based on the principle of subsidiarity, 
provides that provincial and national government must, by agreement, assign any Schedule 4 
Part A matter or Schedule 5 Part A matter which necessarily relates to local government if that 
matter would be most effectively administered locally and the municipality has the capacity to 
administer it.  
 
The Constitution entrenches participatory democracy and local government structures are 
obliged to fulfil the developmental mandate of government and to conduct their business in a 
manner that encourages public participation and promotes the legitimacy of the local 
government sphere. In administering the matters assigned to local government, the municipal 
council must, within its capacity, strive to achieve the constitutional objects of local 
government. These constitutional objects are: 
 
(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
(c) to promote social and economic development; 
(d)  to promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
(e) to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local 
government.423 
 
The Constitution also assigns developmental duties to municipalities. Section 153 provides that 
a municipality must structure and manage its administration, budgeting, and planning processes 
to accord priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community, and participate in national and provincial development 
programmes. 
 
                                                 
422 Ibid s 151(4). 
423 Ibid s 152. 
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Mechanisms are built into local government legislation to ensure that the developmental 
mandate is entrenched. In terms of the Municipal Structures Act, the municipal council must 
meet at least quarterly.424 The Act also requires the council to review, on an annual basis:425  
 
(a)  the needs of the community; 
(b) its priorities in meeting those needs; 
(c) its processes for involving the community; 
(d)  its organisational and delivery mechanisms for meeting the needs of the community; and 
(e) its overall performance in achieving the constitutional objectives outlined above. 
 
4.2.4 National and Provincial Governments’ Powers in Schedule 4 Part B matters 
 
Schedule 4 of the Constitution sets out the functional areas of concurrent national and 
provincial legislative competence. Local government has legislative and executive authority to 
administer Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B matters. These powers are conferred on 
local government to the extent set out in section 155(6)(a) and (7) of the Constitution.  
 
The question arises as to the extent of national and provincial governments’ powers to legislate 
in respect of Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B matters. In respect of provincial powers, 
section 155(6) gives provinces the power to establish municipalities in their respective 
jurisdictions. This section places an obligation on provincial government to provide for 
monitoring and support of local government in the province, and to promote the development 
of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform their own functions and 
manage their own affairs. 
 
The meaning of the obligation to ‘monitor and support’ was considered by the Constitutional 
Court in the First Certification Judgment.426 The Court found that the meaning of ‘monitor’ 
must be considered in the context of the Constitution and in particular section 139. In this 
context ‘supervision’ connotes a process of provincial review of the actions of local 
government in order to measure the fulfilment of its obligations and a process of implementing 
corrective measures where local government falls short.427 
                                                 
424 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
425 Ibid s 19.  
426 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
427 Ibid para 370. 
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In the context of section 154(1), the Constitutional Court considered the extent of national and 
provincial government’s legislative and executive powers to support local government. It noted 
that provincial governments’ powers are not insubstantial and must ensure the maintenance of 
existing local government structures, powers, and functions to prevent a decline in those 
structures, powers, or functions. The provinces must use their legislative authority to promote 
the development of local government’s capacity to perform its functions and manage its own 
affairs.428 
 
In relation to the power to ‘monitor’, the Constitutional Court noted that the monitoring power 
could not be interpreted as bestowing additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on 
the domain of local government, beyond the ‘power to measure or test at intervals local 
government compliance with national and provincial legislative directives’ or with the 
Constitution itself. The Court stated that the Constitution seeks to realise a structure for local 
government that on the one hand reveals a concern for the autonomy and integrity of local 
government and ‘prescribes a hands-off relationship between local government and other levels 
of government and, on the other, acknowledges the requirement that higher levels of 
government monitor LG functioning and intervene where such functioning is deficient.’429 
 
Section 155(7) of the Constitution deals with both national and provincial governments’ 
powers with respect to local government. It provides that (subject to s 44) the provincial and 
national governments have the legislative and executive authority to ensure that municipalities 
effectively perform their functions in respect of the matters listed in Schedules 4B and 5B by 
regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive authority. 
 
In the First Certification Judgment, the Constitutional Court considered the meaning of 
‘regulate’ as connoting broad managing or controlling rather than a direct prescriptive 
function.430 There is a fair amount of agreement amongst academics that the regulatory power 
conferred by section 155(7) permits national and provincial governments to prescribe 
framework legislation laying down norms and standards. Such a regulatory power does not 
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extend to the ‘core’ of local government functional competencies.431 Accordingly, it is 
submitted that national and provincial legislation which goes beyond establishing frameworks 
or the prescription of norms and standards may be attacked on the ground of constitutional 
invalidity. 
 
4.2.5 National Government’s Powers in Schedule 5 Part B matters 
 
Schedule 5 of the Constitution sets out the functional areas of exclusive provincial competence. 
However, provincial competence is subject to section 44(2) which empowers national 
government to legislate on Schedule 5 matters when this is necessary: 
 
(a) to maintain national security; 
(b) to maintain economic unity; 
(c) to maintain essential national standards; 
(d) to establish minimum standards for the rendering of services; or 
(e) to prevent unreasonable action taken by a province which is prejudicial to the interests of another 
province or to the country as a whole. 
 
It is submitted that the same qualification applies here – the legislative power of national 
government over Schedule 5 Part B matters relates to the ability to set norms and standards and 
monitoring requirements and does not extend to the ‘core’ of Schedule 5 B matters.  
 
4.2.6 Provincial Government’s Powers in Schedule 5 Part B matters 
 
Provincial government’s powers with respect to Schedule 5 Part B matters are similar to its 
power over Schedule 4 Part B matters. On the face of it then, it would appear that provincial 
government has wider powers over Schedule 5 Part B matters than national government since 
provincial government it is not limited to the grounds set out in section 44(2).432 This accords 
with the quasi-federal design for the provinces discussed in the preceding chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                 
431 Mettler J ‘The legislative powers of local government’ (2000) LG Working Paper Series No 1 at 10 Community 
Law Centre University of the Western Cape available at www.mlgi.org.za accessed on16 March 2016; De Visser 
J ‘Powers of Local Government’ (2002) LG Working Paper Series No 2 at 6 Community Law Centre University 
of the Western Cape available at www.mlgi.org.za accessed on16 March 2016; Steytler (2008) 3 TSAR 519. 
432 De Visser ibid at 11. 
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4.2.7 Assignment of Powers to Local Government 
 
In addition to the functions allocated to local government by Schedules 4 Part B and 5 Part B 
to the Constitution, the national and provincial spheres have the authority to assign powers and 
functions to local government. In this regard both national and provincial government may 
assign the power to legislate over a matter which falls outside of Schedule 4 Part B and 
Schedule 5 Part B to the local sphere by passing an Act to that effect. An assignment of 
legislative power may also be made to a specific municipality. An assignment of this nature, 
made in terms of section 44(1)(a)(iii) or section 104(c) does not have to be a blanket transfer; 
national or provincial government may restrict the legislative power in the assignment Act.433 
 
The Municipal Systems Act provides additional requirements for general assignment by 
legislation. In terms of these requirements, the relevant Minister or Deputy Minister must 
publish the Bill for public comment; consult with the Minister of Local Government, the 
Minister of Finance, and the SALGA; and request an assessment of the financial implications 
of the assignment from the Financial and Fiscal Commission.434 
 
In addition, the Minister (or Deputy Minister) initiating the assignment must assess whether 
the assignment imposes a duty on the municipalities concerned; whether the duty falls outside 
of Schedules 4B and 5B; and whether the performance of the duty has financial implications. 
In deciding whether the duty imposes financial implications, the assessment of the Financial 
and Fiscal Commission must be taken into account. If the answer to the preceding three 
questions is in the affirmative, the Minister (or Deputy Minister) must ‘take appropriate steps 
to ensure that sufficient funding and capacity building initiatives’ are made available to the 
municipalities concerned.435 These provisions apply equally and with the necessary changes 
for the context, in respect of general provincial assignments to municipalities. 
 
Sections 99 and 126 of the Constitution permit the assignment of executive powers to 
municipal councils. Assignment of an executive power differs from transfer of a legislative 
power in that it assigns executive powers only and not legislative powers. Further, an executive 
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434 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000: s 9(1). 
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power entails a compulsion by allocating a duty to do something. For this reason, it must be 
done by agreement with the municipality concerned.436 
 
The requirements prescribed by the Municipal Systems Act for transfer of an executive 
obligation require the Minister initiating the assignment to consult the Minister for Local 
Government before concluding the agreement. In addition he or she must ensure provision of  
funding and capacity building if the assignment has financial implications.437 
 
As discussed earlier, the Constitution also entrenches subsidiarity in section 16(4) by 
mandating national and provincial governments to assign to a municipality the administration 
of any matter listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates 
to local government if: 
 
(a)  the matter would most effectively be administered locally; 
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer it; and  
(c) the municipality agrees to the assignment.438 
 
The rationale behind the requirements and procedures for the transfer of legislative and 
executive powers outside of those allocated to local government in the Schedules is the 
‘protection’ of local government against the assignment of responsibilities without resources 
(unfunded mandates).  
 
4.3 Conflict of Laws 
 
It has been established above, that local government’s powers to legislate on Schedule 4 Part 
B and Schedule 5 Part B matters are not exclusive. In line with their oversight role, national 
and provincial governments are given the power to pass legislation which regulates the exercise 
of municipal authority and ensures that municipalities are performing their functions 
effectively. What happens, then, when a municipality passes a by-law on a matter and later, 
                                                 
436 De Visser J ‘Powers of Local Government’ (2002) LG Working Paper Series No 2 at 11, 19 Community Law 
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national or provincial government passes a law regulating the same matter? How will the 
conflict as to which law prevails be resolved? 
 
In terms of section 156(4) of the Constitution, a by-law that conflicts with national or provincial 
legislation is invalid. However, the operation of this section is subject to section 151(4) which 
provides that the national and provincial government may not compromise or impede a 
municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions. The apparent 
impact of this provision is that there are circumstances in which a by-law will prevail over 
national or provincial legislation.  
 
De Visser has proposed a test which may be applied to determine whether a by-law or the 
national or provincial Act prevails. The test comprises of four questions: 
 
(a) Is there national or provincial legislation on the subject matters of the by-law? 
(b) If yes, does the by-law conflict with that legislation? 
(c) If there is conflict, is the national or provincial law valid?  
(d) Does the national or provincial law impede or compromise the municipality’s ability to perform 
its task?439 
 
(a)  Is there national or provincial legislation on the subject matter of the by-law? 
 
Once it has been established that the subject matter of the by-law and the national or provincial 
law are the same, the matter proceeds to the second leg of the enquiry. 
 
(b) If yes, does the by-law conflict with that legislation? 
 
Whether there is a conflict involves enforcement. If it is possible to enforce both the by-law 
and the other law with regard to the same events, there is no problem. However, if neither the 
by-law nor the national law can be enforced, then on the face of it, there is conflict and it is 
necessary to proceed to the next step. 
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(c) If there is conflict, is the national or provincial law valid? 
 
The national or provincial law must be enacted within the respective legislative competency of 
the relevant sphere of government. This is the most complex part of the enquiry. As discussed 
above, the powers of national and provincial governments to legislate on local government 
matters are limited. The national or provincial law can only prevail if it is enacted in an area in 
which legislative competence exists (refer to the discussion above). 
 
(d) Does the national or provincial law impede or compromise the municipality’s ability 
to perform its task?440 
 
Section 151(4) states that both ‘national and provincial government may not compromise or 
impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.’ Section 
41(g) in Chapter 3 (cooperative governance) of the Constitution contains a similar principle – 
‘All spheres of government ... must ... exercise their functions in a manner that does not 
encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another 
sphere.’ In applying this section the Constitutional Court emphasised that section 41(1)(g) deals 
with the way power is exercised, not with whether or not a power exists.441 De Visser argues 
that the meaning of section 151(4) is similar, and that national and provincial legislation must 
still comply with section 151(4) even if the relative spheres are competent to legislate in a 
particular functional area.442 This leg of the test deals with how national or provincial 
government have exercised their powers. If the exercise is such that the legislation limits the 
municipality in its right to exercise its powers or perform its functions, the strong wording of 
section 151(4) appears to connote a permanent defect and the national or provincial legislation 
is accordingly invalid.443 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
440 Ibid at 4.  
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442 De Visser J ‘Powers of Local Government’ (2002) LG Working Paper Series No 2 at 13 Community Law 
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4.4 Concurrency in the South African Constitution 
 
A number of common problems manifest in government administrations which use common 
competencies or concurrent allocation of powers as found in the South African Constitution. 
These include the duplication of services, ineffective service delivery, unfunded mandates for 
the lowest sphere of government, the domination of the lowest sphere by the higher spheres, 
and the lack of transparency and accountability.444 These issues are shared by many 
decentralised federal systems as they are characteristic of the division of powers between two 
levels of government. Therefore it can be seen that the Brazilian, German, Indian, and Nigerian 
Constitutions each contains various manifestations of concurrent powers and each is faced with 
the difficulties that accompany concurrent powers. The problems of concurrency which 
negatively impact on government functioning become even more pronounced where a third 
sphere of decentralised government is added as has been done in South Africa.445 
 
The formulation of the division-of-powers provisions has resulted in a number of practical 
complexities for interpretation and implementation. The most obvious difficulties arise in the 
case of ‘overlapping mandates’. An overlapping mandate occurs where a functional area is 
shared between two or more spheres. In South Africa, national and provincial governments 
may regulate the exercise of municipal authority by passing legislation which establishes a 
framework or sets standards for municipal services. However, such national or provincial 
legislation may not restrict the municipality’s right to govern (see the De Visser test above). 
The problem with framework legislation is that in many cases it exceeds the boundaries set by 
the Constitution and becomes prescriptive to a point which encroaches on the autonomy of the 
sub-national sphere of government. This has occurred in Germany and it is also prevalent in 
South Africa as the case studies in this chapter demonstrate. 
 
Another difficulty arises where the Constitution assigns the same power to all three spheres, 
merely qualifying the allocation by a geographical or jurisdictional condition. For instance, 
‘health services’ is a Schedule 4 Part A competence – ie, an area of concurrent national and 
provincial competence. But ‘municipal health services’ is an area of local government 
competence in terms of Part B of Schedule 4. The difficulty lies in defining where ‘municipal 
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health services’ end and ‘health services’ begin. This is not merely a theoretical question; the 
implications for service delivery are grave and can be a matter of life and death for those who 
rely on the public sector for healthcare. 
 
From the point of view of government administration, the practical difficulties of unclear 
functional mandates may be compounded in practice by changes from the old system of local 
governance to the new – for example, where a function that was administered by local 
government under the old dispensation is shifted to a provincial government department by the 
Constitution. Over the years very real gaps in service delivery have occurred simply because 
the staff for one function are deployed in one sphere of government, and the constitutional 
mandate in another. This problem is often exacerbated by the failure to transfer budgets. It is 
submitted that the administrative structure of government is not aligned to its functional 
mandates. This is particularly so at the provincial and national levels. It is consequently 
necessary to restructure and align the administration of government in order to bolster the 
realisation of the constitutional vision for developmental local government. 
 
Another difficulty relates to the interpretation of the precise meaning and ambit of the 
functional areas. The Constitution defines none of the functional areas. An example is the area 
of development planning – ‘regional planning and development’ falls within an area of 
concurrent national and provincial competence – it is a Schedule 4 Part A competence, as is 
‘urban and rural development’. Compare these two functional areas with ‘building regulations’ 
and ‘municipal planning’ which are local government areas of functional competence in terms 
of Schedule 4, Part B, and the result is a recipe for confusion.  
 
Working through the various difficulties related to concurrency can prove a nightmare for 
government administrators. In the South African context this problem has been exacerbated by 
a number of factors. In the first place, the decentralisation process was not organic but was 
imposed by the Constitution – in many federal dispensations a number of constituent states 
come together to form a federation. Thus, at the time of federation they have a number of 
entrenched local competences. In South Africa, decentralisation occurred in the opposite way. 
A constituent and largely unitary state apparatus was sought to be transformed into a 
decentralised state through the Constitution. In practice, the result has been that the provincial 
and national governments have struggled to adapt to the constitutional system, while the ‘new’ 
local sphere has embraced autonomy more readily, particularly in the larger metropolitan 
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municipalities. Added to the complexity of the constitutional and legislative arrangements, is 
the shortage of skills. All of these factors have had a significant impact on the efficacy of post- 
constitution government administration.  
 
4.5  Overregulation  
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, national government has passed a number of local government laws 
aimed at giving practical effect to the constitutional vision of developmental local government. 
At the same time, various national departments have passed a variety of laws within their 
departments’ functional areas which are directed at local government. As a result municipalities 
have become the convergent point for a large number of laws which were drafted by 
departments with varying levels of understanding as to how local government operates. There 
appears to be no policy coherence between the laws passed by the national and provincial 
governments and often these laws amount to overregulation in that they exceed the 
constitutional limits permitted for framework legislation by prescribing detail in local 
government functional areas. This problem is illustrated in two case studies. The first focuses 
on waste management in the eThekwini Municipality and the second on animal pounds in 
KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
4.5.2 Case Study: Overregulation in relation to waste management : eThekweni 
Municipality 
 
The practical implications of ovvergulation in the municipal sphere are illustrated in this case 
study. In August 2012 the following regulations made in terms of the National Environmental 
Management Waste Act446 were published in the Government Gazette for public comment:  
(a)  Draft standards for disposal of waste to landfill.447 
(b)  Draft standards for assessment of waste for landfill disposal.448 
(c) Draft waste classification and management regulations.449 
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eThekwini Municipality’s Legal and Solid Waste Departments responded to the request for 
comments on the draft legislation by submitting comments drafted by their legal department 
with input from the solid waste department. In essence, the municipality argued that the draft 
standards, which fall within the functional area of ‘refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid 
waste disposal’, were unconstitutional due to the level of prescriptive detail they contained 
which exceeded the bounds set out in the Constitution for national government’s legislative 
authority over local government competencies. The municipality pointed to the problem and 
requested that the national department allow them to focus on their service delivery mandate. 
They argued that while the regulatory framework governing the functional area of ‘refuse 
removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal’ had previously been based on two by-laws 
and was relatively simple, it was becoming increasingly complex and unmanageable. 
 
To illustrate the volume of legislation applicable to local government, the eThekwini 
Municipality pointed to the large number of laws which have been passed relating to local 
government. 
(a)  In the general administration category of local government there are twelve ‘main’ 
national laws. 
(b)  These national Acts cover some 3 046 pages – excluding attendant legislation such as 
the Promotion of Access to Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), the promotion of 
Access to Information Act (PAIA), etc.450 The tally also does not include subject 
specific legislation, for example, the National Health Act, the KwaZulu-Natal 
Provincial Health Act, and Health by-laws.451 Municipalities must interpret and 
implement all of these Acts. 
(c) In addition, to these Acts local government must administer provincial laws impacting 
local government. 
(d) Added to these national and provincial laws are the many by-laws. 
 
The municipality highlighted the fact that the regulatory environment of local government is 
exceptionally complex with the result that it is becoming increasingly difficult to focus on the 
core business of municipalities as they are becoming ‘bogged down’ in regulations, technical 
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specifications, and the like. To illustrate this point further, the eThekwini Metro pointed out 
that where municipalities previously used a single by-law to administer refuse disposal, there 
is now a national Act – the National Environmental Management: Waste Act.452 In terms of 
this Act, the national government has proposed the following regulations and notices. 
(a)  Waste management activities that have, or are likely to have, a detrimental effect on the 
environment.453 
(b) Draft Waste Information Regulations.454 
(c) National Domestic Waste Collection Standard.455 
(d)  Draft Policy on Free Basic Refuse Removal.456 
(e) Draft Integrated Industry Waste Management Plan for the South African Tyre 
Recycling Process (SATRP) Company relating to Waste Tyre Regulations.457 
(f) Draft National Waste Management Strategy.458 
(g)  Waste Information Regulations.459 
(h) List of waste management activities that have, or are likely to have a detrimental effect 
on the environment.460 
(i)  Change of licensing authorities.461 
(j)  Draft national standards for the scrapping or recovery of motor vehicles.462 
(k)  Draft national standard for disposal of waste to landfill.463 
(l)  Draft standard for assessment of waste for landfill disposal.464 
(m)  Draft national standards for the extraction, flaring or recovery of landfill gas in South 
Africa.465 
(n) Draft waste classification and management regulations.466 
(o) Draft national norms and standards for the storage of waste.467 
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(p)  Waste Tyre Regulations: Draft Integrated Waste Tyre Management Plan for the 
Recycling and Economic Development Initiative of South Africa (REDISA).468 
(q) Fee structure for applications for environmental authorisations and waste management 
licences.469 
(r) Draft national norms and standards for the remediation of contaminated land and soil 
quality.470 
(s)  Regulations for site assessments and reports.471 
(t)  Draft Integrated Industry Waste Tyre Management Plan of the Recycling and Economic 
Development Initiative of South Africa (REDISA).472 
 
The eThekwini Municipality pointed out that this amounts to hundreds and thousands of pages 
of legislation which the municipality must implement. The municipality submitted that it was 
drowning under the sheer weight of legal regulation which it was required to implement. It 
pointed out that as a high-capacity municipality – the only Metro in the province of KwaZulu-
Natal – it should be the best placed to be able to implement the proposed regulations. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case; the waste management department indicated that they did 
not have the capacity to implement the regulations or the competence to run landfills to the 
standard required by the regulations due largely to the lack of skilled, trained personnel. Further 
that this applies to most, if not all of the technical specifications. The municipality pointed out 
that if it could not implement the proposed regulations, then certainly the district and local 
municipalities in the provinces would not be able to do so. In fact, since many local 
municipalities in KwaZulu-Natal do not have legal advisors – one wonders how they would 
interpret the legislation in the first place.  
 
The failure of national and provincial departments to include municipalities in the drafting 
process merely exacerbates the problem. A practice has developed whereby municipalities first 
gain sight of new legislation affecting local government when it is published in the Government 
Gazette. Municipalities submit comments on the draft legislation and very often, apart from an 
acknowledgement of receipt, that is the end of the process for individual municipalities. It is 
doubtful whether this process can be considered a cooperative process which meets the 
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requirements of section 41 of the Constitution. The inclusion of organised local government 
has not provided a voice for all municipalities. This may be because the interests of local 
government vary, or perhaps the SALGA is constrained by capacity. Whatever the reason, most 
metropolitan municipalities prefer to engage directly with national departments’ proposed 
legislation. 
 
The manner in which framework regulation has exceeded constitutional bounds has impacted 
negatively on local government autonomy and local innovation. As Steytler puts it  
 
the question posed is whether the sheer, volume, style, nature and scope of the legislative framework that has 
emerged is facilitating or impeding the achievement of this mandate. Is the legislative framework undermining 
the fundamental constitutional principle that a ‘municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the 
affairs of the local community, subject to national and provincial legislation?’473 
 
In examining the contention that local government has been overregulated two aspects must be 
considered – first, the volume or amount of legislation that has been passed; and second, the 
‘depth’ of that legislation. Legislation which prescribes in detail how local government is 
required to carry out constitutionally mandated functions goes beyond what is constitutionally 
permitted. This tendency to prescribe detailed processes and procedures appears to be based on 
a mistrust of the ability of municipal councillors and officials to perform their functions.474 It 
is also partly in response to the view that law can solve governance problems. In many cases 
proper administration, support, and supervision would be a more appropriate response than 
throwing more law and regulation at the problem.475 Finally, Schmidt ascribes the penchant for 
overregulation to an ambivalent acceptance by national government of the ‘spheres’ concept 
of government, while in reality still clinging to the idea of ‘tiers of government’.476 
 
The case study illustrates the difficulties faced by municipalities in dealing with the increasing 
volumes of legislation adopted by national government directed at local government. The 
example speaks to the many ways in which overregulation occurs – the volume, complexity, 
and prescriptive nature of the regulations are clear, as is the difficulty of adopting a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ approach to regulation. In the example above, it is obvious that local and district 
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municipalities would have great difficulty in implementing legislation which even the 
metropolitan municipalities have limited capacity to implement. What is also clear is that those 
drafting the legislation at national level have no grasp of the practicalities involved in 
administering the functional area which is the subject of the regulations. It would appear also 
that there was little or no engagement with local government in the formulation of the 
legislation – or if there was engagement, the input of local government was not accorded due 
weight.  
 
The unfortunate consequences of the overregulation of local government have been 
summarised as:477 
 
(a) Increasing costs of compliance 
 
Compliance with the vast and elaborate legal framework costs money. The large metros have 
in-house legal departments. Unfortunately, many of the smaller municipalities do not have 
legal advisors and have to rely on private attorneys (ironically often at greater cost). 
 
(b) Opting out of governing 
 
Where processes are too difficult, municipalities who can afford it may simply opt to outsource 
the process. This occurred in the area of Integrated Development Plans where many 
municipalities outsourced to consultants.  
 
(c) Stifling innovation, experimentation, and local initiative 
 
The detailed prescription of the manner in which processes are to be implemented makes any 
form of innovation impossible as no room is left for local initiative. 
 
(d) Ticking boxes 
 
Perhaps one of the most unfortunate consequences of overregulation is the elevation of 
compliance with the rules above the object behind the rules – replacing substance with form. 
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(e) Opting for lawlessness 
 
Finally, and perhaps most serious, is the possibility that local government practitioners, bogged 
down by the sheer weight of regulation and overwhelmed by the impossibility of compliance, 
opt to do what is necessary and avoid legal regulations. This sort of ‘the end justifies the means’ 
mentality has the exact opposite result to what the laws were intended to achieve – an increase 
in lawlessness rather than compliance.478 An example of this is discussed in the case study, 
below. 
 
4.5.3 Case Study: Management of Animal Pounds in KwaZulu-Natal479 
 
(a)  Introduction 
 
In Zondi v MEC for Traditional and Local Government Affairs & others480 certain provisions 
of an old provincial Ordinance which remained on the KwaZulu-Natal statute books were held 
to be unconstitutional. The facts of the case concerned the impounding of livestock belonging 
to Mrs Zondi, the widow of a farm labourer, by the farm owner who was acting in terms of the 
Natal Pound Ordinance.481 The Ordinance allowed for the immediate seizure of trespassing 
animals without notice to the livestock owner and provided for the assessment of damages by 
two ‘interested persons’ who had to be registered voters. Provision was made for the payment 
of impounding fees and damages by the livestock owner, as well as for the sale in execution of 
impounded animals if the owner could not pay the fees. There was no provision for judicial 
process in the procedures laid down in the Ordinance.482 
 
The Constitutional Court held that the need to take action against trespassing animals had to be 
weighed against the rights of livestock owners. Section 34 of the Constitution guarantees the 
right of access to the Courts and once animals had been impounded the judicial process had to 
be allowed to oversee the sale in execution as the need for immediate action had fallen away. 
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The Ordinance was accordingly held to be unconstitutional, but the Constitutional Court 
suspended the order of invalidity in order to allow the KwaZulu–Natal government an 
opportunity to correct the inconsistency. This case highlights the need for provincial 
governments carefully to re-evaluate all Ordinances predating the Constitution – many may 
indeed be unconstitutional.483 
 
(b) The KwaZulu-Natal Pounds Act 
 
The KwaZulu-Natal Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs drafted 
the KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act, 2006 (KZN Pounds Act), in response to the decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Zondi.484 In terms of the constitutional distribution of functions, 
‘facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals’ is a Schedule 5 Part B matter 
over which local government has legislative and executive authority. Clearly, any legislation 
drafted by the provincial government would need to take account of this. It must be borne in 
mind that the local government functional area of ‘facilities for the accommodation, care, and 
burial of animals’ overlaps with the national and provincial governments’ competence over 
both ‘agriculture’ and ‘animal control and diseases’ in terms of Schedule 4 Part A. The KZN 
Pounds Act attempts to navigate the allocation of powers and functions by providing that the: 
‘Act applies to all municipalities within the province [and] is administered by the responsible 
Member of the Executive Council’ with the added proviso that the: ‘Act does not apply to a 
municipality which, in the opinion of the responsible Member of the Executive Council, has 
established a pound in terms of a municipal by-law that complies with the principles of the 
Act.’485 
 
Despite attempts by the provincial department to navigate the tricky allocation of powers issues 
which the ruling in Zondi involves, the eThekwini Municipality has consistently stuck to the 
view that it is not bound to implement the provisions of the KZN Pounds Act because, in its 
view, the Act is unconstitutional, impractical, and costly to implement. Animal pounds in the 
municipality are administered by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) 
which receives a grant-in-aid from the municipality. The eThekwini Metropolitan area is 
serviced by three SPCA’s – Durban & Coast; Kloof & Highway; and Amanzimtoti. The cost 
                                                 
483 Ibid. 
484 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act 3 of 2006. 
485 Ibid s 2. 
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of implementing the KZN Pounds Act was calculated by the eThekwini Municipality’s 
Treasury Department to amount to approximately sixteen times the cost of the extant system.  
 
The non-implementation of the KZN Pounds Act points to some of the pitfalls that bedevil the 
drafting of provincial legislation to guide municipalities in the execution of their duties. The 
practical and administrative difficulties inherent in the legislation which the province enacted 
may have been avoided if municipalities had been fully engaged in the drafting process instead 
of being treated as ‘implementers’. Unfortunately, the tendency to regard local government as 
the implementing arm is widespread and examples of laws which are impractical, costly to 
implement, or of questionable constitutional validity abound. The position taken by the 
municipality in this instance, may or may not be defensible, but the point that emerges clearly 
is that the vast volume of legislation being directed at local government may in fact be 
increasing lawlessness and breeding a culture of non-compliance – hardly what the law-makers 
intended! At the time of writing, the eThekwini Municipality had not taken steps to establish a 
pound or to enter into an agreement with a service provider to establish a pound on its behalf.  
 
4.5.4 National Legislation in Municipal Legislative areas of competence 
 
In 2013, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) published the draft 
Public Administration Management Bill for comment.486 The aim of the Bill is to provide for 
the organisation and management of personnel within the three spheres of government. 
Lindiwe Sisulu, the then Minister of Public Service and Administration, described the Bill as 
the ‘longest-serving Bill’. According to the Minister, the Bill should have been passed in 1996 
after the Constitution had come into operation, but this never happened.487 
 
The Bill used Chapter 10 of the Constitution (dealing with Public Administration) as its point 
of departure. Key features of the Bill included the creation of a single public service which 
allowed for the transfer of public servants across spheres. According to the DPSA, this would 
improve service delivery by ensuring an equitable distribution of resources across all three 
spheres of government. The Bill dealt with discipline, ethics, and integrity – requiring 
disclosure of financial interests by government employees – and sought to create a Disciplinary 
                                                 
486 Draft Public Administration Management Bill, 2013, GN 519 of 2013 GG 36521. 
487 See https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16716/ accessed on19 July 2019. 
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Technical Assistance Unit to deal with disciplinary matters. It also provided for a national 
School of Government to deal with capacity-building and the training of government 
employees. 
 
The Public Administration Management Bill was resisted by municipalities and the SALGA 
as an unconstitutional infringement of local government’s autonomy. The eThekwini 
Municipality and KZN SALGA were quick to point out that section 160(1)(a) of the 
Constitution enables a municipal council to decide on the exercise of all the powers and the 
performance of all the functions of the municipality; while subsection (d) empowers a 
municipal council to employ the personnel necessary for the effective performance of its 
functions.  
 
Municipalities argued that the constitutional allocation of power to municipalities to structure 
their personnel cannot be circumvented by a national Act. Local government claimed that 
reading section 160(1) with Chapter 10 of the Constitution, supported its argument that the Bill 
in its current form was unconstitutional. Section 196 of the Constitution provides that there is 
a single PSC for the Republic. Section 196(4)(f)(iv) states that the Commission is to advise 
national and provincial organs of state regarding personnel practices in the public service, 
including those relating to the recruitment, appointment, transfer, discharge, and other aspects 
of the careers of employees. It is clear from the provisions governing the establishment of the 
PSC, that this Commission has powers over the national and provincial spheres of government 
only. The intention was to vest the powers to regulate and oversee personnel practices in the 
local government sphere in the municipal council. Both the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act488 and the Local Governmet: Municipal Structures Act489 contain further 
provisions regulating a municipal council’s exercise of this constitutionally enshrined power.  
 
Local government turned to the Constitutional Court’s consideration of the provisions relating 
to the PSC in the First and Second Certification Judgments to support its argument. Under the 
interim Constitution, the provinces were empowered to establish Provincial PSCs which, when 
established, would have powers and functions similar to those of the National PSC in respect 
of provincial public servants. The Constitution changed this arrangement by providing for a 
                                                 
488 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
489 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.  
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single PSC with power over both the national and provincial spheres. This change was 
approved by the Constitutional Court which necessitated amendments to the constitutional 
provisions dealing with the PSC in order to safeguard the autonomy of the provincial sphere 
with respect to the staffing of provincial administrations. Even following these amendments, 
the Constitutional Court found in the Second Certification Judgment, that there had been a 
reduction of the ‘powers of the provinces arising out of the alteration in the functions of the 
PSC, the change in its composition, and the disestablishment of the provincial service 
commissions.’490 
 
From this it is clear that the Constitutional Court considered the amendment of the powers of 
the PSC between the interim and the 1996 Constitution sufficiently significant to require 
amendments to the text so as to afford provincial governments some representation on the PSC 
mooted in the final text. This supports the contention that the Bill would not withstand 
constitutional scrutiny in so far as it seeks to erode the powers of local government as a distinct 
sphere of government. Only an amendment to the Constitution can achieve the aims of the Bill, 
and such an amendment would no doubt be subjected to a detailed analysis of the extent to 
which it violates the constitutional allocation of powers between the three spheres. One cannot 
circumvent the constitutional design by merely extending the ambit of the PSC’s role to include 
the municipal sphere via an Act of Parliament. If it was legally competent to effect a disguised 
amendment to the Constitution in the manner proposed by the Bill (which it is not), such a 
course of action would violate the authority of the Constitution as the supreme law of the 
country. Accordingly, the argument went, allowing Acts of Parliament to amend the 
Constitution undermines the hierarchy of laws established by the Constitution and 
compromises the integrity of our statute book. Therefore, they argued that in future, when 
reading section 160(1) or Chapter 10 of the Constitution, it would be necessary to cross-
reference to another Act which overrides the Constitution.  
 
If the Public Administration Management Bill is considered in the context of the discussion of 
fiscal practice in Chapter III, a tendency toward centralisation in the legislation begins to 
emerge. It is interesting to note that a raft of regulations dealing with municipal personnel and 
human-resource issues has been made in terms of the existing suite of local government 
                                                 
490 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) para 198. 
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legislation. These include the following regulations made in terms of the Municipal Systems 
Act: 
(a)  the Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations;491 
(b)  the Local Government: Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers 
and Managers directly accountable to Municipal Managers;492 
(c) Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers;493 and 
(d)  Local Government: Regulations on Appointment and Conditions of Appointment of 
Senior Managers.494 
 
Also made in terms of the Municipal Systems Act, but still in draft form, are the following: 
(a)  the Draft Competency Guidelines for Municipal Managers and Managers directly 
accountable to Municipal Managers;495 and  
(b) the Local Government Remuneration Framework: packages payable to Municipal 
Managers and Managers directly accountable to Municipal Managers.496 
 
In 2012, National Treasury also released draft regulations made in terms of the Municipal 
Finance Management Act dealing with municipal staff misconduct – the Draft Municipal 
Financial Misconduct Regulations.497 The latter are presumably still in draft form as they 
contained provisions which conflicted with the Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations 
for Senior Managers498 drafted by the National Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs. The argument can certainly be made that all of these regulations dealing 
with personnel and human-resource management in local government are constitutionally 
flawed in the same way as the draft Public Administration Bill. If that argument fails, then it is 
submitted that they constitute overregulation and breach the permissible constitutional limits 
for national and provincial oversight in terms of the Constitution. 
                                                 
491 Local Government Municipal Planning and Performance Regulations, 2001, GN R796 of 24 August 2001. 
492 Local Government Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers directly 
accountable to Municipal Managers, 2006, GN R805 of 1 August 2006. 
493 Local Government Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010, GN 344 of 21 April 2011. 
494 Local Government Regulations on Appointment and Conditions of Appointment of Senior Managers, 2014, 
GN 21 of 17 January 2014. 
495 Draft Competency Guidelines for Municipal Managers and Managers directly accountable to Municipal 
Managers, 2006, GNR 347 of 23 March 2007.   
496 Local Government Remuneration Framework: Packages payable to Municipal Managers and Managers 
directly accountable to Municipal Managers GN 348 of 25 April 2015. 
497 Draft Municipal Financial Misconduct Regulations GN 556 of 13 July 2012. 
498 Local Government Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers 2010 GN 344 of 21 April 2011. 
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The difficulty faced by local governments is that they have no effective way of bringing their 
concerns regarding draft legislation to the fore. Comments submitted to the department which 
is in fact the sponsor of the Act are very often ignored. In the result, there are many examples 
of legislation currently on the statute book which is of questionable constitutional validity. 
Local government is required to implement that legislation although it may harbour a very 
strong conviction that the legislation is unconstitutional. Municipalities which are under the 
control of provincial and national governments administered by the same political party, lack 
the political will to challenge the constitutionality of these laws. The result is that year after 
year more and more legislation is enacted which gradually undermines the constitutional design 
for the allocation of powers between the three spheres.  
 
4.5.5 Case Study: Rabies Outbreak in the eThekweni Municipality499 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
A real and painful example of how these factors play out in practice is illustrated by a rabies 
outbreak which began on the outskirts of the eThekwini metropolitan area in 2007. When the 
outbreak resulted in the death of a child in one of the rural areas of the municipality, the city’s 
health department contacted the legal unit for advice. On the facts provided by the health 
department it appeared that the city’s programme to vaccinate dogs had been discontinued on 
the basis of the city’s belief that the function would be performed by the provincial Department 
of Agriculture and Veterinary Services. The staff performing this function had been moved to 
other areas. The city’s health department’s capacity was stretched with the environmental 
health, air pollution, and primary health functions. (The latter function is often cited as an 
unfunded mandate.) From discussions between the health and legal departments at eThekwini 
Municipality, it was apparent that a response to the rabies outbreak would require action on a 
number of fronts, including immunisation, control of animals, licensing, removal of ownerless 
and diseased animals, euthanising of diseased animals, removal and burial of destroyed 
animals.  
 
                                                 
499 The example discussed in this section is based on the experience of the writer whilst working as a senior 
manager at eThekweni Municipality. 
 
  
138 
 
According to the Constitution, ‘animal control and diseases’ falls within a functional area of 
concurrent national and provincial competence (Schedule 4, Part A of the Constitution). 
Schedule 5B assigns the following functional areas impacting on responses to the rabies 
outbreak, to local government: 
(a)  control of public nuisance; 
(b)  facilities for the accommodation, care, and burial of animals; 
(c) licensing of dogs; and 
(d) pounds. 
 
The allocation of these functions to local government is subject to the duty of provincial 
government to monitor and support local government in carrying out these functions. At that 
time, inquiries revealed that there was not a single official in the legal department at the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture who had knowledge and understanding of the fact that 
the constitutional mandate for ‘animal control and diseases’ fell under that provincial 
department. Enquiries also revealed that there was no existing programme to vaccinate against 
rabies within the jurisdiction of the eThekwini Municipality. The function had merely ceased 
to be performed. Somewhere between the legislative divide of the constitutional allocation of 
powers, the existing national and provincial legislative framework, the by-laws, and the 
administrative practices of the province, the key preventative measure – the immunisation of 
animals – had simply stopped being performed. The municipality, for its part, due in part to an 
increase in jurisdictional area and functions, and in part due to an apparent internal dispute 
between the Metro Police and health departments regarding who was responsible for 
performing the function, had ceased to perform the function of licensing animals.  
 
The relevant senior manager at the city’s health department, disturbed by the death of a young 
child due to rabies infection, contacted the city’s legal department in an attempt to resolve the 
matter. Attempting to situate the problem in legal terms, the legal department set out the 
relevant national laws as follows: 
(a)  Animals Protection Act and the regulations made in terms of the Act;500 
(b) Animal Diseases Act;501 and 
(c) Animal Health Act.502 
                                                 
500 Animal Protection Act 71 of 1962.   
501 Animal Diseases Act 35 of 1984. 
502 Animal Health Act 7 of 2002. 
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(b) Animals Protection Act 
 
(i)  Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this Act is the prevention of cruelty to animals. It contains a number of 
provisions which may be useful in the present context: 
 
(ii)  Offences  
 
Any animal owner who fails to procure veterinary, medical, or other treatment or any animal 
in need of such treatment, whether through disease, injury, or any cause, or who fails to destroy 
any seriously injured or diseased animal in circumstances where it would be cruel to prolong 
the animal’s life, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding twelve months, or to such imprisonment without the option of a 
fine.503 This section is extended by section 2(3) to cover cases of negligence.504 
 
(iii)  When a police officer may destroy an animal505 
                                                 
503 Ibid s 2(1)(e). 
504 Ibid. Section 2(3) provides: ‘For the purposes of subsection (1) the owner of any animal shall be deemed to 
have permitted or procured the commission or omission of any act in relation to that animal if by the exercise of 
reasonable care and supervision in respect of that animal he could have prevented the commission or omission of 
such act.’ 
505 Section 5 provides: 
(1)  Whenever a police officer is of the opinion that any animal is so diseased or severely injured or in such a 
physical condition that it ought to be destroyed, he shall, if the owner be absent or refuses to consent to the 
destruction of the animal, at once summon a veterinarian or, if there is no veterinarian within a reasonable distance, 
two adult persons whom he considers to be reliable and of sound judgment, and if such veterinarian or adult person 
after having duly examined such an animal certify that the animal is so diseased or so severely injured or in such 
physical condition that it would be cruel to keep it alive, such police officer may without the consent of the owner 
destroy the animal or cause it to be destroyed with such instruments or appliances and with such precautions and 
in such manner as to inflict as little suffering as practicable. 
(2) Any police officer who destroys any animal or causes it to be destroyed in the absence of the owner shall, if 
such owner’s name and address are known, advise him of the destruction, and where the destruction of any animal 
takes place on any public place or public road shall, subject to the provisions of the Animal Diseases Act, 1984 
(Act 35 of 1984), remove the carcass or cause it to be removed therefrom. 
 (3) A veterinarian may in respect of any animal exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1) upon a police 
officer without summoning another veterinarian, police officer or any other person, and in respect of such exercise 
of those powers the provisions of subsection (2) shall apply. 
(4) Any expenses which may be reasonably incurred by any police officer or veterinarian in carrying out the 
provisions of this section may be recovered from the owner of the animal in question as a civil debt. 
(5) It shall be a defence to an action brought against any person arising out of the destruction of an animal by him 
or with his authority, to prove that such animal was so severely injured or so diseased or in such a physical 
condition that it would have been cruel to have kept it alive, and that to summon a police officer or follow the 
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1.  This section allows a police officer to destroy an animal which is obviously diseased, 
in the absence of the owner of that animal. Before destroying the animal a veterinarian 
or two adult persons must agree with the police officer’s assessment of the animal’s 
health. 
2.  A veterinarian may destroy an obviously diseased animal without summoning any other 
person. 
3.  Any expenses incurred in carrying out this section may be recovered from the owner of 
the animal as a civil debt. 
4.  Any police officer who destroys any animal in the absence of the owner must advise 
the owner of the destruction, if his or her address is known. 
5. Where the destruction of an animal takes place in a public place or on a public road, the 
police officer must remove the carcass or cause it to be removed. 
 
(iv)  Powers of officers of the SPCA 
 
The powers conferred on a police officer to destroy diseased animals in terms of section 5 may 
also be exercised by an officer of any SPCA. 
 
(v) Regulations relating to the seizure of animals by an officer of a society for the 
prevention of cruelty to animals506 
 
These regulations provide for seizure, reporting, notice, disposal and expenses related to the 
seizure of animals by an officer of a society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
procedure prescribed in this section would have occasioned unreasonable delay and unnecessary suffering to such 
animal. 
506 GN R468 of 14 March 1986. 
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(c) Animal Diseases Act 
 
(i) Introduction 
 
The whole of this Act has been repealed by the Animal Health Act, 2002.507 However, the latter 
Act had not yet come into operation at the time. In the interim, the provisions of the Animal 
Diseases Act continued to apply. The Act contains a number of provisions relating to animal 
control which may be utilised in the present case. 
 
(ii) Designation of authorised persons 
 
The Act (in s 3) makes provision for the Director of Animal Health within the Department of 
Agriculture to designate any applicant with the required knowledge, experience, qualifications, 
and means as an authorised person to carry out certain functions in the Act. This provision is 
significant because it could be used by eThekwini Municipality to apply for one or more of its 
officials to be designated an ‘authorised person’ for the purposes of the Act. 
 
(iii) Control measures 
 
Section 9 of the Act allows the Minister to prescribe control measures in respect of particular 
animal diseases for the whole Republic, or for a specific defined area.  
 
(iv) Animal Health Schemes 
 
In terms of section 10, the Minister may by notice in the Gazette establish a scheme in respect 
of any controlled purpose or for the improvement of animal health. The section is quite detailed 
and provides for the establishment of different schemes for the improvement of animal health 
in general, or of the health of different kinds of animals, animal disease, or parasites. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
507 Animal Health Act 7 of 2002. 
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(v) Duties of owners 
 
An obligation is placed on owners or managers of land where there are animals to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent the infection of the animals with any animal disease. Section 32 
also creates a number of offences, including contravention of an animal health scheme or 
control measure. 
 
(vi) Powers of entry and inspection 
 
The powers of the director to enter property at any time, and without notice to exercise a power 
granted under the Act are detailed in section 16. This power may be delegated (on application) 
to a person authorised under section 3. 
  
(vii) Seizures by Director 
 
The powers granted under this section include the power to seize any animal or thing without 
notice, and the power to destroy or dispose of any animal or thing. This power may also be 
delegated under the application procedure in section 3. 
 
(viii) Compensation 
 
In terms of this section, the owner of any animal or thing which has been destroyed pursuant 
to any control measure may submit an application for compensation for the loss of the animal 
or thing to the director. This section is clearly intended to cover situations where large herds of 
animals are destroyed due to the outbreak of some or other disease.  
 
(d)  Animal Health Act 
 
The main purpose of this Act is to provide measures to promote animal health and to control 
disease. The Act had not commenced operation (probably because it did not provide measures 
for disease control). 
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(e)  Provincial Legislation 
 
The following provincial Acts, Ordinances and regulations were identified as relevant: 
• Licensing and Control of Dogs Ordinance;508 
• KwaZulu Animal Protection Act;509 
• KwaZulu Act on the Licensing and Control of Dogs;510 
• Regulations relating to Dog Licenses in Public Health Areas;511 
• Regulations in terms of Ordinance, 1941;512 
• Regulations relating to the Licensing and Control of Dogs;513 and 
• Regulations relating to Dog Licenses in the areas of jurisdiction of Health 
Committees.514 
 
Perhaps the most significant of these Acts, Ordinances and regulations is the Licencing and 
Control of Dogs Ordinance. This Ordinance is incorporated by reference into the eThekwini 
Municipality Animal By-laws. The by-laws provide that ‘licensed’ in relation to dogs, means 
licensed in terms of the Licensing and Control of Dogs Ordinance (the Ordinance). The 
ordinance requires every owner of a dog which is six months of age or older to pay an annual 
prescribed licence fee. The licence fees are paid for the benefit of the provincial revenue fund. 
Upon payment of the fees, a dog licence is issued to the owner. The by-law regulates matters 
such as the production of a licence on demand, euthanising of dogs, etc. Authorised persons 
for the purpose of the Ordinance include a magistrate, a member of the SAPS, an officer of the 
Natal Provincial Administration, or any other person authorised by the Ordinance to issue 
licences. The difficulty with the Ordinance is that the licensing of dogs is a local government 
functional area in terms of the Constitution. 
 
A perusal of the provincial legislation reveals that much of the legislation refers to the old 
order; as such, there are jurisdictional problems in applying it. (For example, some of the Acts 
refer to the old KwaZulu areas, while other regulations refer to the area of jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
508 Licensing and Control of Dogs Ordinance 10 of 1942. 
509 KwaZulu Animal Protection Act 4 of 1987. 
510 KwaZulu Act on the Licensing and Control of Dogs Act 19 of 1988. 
511 Provincial Notice 297 of 1969. 
512 Ordinance 20 of 1941.  
513 Provincial Notice 475 of 1969. 
514 Provincial Notice 541 of 1946. 
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health committees, etc.). In addition, some of the legislation covers functional areas which have 
been allocated to local government under the new constitutional dispensation. In view of this 
the advice from the Legal Unit to the Health Unit at the eThekwini Metro was that solutions 
which involve minimal reliance on the fragmented provincial legislative framework should be 
preferred.  
 
(f) By-laws 
 
(i) Introduction 
 
The Legal Unit attempted to analyse the existing provisions of the animal by-laws with 
reference to the relevant local government’s constitutional functional areas.  
 
(ii)  Control of public nuisance 
 
1.  Limitation on number of dogs: The by-laws contain provisions limiting the number of 
dogs which may be kept on a property. This provision is enforceable by the 
municipality, but it also refers to the Ordinance in that provision is made for an 
application for permission to license more dogs in terms of section 11 of the Ordinance; 
and 
2.  General prohibitions: This section contains a number of useful and enforceable 
provisions such as that prohibiting owners from allowing diseased animals to be on a 
public street, or providing that any ownerless animal may be seized by a policeman or 
any officer of the Durban and Coast SPCA. 
 
(iii)  Licensing of dogs 
 
The by-law provisions relating to licensing incorporate certain sections of the Licensing and 
Control of Dogs Ordinance. They are accordingly unenforceable in those parts of the 
municipality which fall under the R293 areas.   
 
(iv) Facilities for the accommodation, care, and burial of animals 
 
The by-laws do not address this issue. 
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(v) Pounds 
 
The by-laws do not address this issue. 
 
(vi) Section 27 of the by-laws: ‘Emergency measures to prevent spread of disease’ 
 
Section 27 allows the Council’s Medical Officer of Health to publish a notice prohibiting dogs 
and cats from being on any street or public place unless they are on a leash. Any dog or cat 
found in a public place may be seized, impounded, and destroyed if suspected of having rabies. 
The section further provides that during the period in which a prohibition is in force, the owner 
of an animal required to be immunised, may be required to produce a valid certificate of 
immunisation to any authorised officer.  
 
(g) Advice 
 
The legal unit presented the following advice to the health department as a possible way 
forward in addressing this issue. The analysis of applicable laws shows that the current 
legislative framework is wholly inadequate in both the provincial and local government 
spheres. Animal control and diseases is not a local government competence, and in terms of 
the existing framework, the lead in co-coordinating a response to a rabies outbreak should be 
taken by the National and Provincial Departments of Agriculture acting in conjunction. 
 
The first version of the Environmental Implementation Plan (EIP) published by the National 
Department of Agriculture lists the development of an animal disease contingency plan as a 
programme of the Directorate of Veterinary Services.515 The EIP states that the Veterinary 
Services Directorate works in close collaboration with the Veterinary Services of the PDA’s 
(provincial departments), which are responsible for the implementation of policies and 
programmes.516 The EIP further states that 'of particular importance are diseases transmissible 
to humans (such as rabies)’.517  
 
                                                 
515 GN 659 of 17 May 2002, 64. 
516 Ibid 57. 
517 Ibid 64. 
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The analysis of the national legislative framework reveals a framework at national sphere 
which is able to deal with the current problem. It is submitted that the animal diseases aspect 
of responses to the rabies outbreak should be dealt with at national and provincial levels. In so 
far as the animal by-laws address issues related to the functional area ‘animal control and 
diseases’, these sections of the by-laws are in all likelihood unconstitutional. 
 
Option 1 
 
As ‘animal and diseases control’ is a concurrent national and provincial function, the 
eThekwini Metro could call upon the relevant parties to assist by implementing their 
contingency plan as required by the EIP. Reponses at the local government level would then 
be confined to matters falling within its functional domain (‘control of public nuisances’, 
‘licensing of dogs’, ‘facilities for the accommodation, care, and burial of animals’, and 
‘pounds’). Efforts would then be concentrated on sorting out the legislative framework relating 
to municipal functional domains. 
 
This project would require the repeal of all conflicting provincial legislation. Licensing is an 
area of critical concern. Here extensive consultations would be required between the municipal 
departments tasked with administering Health, Legal, Licensing, Metro Police, Human 
Resources, and Treasury regarding provision for enforcement mechanisms, staff, and funding 
implications. 
 
Option 2 
 
A second suggested option was to seek authorisation from the Director of Animal Health within 
the Department of Agriculture to designate some of the municipality’s officials as authorised 
persons to carry out certain functions in the Act (in terms of s 3 of the Animals Diseases Act). 
The funding implications of this route would also need to be considered.   
 
(h)  Analysis  
 
This case study illustrates a number of the issues outlined in this thesis, including: 
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(i)  concurrency and overlap between the applicable functional areas; 
(ii) misalignment between organisational capacity and the constitutional allocation of 
functions; 
(iii) differing understandings of the manner in which the Constitution allocates powers and 
functions to officials; and 
(iv)  the non-alignment of the statute book with the Constitution (existence of old order 
legislation not aligned with the Constitution). 
 
The exercise of trying to navigate the bewildering complexity of the legislative landscape 
governing local government is a matter of daily practice for officials in all three spheres of 
government. When officials are presented with a case such as the present one, the question they 
need answered is simply: ‘Who does what?’ This example shows that often the answer is not 
readily forthcoming. The difficulty in interpreting the potentially applicable Schedule 4 and 
Schedule 5 competencies is a problem which must be resolved before the matter can be 
addressed. Enter the next set of problems – first, many of the officials at the various levels of 
government do not understand the constitutional allocation of powers. They understand the 
previous system and nobody has brought them up to speed with what the new system requires. 
In the result, turf wars, inaction, opting out, and opting for lawlessness all manifest. In all of 
this, service delivery suffers. And in a case such as the present, the price is the life of a 
vulnerable rural child.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the division of powers between local, provincial, and national 
government spheres by examining case studies drawn from the practice of government. The 
evidence from practice is that local government is the point of convergence for a large number 
of laws and policies formulated by national and provincial departments. Often these 
departments have differing understandings of local government’s functional and administrative 
arrangements, and very often local government is consulted only after the process of drafting 
has been completed. The presidency’s Ten-Year Review of Intergovernmental Relations and 
Service Delivery, highlighted the issue in the following terms: 
 
Good governance requires that the national government and the provinces execute their regulatory function over 
municipalities in an integrated and coordinated manner. Several national departments exercise regulatory 
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responsibilities that impact on municipalities. If each of the departments works with an own understanding of the 
role of local government and its own regulatory powers, the risk is that there are as many concepts of local 
government as there are departments. The cumulative effect of these different concepts amounts to a burden on 
local government. If a province’s own understanding of its regulatory powers over local government is added, the 
end result is even more burdensome and confusing to municipalities. The practice of regulation suggests that there 
is no consistency in approach to local government by line departments at both national and provincial level.518  
 
A detailed analysis of the impact this has had on the legislative framework local government 
must implement is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that practice offers many 
examples: 
(a)  National and provincial laws which prescribe detailed, often cumbersome and costly 
processes for municipalities to follow and which are drafted in local government 
functional areas, eg the KZN Pounds Act.519 To this category, it is submitted that large 
sections of the Municipal Systems Act520and the regulations made in terms of the Act521 
and parts of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA)522 and its regulations,523 
may be added. With respect to the regulations made in terms of the MFMA, it is 
submitted that the detailed legal prescriptions governing the Supply Chain Management 
process in government is an area which may benefit from further study.524 In particular 
the question of whether the detailed processes hamper service delivery should be 
examined together with the question of whether they have contributed to the prevention 
of corrupt practices. 
                                                 
518 Layman T ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South Africa: A Ten-year review 
commissioned by the Presidency’ (2003) at 24 available at http://sarpn.org/documents/d000078751docs/ 
Layman%20Tim.pdf accessed on 23 September 2017. 
519 KwaZulu-Natal Pound Act 3 of 2006.  
520 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000: ss 27, 29, 37(b), (d)-(h); 54A, 56, 78, 80, 85, 86A, 
86H-K, 88-90, 92, 93, 93A–H, 95, 97 and 104. 
521 Local Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations, 2001; Local Government: 
Municipal Performance Regulations for Municipal Managers and Managers Directly Accountable to Municipal 
Managers, 2006; Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010.  
522 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 0f 2003: ss 21-24, 28, 33, 43, 46, 52-54, 60, 62 –
71, 75, 84, 87-90, 112, 120 and 168. 
523 Municipal Investment Regulations GNR. 308 GG 27431 dated 1 April 2005; Municipal Public-Private 
Partnership Regulations GNR 309 GG 27431 dated 1 April 2005; Municipal Supply Chain Management 
Regulations GN 868 GG 27636 dated 30 May 2005; Municipal Regulations on Minimum Competency Levels 
GNR 493 GG 29967 dated 15 June 2007; Municipal Regulations on Debt Disclosure GNR 492 GG 29966 dated 
5 June 2007; Municipal Asset Transfer Regulations GNR 878 GG 31346 dated 22 August 2008. 
524 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 0f 2003: ss 110-116, 119; Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000; Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, Regulations GNR 502 GG 
34350 dated 8 June 2011; Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations GN 868 GG 27636 dated 30 May 
2005.  
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(b)  Provincial and national laws which add permitting processes at provincial level for 
functions that are administered at local level.525 
(c) New and old-order legislation which frustrates municipalities’ ability to draft by-laws 
because they contain provisions which directly impact on municipalities in the 
functional area which the draft by-law seeks to regulate.526 
(d)  Conflicting national and provincial laws and policies.527 
 
This illustrates that the implementation of the constitutional allocation of powers has not been 
translated into consistent legislative practice which respects the constitutional status of local 
government. If government’s own studies demonstrate that ‘there are as many concepts of local 
government as there are departments’, clearly this will be reflected in the legislation and policy 
emanating from those departments. It is hardly surprising, then, that government’s review also 
found that ‘national and provincial legislation and policies are also sometimes at odds’.528 The 
question which cannot be escaped is this – Is the difficulty which national and provincial 
departments experience in understanding the constitutional allocation of powers a challenge of 
capacity, implementation, or constitutional design? Or can it be laid at the door of some other 
factor or possibly a combination of factors? And how do all of these factors combine to impact 
on the functioning of local government and its ability to fulfil its constitutionally mandated 
functions? The crucial question is what can be done to address these challenges and to improve 
the efficacy and functioning of government. 
 
The following recommendations are made to address the challenges outlined above: 
(a)  The lack of coordination between national and provincial departments in the area of 
legislation within their mandates but impacting on local government must be addressed 
as a matter of urgency. 
(b)  A more inclusive consultative process for the drafting of legislation and policy 
impacting on local government must be implemented. Local government should be 
included in the process of drafting and developing any laws which they are required to 
implement. 
                                                 
525 This is seen for instance in relation to permitting processes for the operation of taxis in KwaZulu-Natal. 
526 An example of this phenomenon was discussed in the section on Management of Animal Punds in KZN above. 
527 For example the conflicting legislation discussed in relation to the DPSA and the draft Public Administration 
Bill. 
528 Layman T ‘Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery in South Africa: A Ten-year review 
commissioned by the Presidency’ (2003) at 24 available at http://sarpn.org/documents/d000078751docs/ 
Layman%20Tim.pdf accessed on 23 September 2017. 
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(c) A coordinating structure, with responsibility for coordinating legislation and clearing it 
for constitutionality and coherence with government policy and compatibility with 
existing policies and laws across government departments, must be developed. (This is 
distinct from the technical process or exercise of certifying a Bill for constitutionality 
performed by the Premier’s Offices and the Office of the Chief State Law Advisor.) 
(d)  The understanding by officials of the powers and functions of local government, the 
link between policies and laws and budgets, and the meaning of the constitutional value 
of cooperative governance need to be addressed. 
(e)  All old-order legislation still on the statute books must be rationalised and either 
redrafted to bring it into line with the Constitution, or repealed. 
(f)  Local government legislation must be reviewed and simplified. All laws which are in 
violation of the Constitution must be repealed. 
(g)  The alignment of government departments with the functional allocation of 
responsibilities needs to be addressed via a comprehensive process that includes an 
assessment of capacity in local government and in provincial and national departments. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF CONCURRENT FUNCTIONAL 
AREAS: THE PLANNING EXAMPLE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
5.1.1  General 
 
In the previous chapter the constitutional allocation of powers to local government was 
examined. The effect of the concurrent allocation of responsibilities on efficient and effective 
government was also discussed. It was mentioned that one of the challenges which manifests 
in constitutions which incorporate concurrent powers is the difficulty of delimiting the 
functional areas of responsibility of the different spheres.529 One of the functional areas in 
which this difficulty has manifested is that of planning. The Constitution has divided legislative 
and executive authority over development planning between the three spheres in the following 
manner: ‘municipal planning’ and the related function of ‘building regulations’ are local 
government competencies.530 On the other hand, ‘regional planning and development’ and 
‘urban and rural development’ fall within an area of concurrent national and provincial 
competence – they are Schedule 4 Part A functions. Finally, the functional area of ‘provincial 
planning’ is located in Schedule 5 Part A which lists functional areas of exclusive provincial 
competence.531  
 
The area of planning also overlaps somewhat with other functional areas such as the 
‘environment’ –a Schedule 4 Part A competence – and with a number of other areas including 
mining.532 In fact, Yacoob J observed in the Wary Holdings case that: ‘Planning entails land 
use and is inextricably connected to every functional area that concerns the use of land. There 
is probably not a single functional area in the Constitution that can be carried out without 
                                                 
529 See the discussion in Section 4.4 above. 
530 Constitution: Schedule 4B. 
531 Constitution. 
532 This overlap was explored in the case of Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) 
[2013] ZAKZPHC 6 which is discussed in Chapter 6. 
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land.’533 It is not surprising, then, that contestation over the functional area of planning has 
generated a large body of case law dealing with the interpretation of Schedules 4 and 5 to the 
Constitution. In this section the judicial development of the law with regard to the precise 
meaning and ambit of the functional areas dealing with development planning is discussed.  
 
5.1.2 Planning Terminology534 
 
In South Africa there has been some confusion about which term best describes the law relating 
to land-use management and planning. The terms ‘planning law’;‘land-use planning law’; 
‘spatial planning law’; and ‘physical planning law’ have been used at various times. According 
to Van Wyk, the essentials of planning law are land-use planning and land-use management.535 
Land-use planning (or forward planning) entails the compilation of plans to determine land use 
such as Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and town planning schemes which includes the 
zoning of land. Land use management or development control comprises the management of 
the changes to the original plans such as rezoning and subdivision of land.536 The ‘Wise Land 
Use: White Paper on Spatial Planning, Land Use Management and Land Development’ 
suggested that the term ‘integrated development planning’ be used to denote plan creation (also 
known as forward planning), while the terms ‘land-use management’ and ‘land development’ 
be used to denote change in land use (also known as development control).537 As will be seen 
from the discussion which follows, the courts have provided some clarity on the issue of 
terminology. 
 
5.1.3 Planning Legislation538 
 
Municipalities administer planning decisions via a combination of new-order national and 
provincial legislation and old Ordinances which remain on the statute books of most 
provinces.539 The primary planning instruments of municipalities are the IDP and the Spatial 
                                                 
533 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) para 128. 
534 Van Wyk (2011) 13 PER/PELJ 214 at 219. 
535 Van Wyk (2009) 24(2) SA Public Law 545 at 559. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Van Wyk (2011) 13 PER/PELJ 220. 
538 Ibid at 219–235. 
539 Ibid. 
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Development Framework (SDF) they contain.540 The Municipal Systems Act compels 
municipalities to adopt an IDP containing an SDF setting out the desired spatial form of the 
municipality together with strategies to achieve it. The SDF must set out desired land-use 
patterns in the municipality, address spatial reconstruction, relate to the location and nature of 
development in the municipality, and set out the basic guidelines for a land-use management 
system for a municipality.541 
 
Before the commencement of the Spatial Land Use Management Act542 on 1 July 2015, 
planning at municipal level was conducted via the town planning and township Ordinances of 
the erstwhile provinces. In addition to these Ordinances, the provinces applied separate 
legislation adopted to govern planning in the homelands and TBVC states.543 
 
Together with all these laws, national environmental legislation also impacts on the municipal 
planning function by laying down procedures for the granting of environmental authorisation 
to undertake certain developments.544 
 
Against this background, it is necessary to examine the jurisprudence which has emerged from 
judicial consideration of disputes concerning the exercise of planning powers by the three 
spheres in the area of development and planning. As discussed in the introduction to this 
chapter, the boundaries between the functional areas of ‘municipal planning’; ‘regional 
planning and development’; ‘urban and rural development’; and ‘provincial planning’ are not 
clear and the precise ambit of the functional areas is not defined. In the absence of definitions 
in the Constitution or any guidelines, the courts have provided useful guidance in interpreting 
and defining the precise ambit of the Constitution’s allocation of functional competences 
between the spheres. 
 
 
 
                                                 
540 Ibid at 223. 
541 Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000: s 26. 
542 Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013.  
543 These laws included the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, legislation of the former homelands of 
KwaZulu-Natal, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, Lebowa, KwaNdebele, QwaQwa and laws governing the former TBVC 
states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. 
544 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
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5.2 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another545 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
Wary Holdings was the first case to come before the Constitutional Court which considered the 
issue of the limits of local government’s powers under the new constitutional order. The issue 
to be decided was whether the power granted by old-order legislation to the national Minister 
of Agriculture and Land Affairs to approve or reject subdivision, had survived in light of the 
new constitutional status of municipalities under the Constitution.546 The effect of the decision 
of the Court would be to either remove or confirm that power.547 The Court was accordingly 
called upon to determine the power of the national government to administer agricultural land 
falling within municipal boundaries in the context of local government’s enhanced 
constitutional status. 
 
The facts of the case involved the validity of an agreement for the sale of land concluded 
between the applicant and the first respondent. At the time of sale the land was zoned 
‘agricultural’ but the applicant had lodged an application with the relevant local authority for 
the rezoning and subdivision of the land. Subdivision was, in fact, a suspensive condition of 
the sale. The subdivision was eventually approved subject to conditions which were costly to 
implement. The applicant then sought to increase the purchase price of the property in order to 
cover the attendant costs and the subsequent increase in the property’s value. When the 
respondent refused to pay the increased price, the applicant claimed that the agreement of sale 
was invalid and unenforceable.548 
 
                                                 
545 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC). 
546 The Minister of Agriculture’s power emanated from the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
547 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) para 45. 
548 Ibid para 3. 
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The respondent approached the Port Elizabeth High Court for a declaratory order that the 
agreement was binding together with an order compelling the applicant to effect the transfer. 
The applicant sought to defend the application by arguing that the property sold was 
‘agricultural land’ within the meaning of the Act. As such, the sale required the Minister to 
consent in writing to the subdivision in order for the sale agreement to be valid. 549 
 
Two parties, who were sellers in similar sale-of-land contracts, applied and were admitted as 
amici curiae in the proceedings. The Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs (the Minister) 
was joined as an intervening party. The Minister aligned herself with the stance of the applicant.  
 
The matter turned on whether the land in question was ‘agricultural land’ within the meaning 
of the Act. The definition of ‘agricultural land’ in section 1 of the Act is as follows: 
 
‘agricultural land’ means any land, except— 
(a) land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a municipal council, city council, town council, village council, 
village management board, village management council, local board, health board or health committee . 
. . but excluding any such land declared by the Minister after consultation with the executive committee 
concerned and by notice in the Gazette to be agricultural land for the purposes of this Act; 
 . . . . 
(f) land which the Minister after consultation with the executive committee concerned and by notice in the 
Gazette excludes from the provisions of this Act; 
Provided that land situated in the area of jurisdiction of a transitional council as defined in section 1 of the Local 
Government Transition Act, 1993 (which immediately prior to the first election of the members of such 
transitional council was classified as agricultural land), shall remain classified as such.550 
 
The majority judgment was delivered by Kroon J. The Constitutional Court reasoned that the 
Act aimed to prevent the division of farming land into smaller, less profitable plots. In order to 
achieve this, the Act gave the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs extensive powers to 
regulate and control agricultural land.551 
 
                                                 
549 Ibid paras 4–5. 
550 Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970: s 1. 
551 These powers included the curtailment of owners’ common-law rights to subdivide their properties by the 
introduction of a requirement of ministerial consent prior to subdivision. See Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo 
(Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus 
curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC) para 12. 
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The Constitutional Court noted that ‘agriculture’ is listed in Schedule 4 Part A as a functional 
area of concurrent national and provincial competence. 552 The decision of the Court a quo had 
turned on its interpretation of the proviso to the definition of ‘agricultural land.’ This proviso 
was added on the eve of the first local government elections to remedy the fact that following 
the elections all existing agricultural land would fall within the boundaries of a municipality.553 
 
It held that the Minister’s written consent to the subdivision was a pre-requisite for a valid and 
enforceable agreement as, in the Constitutional Court’s view, the proviso provides a point in 
time with reference to which it must be decided if the land in question qualifies as agricultural 
land. If the land is agricultural land at that point in time, it remains so irrespective of any later 
changes to local government structures or boundaries. 554  
 
5.2.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal decision555 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the proviso had been enacted as an interim measure in 
order it to preserve the status quo until the establishment of the new local government 
structures. Once the restructuring of local government was complete, the interim measure fell 
away. In the SCA’s view, the plain meaning of the words in the proviso was that it was intended 
to operate only so long as the land affected remained within the jurisdiction of a transitional 
council. If the legislature had intended the classification to survive after the transitional 
councils had ceased to exist, it would have said so expressly.556  
 
The seminal part of the judgment as regards the interpretation of local government powers and 
functions, is the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that the High Court’s approach was 
incompatible with the ‘radically enhanced status and powers which the new constitutional order 
accorded local government structures.’557 This status necessarily includes the competence and 
capacity on the part of municipalities to administer land falling within their areas of jurisdiction 
                                                 
552 Constitution: Schedule 4. 
553 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) paras 28-30. 
554 Ibid para 24. 
555 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd & another 2008 (1) SA 654 (SCA). 
556 Ibid paras 21-28. 
557 Ibid para 32.  
 
  
157 
 
without national and provincial executive oversight.558 The SCA reasoned further that in terms 
of the definition of ‘agricultural land’ in the Act, the Minister retained the power to declare any 
land ‘agricultural land’ for the purposes of the Act. This fact had been overlooked by the High 
Court. In view of this the SCA found that the objective of the Act would not be thwarted as 
section 3 of the Act still prohibits the subdivision of ‘agricultural land’ without the Minister’s 
consent.559 
 
5.2.3 The Constitutional Court decision560 
 
(a) The majority judgment 
 
The Constitutional Court applied the ordinary-meaning rule to the interpretation of the 
definition of ‘agricultural land’.561 Kroon J, writing for the majority, was of the view that the 
interpretation of the proviso was not tied to the life of the transitional councils.562 He considered 
the finding of the SCA that the proviso was intended as an interim measure to be correct, but 
went on to reason that this does not mean that the proviso was intended to promote the 
contemplated restructuring of local government as there is no reference to the final local 
government structures to come into being in the future. He concluded: ‘In short, the proviso 
has to do with agriculture, not restructuring of local government.’563 
 
In a split decision of seven to three the Constitutional Court set aside the judgment of the SCA 
and reinstated the order of the High Court. In the Court’s view, the powers of local and national 
government could co-exist as the role of each sphere was governed by important policy 
considerations. From a national viewpoint, land, agriculture, food production, and 
environmental considerations are important national policy matters. Accordingly, in the 
                                                 
558 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) para 26. 
559 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd & another 2008 (1) SA 654 (SCA) para 27.  
560 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC).  
561 It is a canon of statutory interpretation that the ordinary meaning of words must be determined from the context 
of the statute (including its purpose) read in its entirety. 
562 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) para 62. 
563 Ibid para 66. 
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Court’s view, it was desirable to adopt an interpretation which preserved national government’s 
authority over policy in order to ensure certainty.564  
 
(b) The minority judgment 
 
The minority judgment held that on the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words the land 
would remain agricultural land only for so long as it remained within the jurisdiction of a 
transitional council.565 Writing for the minority, Yacoob J did not agree with the view that dire 
consequences would result from the interpretation preferred by the SCA. In his view the 
consequences attendant upon such an interpretation accorded with the constitutional scheme 
for the devolution of powers between the spheres. 566 
 
The judge reasoned that the proviso was added to the law one day prior to the first municipal 
elections in respect of transitional councils. This was done in order to prevent the 
administration of agriculture being compromised if the newly established councils did not have 
the requisite capacity to administer the function. The purpose was to ensure that the Minister 
retained these powers until local government had been restructured and laws had been passed 
to divide powers and functions in relation to agriculture and land-use planning.567 
 
The Constitution was passed and its provisions set out the division of powers between the three 
spheres. The minority noted that in terms of this division, ‘agriculture’ is a concurrent 
competence, however, in their view the way in which the Constitution devolved power for 
planning was crucial. In this regard, ‘regional planning’, like agriculture, is a concurrent 
functional area. However, regional planning is distinct from municipal planning, an expressly 
stated municipal function. 568 
 
In Yacoob J’s view, the competence ‘agriculture’ does not exist in a ‘hermetically sealed 
compartment’: ‘Planning entails land use and is connected to every decision concerning 
land.’569 Land use planning must take place in all three spheres of government. He concluded 
                                                 
564 Ibid para 80. 
565 Ibid para 121. 
566 Ibid para 124. 
567 Ibid para 125. 
568 Ibid paras 127-8. 
569 Ibid paras 128. 
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that insofar as the Act was concerned with zoning, subdivision, and sale of land, it was engaged 
in the regulation of the functional area of planning and not agriculture. 570 
 
The minority judgment supports the view that there is an inevitable overlap between the 
functional areas in Schedules 4 and 5 to the Constitution as found by the Constitutional Court 
in the Liquor Bill case.571 In the Liquor Bill case the Court stated that when interpreting 
concurrent powers, the main substance of the legislation must be determined in order to 
establish within which field of competence it falls.572 Applying this approach to the present 
matter, Yacoob J concluded that issues of zoning of land and subdivision were essentially a 
planning function. In his view the Minister’s role in the planning function applied only where 
local government structures were absent. The Constitution requires that planning be undertaken 
by municipalities; to continue to afford the Minister power over planning would be at odds 
with the Constitution by negating the ‘municipal planning’ function and possibly trespassing 
on the provincial competence of ‘provincial planning.’573 
 
The minority judgment goes on to point out that the Municipal Structures and Municipal 
Systems Acts574 confirm the status of land use planning as a municipal function.575 These Acts 
confirm the municipal council’s authority to adopt IDPs and SDFs – instruments which regulate 
land use management in local government. National and provincial governments are afforded 
an oversight role via the power granted to the MEC for Local Government in the two Acts. 
                                                 
570 Ibid para128. 
571 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re: Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) SA 732 
(CC) para 47 where the Constitutional Court found that: 
The list of exclusive competences in Schedule 5 must therefore be given meaning within the context of 
the constitutional scheme that accords Parliament extensive power encompassing ‘any matter’ excluding 
only the provincial exclusive competences.  The wide ambit of the functional competences concurrently 
accorded the national Legislature by Schedule 4 creates the potential for overlap, not merely with the 
provinces’ concurrent legislative powers in Schedule 4, but with their exclusive competences set out in 
Schedule 5.  Examples of concurrent Schedule 4 competences which could overlap with Schedule 5 
competences include ‘trade’ and ‘liquor licences’; ‘environment’ and ‘provincial planning’; ‘cultural 
matters’ and ‘provincial cultural matters’ as well as ‘libraries other than national libraries’; and ‘road 
traffic regulation’ and ‘provincial roads and traffic.’ 
572 Ibid para 62. 
573 Ibid para 131. 
574 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000; Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 
1998.  
575 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) para 128. 
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Similarly, the Acts give the national Minister for Local Government the power to make 
regulations concerning IDPs. 576 
 
Finally, Yacoob J concluded that the application for rezoning in this case had been made well 
after the Municipal Systems Act came into force, and the decision taken by the municipality 
was consistent with its approved IDP and SDF.577 The IDP would have been drafted in 
compliance with the national regulations and would have been approved by the MEC for local 
government. Yacoob J was of the view that in these circumstances the national Minister of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs could not expect to have a veto over this specific subdivision.578 
Accordingly, the minority disagreed with High Court’s interpretation. In its view a literal 
interpretation of the proviso was supported by the context and purpose of the Act.579 
 
5.2.4 Analysis 
 
Academic analysis of the judgment in Wary Holdings has been varied. Van Wyk approves the 
reasoning in the minority judgment to the effect that leaving responsibility for subdivision of 
agricultural land with the Department of Agriculture presents constitutional difficulties as it 
negates municipalities’ planning function which, in terms of the Constitution, is allocated to 
the local government sphere. In Van Wyk’s view it ‘seems incomprehensible that 
municipalities have the power to subdivide urban land but not agricultural or rural land situated 
in the municipal area.’580 In Steytler’s view, the majority judgment is lacking in that it offers 
no proper analysis of the functional division of powers between the three spheres of 
government. In his view, the proviso should have been interpreted so as to conform to the 
constitutional division of powers. This is what Yacoob J did in the minority judgment, but 
Steytler argues that he arrived at a wrong conclusion.581 For Steytler, planning relates mainly 
to the built environment (zoning, building regulations, etc.) and this does not extend to 
decisions on subdivision of agricultural land as municipalities have no interest at stake in such 
                                                 
576 Yacoob J points out that the Minister has made these regulations in Local Government Municipal Planning and 
Performance Regulation GN R796 GG 22605 of 24 August 2001. 
577 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re: Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) SA 732 
(CC) para 140. 
578 Ibid para 139. 
579 Ibid para 141. 
580 Van Wyk (2009) 24(2) SA Public Law 545, 562. 
581 Steytler (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 439. 
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decisions. ‘Agriculture’ is not a functional area of local government and municipalities do not 
have officials with the necessary skills to make such decisions. He points to the Liquor Bill 
case in which the Constitutional Court held that the provincial exclusive competence over 
‘liquor licences’ is limited to licences that have no extra-provincial dimension.582 Applying 
that principle to the present case, the ‘municipal planning’ function should be limited to land-
use matters that have no extra-municipal application. The optimal use of agricultural land can 
only be judged on a provincial or national scale. According to Steytler, this dimension is not 
adequately covered in the IDP as IDPs are unlikely to speak to issues of viable farming units 
which are not municipal business. He also points to the possibility that there may be no 
alignment between IDPs and provincial and national plans. In his view, subdivision of 
agricultural land deals with agriculture and not planning.583 
 
Olivier and Williams contend that the Constitutional Court was correct in finding that the 
proviso and the Act still apply. In their view the majority decision is correct and sound in law 
taking into account the background to the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act, the history, 
content, and manner of assignment in the interim Constitution, and the constitutional 
arrangements in the Constitution.584 
 
5.3 Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
 & others585 
 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 
This decision dealt with a dispute between the City of Johannesburg (the city) and the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal. The dispute involved which sphere of government was entitled to 
exercise the powers relating to the establishment of townships and rezoning of land within the 
municipal area of the city in terms of the Constitution. Chapters V and VI of Development 
Facilitation Act (the Act), authorised provincial tribunals established in terms of the Act to 
determine applications for rezoning of land and for the establishment of townships.586  
                                                 
582 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re: Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) SA 732 
(CC). 
583 Steytler (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 445. 
584 Olivier & Williams (2010) 35(2) Journal of Juridical Science 99. 
585 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC). 
586 Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. 
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The facts were that the city delegated its powers to decide rezoning applications and to establish 
new townships to its planning committee. Difficulties began to emerge when the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal decided rezoning and township establishment applications within the 
city’s area of jurisdiction. The city complained that the tribunal was overly lenient and that its 
decisions were often taken without regard to the city’s development planning instruments. This 
undermined the authority of the city and resulted in ‘forum shopping’. After meetings between 
officials from the city and the province failed to resolve the dispute, the parties agreed that the 
city should approach the High Court for a declaratory order in order to clarify the powers of 
the parties in terms of the Act.587 The city unsuccessfully challenged the constitutional validity 
of the Act in the High Court. On appeal, the SCA declared the Act to be invalid, but suspended 
the declaration of invalidity for eighteen months to allow Parliament to remedy the defects. In 
the Constitutional Court, the city sought confirmation of the SCA’s order, leave to appeal 
against certain ancillary orders relating to the declaration of invalidity, and also leave to appeal 
against the dismissal of its appeal against two of the tribunal’s decisions.588 
 
The central issue before the Constitutional Court was whether the impugned Chapters of the 
Act were inconsistent with the constitutional division of powers between the three spheres. 
This issue turned on the interpretation of Chapters V and VI of the Act, section 156 of the 
Constitution, and the functional areas of ‘regional planning and development’, ‘provincial 
planning’, ‘municipal planning’, and ‘urban and rural development.’589 
 
5.3.2 The Constitutional Court decision 
 
In its reasoning, the Constitutional Court discussed the constitutional scheme for the three 
distinct, interdependent, and interrelated spheres of government. It noted that each sphere is 
autonomous in the exercise of its powers, and that the spheres must respect the status, powers, 
and functions of government in other spheres. Sections 100 and 139 set out how the national 
and provincial spheres are permitted to intervene in municipalities. Section 156(1) affords 
municipalities original constitutional legislative and executive powers over Schedule 4 Part B 
                                                 
587 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) paras 9-10. 
588 Ibid paras 14-18. 
589 Ibid para 19.  
 
  
163 
 
and Schedule 5 Part B matters. The Court noted that section 155(7) obliges national and 
provincial governments to ‘see to the effective performance by municipalities of their functions 
listed in Schedules 4 and 5 by regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive 
authority’.590 
 
In the Constitutional Court’s view, the functional area of ‘planning’ was material to the 
determination of whether Chapters V and VI of the Act were inconsistent with the Constitution. 
The Court reiterated that a purposive approach to interpretation which will allow the spheres 
to exercise their powers ‘fully and effectively’ was required. Referring to the decision in the 
Liquor Bill case, it noted that the Constitution confers planning responsibilities on each of the 
three spheres; whilst the functional areas do not exist in hermetically sealed compartments – 
they are distinct from one another. 591 The Court found that:592 
 
This distinctiveness lies in the level at which a particular power is exercised …. The prefix attached to 
each functional area identifies the sphere to which it belongs and distinguishes it from the functional 
areas of other spheres …. the functional area of ‘provincial roads’ does not include ‘municipal roads’. 
In the same vein, ‘provincial planning’ and ‘regional planning and development’ do not include 
‘municipal planning.’ 
 
In the Constitutional Court’s view, (with the exception of concurrent powers) each sphere of 
government is allocated separate and distinct powers which it alone is entitled to exercise. With 
regard to the meaning of ‘planning’, the Court held that the term has a particular, well 
established meaning in the context of municipal affairs which includes the zoning of land and 
the establishment of townships. There is nothing in the Constitution that indicates that the 
drafters intended to give the term ‘planning’ anything other than its common meaning. The 
Constitutional Court agreed with the SCA that the Constitution uses the term ‘planning’ in its 
commonly understood sense and accordingly held that the contested provisions of the Act 
concerned ‘municipal planning’.593 
 
                                                 
590 Ibid paras 44-49.  
591 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re: Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) SA 732 
(CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 
182 (CC) paras 49-50.  
592 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality ibid para 47. 
593 Ibid para 59. 
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The next question the Constitutional Court considered was whether the contested powers could 
be said to form part of the provincial power of ‘urban and rural development’ in Schedule 4 
Part B. The Court held that to construe any of the national and provincial functional areas in a 
manner which includes areas of local government competence would be inconsistent with the 
constitutional scheme for the allocation of powers. This scheme requires the spheres to respect 
the functions of other spheres and not to encroach upon another sphere’s functional integrity. 
Accordingly, the Court held that the national government cannot enact legislation which 
transfers legislative and executive authority over municipal affairs granted in terms of the 
Constitution to another sphere of government. The mandate of the national and provincial 
spheres is limited to regulating the exercise of executive municipal powers and the 
administration of municipal affairs by municipalities. The Court did not consider it necessary 
to define the functional area of ‘urban and rural development’ save to say that it is not broad 
enough to encompass ‘municipal planning.’594 
 
The Constitutional Court distinguished its reasoning in this decision from that in Wary 
Holdings by stating that in the latter case the Court was not directly confronted with the 
question of interpreting the Schedules, but was instead concerned with the interpretation of the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (SALA).595 Accordingly, Wary Holdings cannot be read 
‘as suggesting that the national sphere has executive powers in the municipal sphere that extend 
beyond its constitutionally prescribed roles of regulating the exercise of municipal powers by 
municipalities themselves and strengthening their capacity to manage their own affairs.’596 
 
Delivering the judgment on behalf of the Constitutional Court, Jafta J held that in granting 
applications for rezoning or the establishment of townships, the development tribunals had 
encroached on the functional area of ‘municipal planning.’ Accordingly, the Court held that 
Chapters V and VI of the Act were inconsistent with section 156 of the Constitution read with 
Schedule 4 Part B. The Court confirmed the order of constitutional invalidity made by the SCA 
                                                 
594 Ibid paras 60-65. 
595 Minister of Public Works & others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association & another 2001 (3) SA 1151 
(CC); Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
596 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) para 70.  
 
  
165 
 
but suspended the declaration of invalidity for 24 months to enable Parliament to remedy the 
defects in the legislation.597 
 
5.4 Swartland Municipality v Louw NO & others598 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
In Swartland Municipality, the Western Cape High Court was called upon to decide the validity 
and enforceability of the Cape Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO) and the scheme 
regulations promulgated in terms of the Ordinance.599 The applicant, Swartland Municipality, 
sought an interdict preventing the fifth respondent, Elsana Quarry (Pty) Ltd (Elsana), from 
conducting mining activities on a farm that had not been properly rezoned by the municipality 
from Agricultural I to Industrial III. Elsana had been granted a mining right effective for 30 
years by the Minister of Minerals and Energy (the Minister). They then conducted and 
submitted an environmental impact assessment which was subsequently approved by the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME).600  
 
In June 2000, Elsana submitted a rezoning application for the farm under the LUPO. However, 
the LUPO application was withdrawn after the respondents were advised by the DME that the 
granting of mining rights was the exclusive preserve of the national government. Elsana 
contended that it was entitled to continue mining activities by virtue of the mining right issued 
to it. However, the municipality argued that Elsana was not permitted to conduct mining 
activities on the property until the property had been zoned Industrial III.601 
 
                                                 
597 This was due to information placed before the Constitutional Court which indicated that the Ordinances which 
empowered the tribunals applied only within the jurisdiction of old provinces but excluded the homelands and 
R293 areas. The suspension was subject to the condition that the development tribunals consider the applicable 
integrated development plans, spatial development frameworks, and urban development boundaries of 
municipalities when deciding applications. A further condition was that no development tribunal may consider an 
application for the grant or alteration of land use rights within eThekwini Municipality or the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality. The latter two conditions were added in order to accommodate the less resourced 
municipalities who lacked capacity to decide land applications and which relied on the tribunals to carry out this 
function. See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality ibid paras 70-101. 
598 Swartland Municipality v Louw NO & others 2010 (5) SA 314 (WCC). 
599 The Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985. 
600 Swartland Municipality v Louw NO & others 2010 (5) SA 314 (WCC) para 7.  
601 Ibid para 8. 
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The parties’ contentions were based on differing interpretations of the effect of provisions of  
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), on the LUPO as 
subordinate legislation, as well as regarding the constitutionality of the LUPO.602 The main 
objective of the MPRDA was to give effect to the state’s custodianship of the country’s mineral 
and petroleum resources. Section 23(6) of the MPRDA provides in this respect as follows:603 
 
A mining right is subject to this Act, any relevant law, the terms and conditions stated in the right and the 
prescribed terms and conditions and is valid for the period specified in the right, which period may not exceed 30 
years. 
 
And section 25(2)(d) goes on to provide that the ‘holder of a mining right must comply with 
the relevant provisions of this Act, any other relevant law and the terms and conditions of the 
mining right…’. 
 
The respondents argued that the functional area of mining and minerals was an exclusive 
national legislative competence and reference to ‘any relevant law’ in the MPRDA did not 
include the LUPO to the extent that it purports to regulate the control and use of land for mining 
purposes. The respondents contended that the LUPO was pre-constitution legislation which 
was inconsistent with the MPRDA and the Constitution.604 
 
5.4.2 The High Court decision 
 
The High Court held that the legislature must have been aware that there was provincial and 
local legislation on land-use planning and zoning when it enacted the MPRDA. In the Court’s 
view the meaning of ‘any relevant law’ in section 23(6) included the LUPO. Having concluded 
that the LUPO was relevant and binding, the Court turned to consider the issue of conflict 
between the LUPO and the MPRDA.605 
 
The High Court noted the constitutional shift away from three ‘tiers’ of government toward 
three ‘spheres’ which was based on the fact ‘that each of the spheres of government (and their 
                                                 
602 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985. 
603 Swartland Municipality v Louw NO & others 2010 (5) SA 314 (WCC) para 14.  
604 Ibid para 16.  
605 Ibid para 20. 
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legislatures) has equivalent status, is self-reliant and inviolable, and enjoys sufficient 
constitutional latitude to define and express its unique character.’606 ‘Mining and minerals’ is 
not listed in the allocation of powers in Schedules 4 and 5. ‘Agriculture’ and ‘regional planning 
and development’ are concurrent provincial and national competencies (Schedule 4 Part A). 
‘Provincial planning’ is an area of provincial legislative authority while ‘municipal planning’ 
is a local government functional area (Schedule 4 Part B). 607 
 
Le Grange J noted that in Wary Holdings, the Constitutional Court held that planning entails 
land use and is therefore connected to every functional area that concerns land. 608 In order to 
determine the meaning of ‘planning’, the judge considered the following dictum of Nugent JA 
in the SCA decision in Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & 
Others:.609 
 
It is clear that the word ‘planning’ when used in the context of municipal affairs, is commonly understood to refer 
to the control and regulation of land use, and I have no doubt that it was used in the Constitution with that common 
usage in mind. The prefix ‘municipal’ does no more than to confine it to municipal affairs. That construction, 
which gives meaningful effect to the term, has the effect of leaving in the hands of national and provincial 
government the authority to legislate in the functional area of ‘urban development’, but reserving to municipalities 
the authority to micro manage the use of land for any such development. On that construction the functional area 
of urban development retains considerable scope for national and provincial legislation. 
 
Accordingly, Le Grange J found that the LUPO provides a statutory framework for the 
regulation of land use and planning which is consistent with the Constitution. The High Court 
held further that the LUPO is not directed at the control of mining and falls within ‘the 
legislative competency scope provided for in both Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution’.610 
Given that the objects of the LUPO and the MPRDA differ, the High Court held that the 
MPRDA cannot be regarded as trumping the provisions of the LUPO. 611 
 
                                                 
606 Ibid para 26. 
607 Ibid para 29.  
608 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC).  
609 Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (2) SA 554 (SCA) para 4 cited at 
para 32 of Swartland Municipality v Louw NO & others 2010 (5) SA 314 (WCC). 
610 Swartland Municipality v Louw NO & others 2010 (5) SA 314 (WCC) para 34.  
611 Ibid paras 34–40. 
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The High Court held that the zoning of land is essentially a planning function. In its view the 
legislator could not have intended to grant the Minister the power to make decisions which 
were outside the scope and purpose of the MPRDA. Such a wide ministerial power would 
‘negate the municipal planning function conferred upon municipalities and may well trespass 
into the sphere of exclusive provincial competence’.612 Accordingly, the Court found that there 
was no conflict between the LUPO and the MPRDA as the two can be read as mutually 
supportive.613 
 
5.4.3 The Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court decisions614 
 
The Minister for Mineral Resources appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA) against 
the order of the High Court. The SCA held that the MPRDA governs mining whereas the LUPO 
governs land use planning. In the Court’s view, the Ordinance and the Act operate alongside 
each other with the result that a party which has been granted a mining right in terms of the 
MPRDA, must seek rezoning of the land in terms of the LUPO before starting to mine. 
 
In the Constitutional Court, the Minister’s appeal was heard together with the similar case, 
Maccsand v City of Cape Town.615 The reasons for dismissing the appeal in that case apply 
equally to the present case, accordingly the reasons were not set out by the Constitutional Court 
in the present case. The Court dismissed the appeal and held that it agreed with the SCA that a 
party who is granted a mining right in terms of the MPRDA may start mining operations only 
if the zoning of land in terms of the LUPO permits it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
612 Ibid para 41. 
613 Ibid para 41. 
614 Louw NO & others v Swartland Municipality [2011] ZASCA 142 and Minister for Mineral Resources v 
Swartland Municipality & others 2012 (7) BCLR 712 (CC). 
615 MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC). 
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5.5 MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others616 
 
5.5.1  Introduction 
 
Like the Swartland Municipality case, this case concerned the interplay between the MPRDA, 
the LUPO, and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA).617 The facts of the case 
and the decision in the matter turned on the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
constitutional allocation of powers in the Schedules to the Constitution. 
 
The dispute arose when the Minister of Mineral Resources granted two mining permits to 
Maccsand which authorised it to carry out mining on the Rocklands and Westridge Dunes in 
Mitchells Plain. Both permits related to areas which were in close proximity to private homes. 
In addition to being close to homes, the Rocklands Dunes were between two schools. The land 
to which the permits related belonged to the city of Cape Town and was zoned as ‘public open 
space’ in terms of the LUPO.618 The city of Cape Town (the city) objected to the mining 
operations and instituted proceedings for an interdict restraining Maccsand from mining sand 
until the dunes had been rezoned to allow for mining. 619 
 
Section 23(1) of the MPRDA empowers the Minister to grant mineral rights subject to any 
terms and conditions she or he may wish to impose. A mining right granted in terms of the 
MPRDA comes into effect on the date on which the environmental management programme is 
approved. The MPRDA obliges the Minister of Mineral Resources to consult the Minister of 
Water and Environmental Affairs when she or he considers an environmental management plan 
or programme. 620 
 
The NEMA was passed in order to establish framework legislation to guide organs of state 
when they take decisions which may affect the environment. It also provides for cooperative 
environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-makers on matters affecting 
                                                 
616 Ibid. 
617 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002; Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985; 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
618 The Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985.  
619 MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) paras 20-22. 
620 Ibid para 6. 
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the environment. In deciding applications for mining rights, the NEMA requires both the 
Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs or the Minister of Mineral Resources, as the case 
may be, to comply with the NEMA. The Ministers are also required to consult every state 
department which administers a law relating to the environment.621 
 
The LUPO is pre-Constitution legislation which came into force in July 1986. The operation 
of the LUPO was preserved by the interim Constitution and it was later assigned to the 
provincial government of the Western Cape. The LUPO governs spatial development by laying 
down procedures for municipalities to submit structure plans to the province. In terms of the 
LUPO, land may not be used for purposes other than those which are permitted by the relevant 
zoning scheme.622 
 
5.5.2 The High Court decision 
 
In the High Court, both Maccsand and the Minister of Mineral Resources argued that 
interpreting the LUPO so as to include ‘mining’ was inconsistent with the Constitution as 
‘mining’ falls under the exclusive competence of national government. The constitutional 
scheme does not permit interference by one sphere in the exercise of powers assigned to another 
sphere. The High Court rejected this argument and found that the LUPO does not relate to 
‘mining’ but to ‘planning’, which is an area of local government competence in terms of the 
Constitution. The LUPO does not purport to regulate mining. Similarly, the Minister of Mineral 
Resources contended that the NEMA does not apply to ‘mining’ activities as the MPRDA 
adequately protects the environment. This argument was rejected by the High Court which held 
that the MPRDA and the NEMA must be interpreted to give effect to the fact that both laws 
apply to mining activities. As a result the High Court interdicted Maccsand from commencing 
or continuing with mining activities until the land had been rezoned in terms of the LUPO and 
the relevant authorisations had been granted in terms of  the NEMA.623 
 
 
 
                                                 
621 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 s 240(2); MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & 
others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) paras 8-10. 
622 Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985; MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2012 (4) SA 181 
(CC) paras 15-16. 
623 MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) paras 23-26. 
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5.5.3 The Supreme Court of Appeal decision 
 
Maccsand and the Minister of Mineral Resources appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal on 
grounds similar to those raised in the High Court. The SCA concluded that the LUPO and the 
MPRDA apply alongside each other. Accordingly, it held that a holder of a mining right cannot 
proceed to mine unless the LUPO permits mining on the land concerned. However, the 
interdicts based on the NEMA were set aside due to the repeal of the regulations underpinning 
the decision.624 
 
Maccsand appealed to the Constitutional Court seeking to challenge the decision of the SCA.  
One of the main issues was whether a holder of a mining right or permit granted in terms of 
the MPRDA may exercise those rights only where the zoning scheme relating to the land in 
terms of the LUPO permits mining.625 
 
5.5.4 The Constitutional Court decision 
 
The Constitutional Court noted that the LUPO predated the enactment of the MPRDA and that 
the Westridge and Rockland Dunes were zoned for ‘public open space’ before Maccsand was 
granted the mining permit. The question was whether the application of the LUPO to the land 
ceased once the mining permits in terms of the MPRDA had been granted. The applicants 
argued that because the LUPO does not regulate ‘mining’, it does not apply to land in respect 
of which mining rights have been granted. They argued further that to hold that the LUPO 
applies would amount to an unjustified intrusion by the local sphere into the exclusive terrain 
of national government.626 
 
The Constitutional Court stated that the MPRDA is concerned with ‘mining’ which is a national 
government competence. On the other hand, the LUPO regulates the use of land which falls 
into the local government competency of ‘municipal planning’. The two laws overlap because 
mining is carried out on land. In the Court’s view, this overlap was not an unjustified intrusion 
by one sphere into the area of competence of another sphere because spheres of government 
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do not exist in sealed compartments. If it is accepted that the LUPO applies to ‘municipal 
planning’, then it applies to the Westridge and Rockland Dunes. Consequently, the Court found 
that the mere granting of a mining right cannot cancel the LUPO’s application. 627 The ratio 
decidendi is set out by Jafta J in the following extract from the judgment:628 
 
The Constitution allocates powers to three spheres of government in accordance with the functional vision of what 
is appropriate to each sphere.629 But because these powers are not contained in hermetically sealed compartments, 
sometimes the exercise of powers by two spheres may result in an overlap. When this happens, neither sphere is 
intruding into the functional area of another. Each sphere would be exercising power within its own competence.  
It is in this context that the Constitution obliges these spheres of government to co-operate with one another in 
mutual trust and good faith, and to co-ordinate actions taken with one another.630 
 
The fact that in this case mining cannot take place until the land in question is appropriately rezoned is therefore 
permissible in our constitutional order. It is proper for one sphere of government to take a decision whose 
implementation may not take place until consent is granted by another sphere, within whose area of jurisdiction 
the decision is to be executed.631  If consent is, however, refused it does not mean that the first decision is vetoed. 
The authority from whom consent was sought would have exercised its power, which does not extend to the power 
of the other functionary. This is so in spite of the fact that the effect of the refusal in those circumstances would 
be that the first decision cannot be put into operation.  This difficulty may be resolved through co-operation 
between the two organs of state, failing which, the refusal may be challenged on review.632 
 
5.5.5 Analysis 
 
Humby contends that national government’s insistence that the MPRDA trumps the LUPO 
must be seen in the context of the historically privileged position which the mining industry 
has enjoyed in South Africa. Both the common law and legislation were geared towards the 
protection of the mining industry – understandably, given the importance of mining to the 
economy. Added to this is the historically submissive status of local government in relation to 
provincial and national government. Under the parliamentary system local government bodies 
                                                 
627 Ibid paras 42-51. 
628 Ibid paras 47-48. 
629 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) para 53. 
630 Constitution: s 41. 
631 Minister of Public Works & others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association & another 2001 (3) SA 1151 
(CC) para 59 and Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands 
Trust & SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 
2009 (1) SA 337 (CC) para 80. 
632 MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) paras 47-48. 
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were ‘creatures of statute’. This is in distinct contrast to the constitutionally enhanced status of 
local government as a fully-fledged sphere of government in its own right that prevails today.633 
 
Woolman and Roux argue that the constitutional notion of spheres of government sets the stage 
for two competing models of federalism with two differing concepts of intergovernmental 
relations – coercive intergovernmental relations versus cooperative intergovernmental 
relations. In the cooperative model there is relative parity between the spheres.634 It is submitted 
that this is the model set out in section 41(1) of the Constitution which enjoins all spheres to 
respect the constitutional status and functions of government in all spheres. By contrast, the 
coercive model harks back to the hierarchical system where national government is dominant. 
Woolman and Roux assert that intergovernmental relations legislation and other laws enacted 
after the Constitution, taken together with the dominance of the ANC in political structures, 
have led to the development of a system which more closely supports the coercive model.635 
This, it is submitted, is unfortunate. 
 
The reasoning of the Constitutional Court in the line of cases discussed above (Wary Holdings, 
Gauteng Development Tribunal, and Maccsand) appears to be developing in the opposite 
direction.636 In the context of national / local intergovernmental relations, Humby discerns the 
development of a line of reasoning which culminates in a ‘doctrine of usurpation’ in the 
Maccsand case.637 This doctrine applies in relation to concurrency and overlap of powers 
between the spheres. Beginning with Kroon J in Wary Holdings, there is a clear statement that 
overlap is to be expected in the constitutional scheme for the allocation of powers. The mere 
existence of an overlap does not necessarily imply a conflict. In Wary Holdings the Court 
accepted that the Subdivision of Land Act (SALA) dealt with subdivision in terms of national 
government’s competence over agriculture, whilst the municipality dealt with it from the 
perspective of its competence to oversee municipal planning.638 This finding was confirmed in 
                                                 
633 Humby (2012) 27(2) SA Public Law 628, 634-635. 
634 Woolman S & Roux T ‘Co-operative government and intergovernmental relations’ in Woolman et al 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed RS 4 at 14-6. 
635 Ibid. 
636 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality; and MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & 
others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC). 
637 Humby (2012) 27(2) SA Public Law 635. 
638 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
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Swartland v Louw and Maccsand.639 In the latter case the Constitutional Court confirmed that 
constitutional powers do not exist in ‘hermetically sealed’ compartments but may overlap. The 
mere existence of overlap does not mean that there is an intrusion by one sphere in the 
functional area of another. Functions can overlap, and it is in this situation that the principles 
of intergovernmental relations come into play.640 Furthermore, it is not only possible for 
different spheres to exercise powers in relation to the same object, but it is in fact possible that 
in exercising their powers in a matter one sphere can have what effectively amounts to a veto 
over a power constitutionally assigned to another sphere (as occurred as a result of the decision 
in Wary Holdings).641 
 
A conflict will only occur where one sphere seeks to exercise powers in the exact functional 
area in which another sphere is assigned competence in terms of the Constitution. This is what 
distinguishes the decisions in Maccsand and Wary Holdings from the decision in Gauteng 
Development Tribunal.642 In the latter case, the provincial department’s exercise of powers 
granted under the Development Facilitation Act were found to be an unconstitutional 
usurpation of local government’s powers to administer the planning function. From this it is 
submitted that a ‘doctrine of usurpation’ can be discerned. Humby postulates that usurpation 
occurs when ‘one sphere of government takes on the executive power of another and attempts 
to operate from the same functional perspective as the encroached sphere in relation to the 
object of the power’.643 
 
As Humby correctly points out, there is ‘play’ in the doctrine of usurpation. This relates to the 
interpretation of legislation and its characterisation as dealing with one as opposed to another 
functional area in the Constitution.644 This can be seen in the difference between the reasoning 
of the majority and minority judgments in Wary Holdings. Whilst Kroon J characterised the 
SALA as dealing with the functional area of ‘agriculture’, Yacoob J characterised it as 
essentially dealing with the functional area of ‘municipal planning’ with vastly differing 
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results.645 In Gauteng Development Tribunal the functional area of ‘municipal planning’ as 
opposed to ‘urban and rural development’646 was interpreted. 
 
The line of judgments has also resulted in clarification of the meaning of the functional area of 
‘municipal planning’ which the Constitutional Court found has a particular, well established 
meaning in the context of municipal affairs which includes the zoning of land and the 
establishment of townships.647 The contribution by the reasoning of the Constitutional Court to 
the interpretation of the constitutional allocation of powers and the practice of 
intergovernmental relations in the above line of cases has been remarkable. The doctrine of 
usurpation can be applied to the interpretation of various conflicts which may arise in the 
interpretation of the Schedules. In addition, given the observation by Yacoob J in Wary 
Holdings that there are very few functional areas in the Constitution which can be exercised 
without land, it is submitted that the Court’s definition of ‘municipal planning’ may apply to 
disputes involving various functional areas.648 
 
5.6 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
 Planning of the Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd649 
 
5.6.1 Introduction 
 
In this case, Lagoonbay, a property developer in the Southern Cape, challenged the validity of 
a decision by the Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning of the Western Cape (the Minister) to refuse Lagoonbay’s application for rezoning 
and subdivision of land related to a proposed development. Lagoonbay required a number of 
approvals in order to proceed with the development – including an amendment of the applicable 
regional structure plan and certain changes to land use. The applications for these two approvals 
were governed by the LUPO. 
                                                 
645 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC). 
646 Humby (2012) 27(2) SA Public Law 638. 
647 Olivier & Williams (2010) 35(2) Journal of Juridical Science 99. 
648 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC). 
649 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC). 
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5.6.2 The High Court decision 
 
Lagoonbay submitted its application to amend the Structure Plan to both the municipality and 
the Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning. The 
municipality recommended that the application be approved. The previous provincial Minister 
approved the application in 2007 subject to certain conditions, including condition 1.3 that ‘the 
associated future zoning application in respect of the land concerned shall be subject to the 
approval by the Provincial Government as the location and impact of the proposed development 
constitutes ‘Regional Planning and Development’.650 
 
On 4 August 2009 Lagoonbay submitted applications for rezoning and subdivision in respect 
of the land sought to be developed. The municipality approved the applications and referred 
them to the provincial Minister for further attention. On 28 April 2011 the provincial Minister 
refused the applications for subdivision and rezoning in terms of sections 16 and 25 of the 
LUPO. Lagoonbay applied to the High Court to set aside the provincial Minister’s decisions 
on the basis that the provincial Minister lacked the functional competence to decide rezoning 
applications. Lagoonbay’s alternative challenge attacked the rationality of the Minister’s 
decision in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).651 The challenge 
based on the PAJA was dismissed in the SCA and failed in the Constitutional Court. Lagoonbay 
requested a declaratory order to the effect that the municipality was the final decision-maker 
in relation to rezoning and subdivision approvals and, accordingly, that the approvals granted 
by the municipality comprised the final land-use approvals. 652 
 
The High Court dismissed the application with costs holding that the provincial Minister was 
authorised by the LUPO to act as she or he had. The High Court accepted that zoning is a 
municipal competence but contended that there were certain categories of decision which 
exceeded the bounds of municipal planning because of the scope of interests affected. In the 
Court’s view, the present development was such a case as it required provincial oversight and 
fell within the bounds of the provincial competence over planning.  The Court decided that 
                                                 
650 Ibid para 5. 
651 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
652 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 8. 
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sections 16 and 25 of the LUPO which granted the provincial Minister the authority to decide 
rezoning and subdivision applications, were not unconstitutional and accordingly that the 
provincial Minister was entitled to rely on these provisions. 653 
 
5.6.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal decision 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal did not deal with the provisions of the LUPO but relied on the 
constitutional allocation of ‘municipal planning’ to local government in deciding that rezoning 
and subdivision applications fall to be dealt with by municipalities. Consequently, the Court 
found that the provincial Minister lacked the authority to refuse Lagoonbay’s applications. The 
SCA relied on its interpretation of the provisions allocating powers in the Constitution spelt 
out in the Gauteng Development Tribunal (SCA) case as authority for its conclusion.654  
 
5.6.3 The Constitutional Court decision 
 
The provincial Minister appealed against the SCA decision to the Constitutional Court. In 
broad outline, the Minister argued that Lagoonbay had not challenged condition 1.3. This 
condition lawfully empowered the provincial Minister to refuse Lagoonbay’s applications. 
Secondly, Lagoonbay had not challenged the constitutional validity of sections 16 and 25 of 
the LUPO and thus could not challenge the decisions resulting from the exercise of powers 
granted the provincial Minister in those provisions. Finally, if the first two arguments failed, 
the provincial Minister contended that the rezoning and subdivision applications fell within the 
province’s competence over provincial planning matters.655 
 
Lagoonbay argued that the provisions of the LUPO had been repealed by implication by the 
Constitution. With respect to the constitutional allocation of powers and relying on Gauteng 
Development Tribunal, Lagoonbay submitted that the competence over ‘provincial planning’ 
does not include rezoning and subdivision applications. 656 
 
                                                 
653 Ibid paras 11-14. 
654 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC). 
655 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 18. 
656 Ibid para 19. 
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The Constitutional Court dealt first with the implied repeal argument. In support of its argument 
that the LUPO had been impliedly repealed, Lagoonbay relied on the decision of the SCA in 
the CDA Boerdery case.657 In that case the SCA had to decide on the validity of a section in the 
Cape Municipal Ordinance which allowed the Premier to approve the imposition of rates.658 
The SCA had struck down the provision, holding that it contravened the right of local 
government to impose rates and taxes in terms of section 229 of the Constitution read with 
certain sections of the Local Government Transition Act.659  
 
The Constitutional Court held that as a matter of general principle, old-order legislation 
remains in force until the necessary steps have been taken to set it aside. It distinguished the 
present case from the decision in CDA Boerdery on the basis that the latter case dealt with a 
provision which could be excised from the Ordinance.660 In the present case the provisions of 
the LUPO were part of a complex scheme and there was nothing before the Court regarding 
the impact of striking down the provisions. Given the importance of the LUPO to planning 
processes, any mode of addressing unconstitutionality should be taken by the appropriate 
legislative authority. Accordingly, the Court found that the implied repeal argument must 
fail.661 
 
On the issue of the constitutional validity of the LUPO, the Constitutional Court was of the 
view that Lagoonbay had not specifically attacked the validity of sections 16 and 25. The effect 
of this omission was fatal to Lagoonbay’s case. The Court cited the view that appellate courts 
are hesitant to pronounce on the constitutional validity of a statute in circumstances where the 
matter has not been properly ventilated before them. The Court held that where a party wished 
to raise the constitutionality of a statute it should do so in the court of first instance.662 
 
The decision in DPP v Minister of Justice laid down the following principles:663 
                                                 
657 CDA Boerdery (Edms) Bpk & others v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & others 2007 (4) 276 
(SCA). 
658 Cape Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974. 
659 Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993. 
660 CDA Boerdery (Edms) Bpk & others v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality & others 2007 (4) SA 276 
(SCA). 
661 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) paras 24-29. 
662 Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa: In Re: Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 (1) SA 732 
(CC) para 38. 
663 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & others 
2009 (4) SA 222 (CC). 
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(a)  A court may raise the unconstitutionality of a law it is called upon to enforce of its own accord. 
(b)  In an instance where a point of law is clear on the papers, but the common approach of the parties 
proceeds on an incorrect perception of what the law actually is, a court should, raise the point of law of 
its own accord for the parties to deal with. 
(b)  Courts should observe the limits of their powers and should not constitute themselves as overseers of 
laws made by the legislature. Ordinarily the courts should raise and consider the constitutionality of laws 
that are properly engaged before them where this is necessary for the proper resolution of the dispute 
before them. 
(d) A court may, of its own accord decide a constitutional issue if it is in the interests of justice to do so. 
Determining the interests of justice entails considerations of the public interest and whether the matter 
has already been fully aired.664 
 
Applying these principles, the Constitutional Court decided that it was inappropriate to 
consider the constitutional validity of the LUPO. This was because a declaration of invalidity 
was not before the Court. The SCA did not consider the validity of sections 16 and 25 at all 
with the result that the Constitutional Court did not have the benefit of the SCA’s insight into 
the matter. Secondly, Lagoonbay had not challenged the validity of the LUPO in its pleadings. 
Thirdly, the LUPO regulates many interconnected aspects of land-use planning apart from 
rezoning (including structure plans, zoning maps, town planning schemes, and departure 
applications). However, the Court had received no submissions on the implications which a 
declaration of invalidity regarding sections 16 and 25 would have for these other aspects. In 
the Court’s view such a declaration of invalidity would have far reaching implications and it 
was reluctant to make such a finding without a proper understanding of those implications. 665 
 
In considering the approach of the SCA to the matter, the Constitutional Court conceded that 
‘at the very least there is…a strong case for concluding that, under the Constitution, the 
provincial Minister was not competent to refuse the rezoning and subdivision applications’.666 
However, the Court was of the view that for the reasons expressed above, the SCA should not 
have ignored the provisions of the LUPO in deciding the matter. 
 
                                                 
664 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 39. 
665 Ibid para 40. 
666 Ibid para 46. 
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Having dismissed the constitutional invalidity argument, the Constitutional Court proceeded to 
decide the matter by applying the provisions of the LUPO. It held that the provincial Minister 
was competent to refuse the rezoning approval in terms of the LUPO, adding that – ‘this in no 
way implies that the provincial Minister was competent under the Constitution to exercise 
zoning functions.’667 Regarding the subdivision decision, the Court held that the local 
authority’s power to decide subdivision applications was not limited in terms of the Scheme 
Regulations made in terms of the LUPO. Accordingly, under the LUPO the provincial Minister 
was not the competent authority to grant or refuse the subdivision application. Because some 
of the subdivision applications were dependent on the rezoning approvals, the Court remitted 
Lagoonbay’s subdivision application to the municipality for reconsideration in light of the 
Court’s judgment.668 
 
As pointed out, the remaining challenge based on the PAJA was rejected, with the 
Constitutional Court holding that the provincial Minister’s decision was based on his 
consideration of information provided by Lagoonbay, the municipality, and the relevant 
provincial planning policies. Accordingly, the Court upheld the High Court decision and found 
that: ‘Lagoonbay has failed to set out a proper basis upon which this Court may interfere with 
the provincial Minister’s policy-laden decision’.669 
 
The order of the SCA was set aside and replaced by an order dismissing the application 
challenging the provincial Minister’s power to decide Lagoonbay’s rezoning application. The 
decision of the provincial Minister to refuse the subdivision application was declared unlawful 
and set aside. The Constitutional Court declared that the George Municipality was the 
competent authority to decide the subdivision application and the subdivision application was 
remitted to the municipality for consideration.670 
 
 
                                                 
667 Ibid para 52. 
668 Ibid para 59. 
669 Ibid para 71. 
670 Ibid para 73.  
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5.7 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
 Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat Council & others671 
 
5.7.1 Introduction 
 
In this matter the Constitutional Court was faced with an application for confirmation of an 
order of the High Court which declared section 44 of the LUPO unconstitutional and invalid. 
Section 44 gave the province the power to decide appeals against municipalities’ planning 
decisions. The Court was directly faced with the question raised in Lagoonbay regarding 
whether direct provincial involvement in municipal planning and land-use decisions, is 
compatible with the constitutional division of powers between the spheres.672  
 
The facts related to two planning decisions in which the province granted approvals which the 
City of Cape Town (the city) opposed. The first concerned an application by Gordonia Mount 
Properties (Pty) Ltd to the city to develop a residential housing estate on the hills above 
Gordon’s Bay. The developer appealed to the province following a delay in deciding the 
application by the city. The provincial MEC upheld the appeal and granted planning approval, 
rezoning, and subdivision in terms of the relevant sections of the LUPO.673 
 
The second matter concerned an application by Gera Investment Trust to redevelop a building 
of historical significance in the Cape Town City Centre. The redevelopment required the 
special consent of the city. The Habitat Council objected to the redevelopment which resulted 
in the refusal of the special consent application by the city. Gera appealed to the provincial 
Minister who overturned the city’s decision, but granted the city an opportunity to impose 
conditions on the approval. The city was slow to add conditions, and the provincial Minister 
intervened to impose conditions of his own under section 42(1) of the LUPO.674 
 
                                                 
671 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
Cape v City of Cape Town and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC). 
672Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 1. 
673 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
Cape v City of Cape Town and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC) para 2. 
674 Ibid para 3. 
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The city was unhappy with the provincial Minister’s intervention in the Gordonia matter and 
instituted proceedings in the High Court for an order declaring section 44 of the LUPO 
unconstitutional and invalid. The Habitat Council, aggrieved by the decision in relation to the 
Gera Investment Trust application, instituted proceedings in the same Court seeking the same 
relief. The matters were consolidated.675 
 
5.7.2  The High Court decision 
 
In the High Court the provincial Minister conceded that section 44 of the LUPO was 
unconstitutional. The High Court agreed, finding that section 44 ‘is manifestly inconsistent 
with the Constitution to the extent that it not only permits appeals to the province against every 
decision made by a municipality in terms of LUPO, but also because it allows [the provincial 
Minister] to replace every decision with his own decision.’676 However, the High Court was of 
the view that this did not mean that the provincial Minister was not permitted to exercise any 
appellate powers over municipal decisions in terms of the Constitution. This was based on the 
potential for overlap between the competence of ‘municipal planning’ and the provincial 
competences of ‘regional planning and development’, ‘urban and rural development’, and 
‘provincial planning’; and also because in terms of the Constitution, provinces enjoyed an 
oversight responsibility in relation to local government. The High Court found that where there 
is an overlap between the competences, the province may rightfully intervene and substitute its 
decision for that of a municipality. This did not apply in cases where the province was merely 
exercising its constitutional oversight responsibility. The High Court’s interim order was 
crafted in accordance with this approach. It also limited the retrospective effect of the 
declaration of invalidity and suspended the declaration for 24 months to allow the province an 
opportunity to enact new legislation. 677 
 
5.7.3 The Constitutional Court decision 
 
In the Constitutional Court, the provincial Minister sought the confirmation of the High Court’s 
order in its entirety. None of the respondents appeared, but the City of Johannesburg was 
                                                 
675 Ibid para 4.  
676 Ibid para 5.  
677 Ibid paras 5–7. 
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admitted as an amicus curia. The city argued that neither the provinces’ planning powers, nor 
its responsibility to oversee municipalities, entitled intervention in individual municipal 
decisions.678  
 
Reviewing its jurisprudence on the constitutional allocation of powers, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the dicta of Moseneke DCJ in Robertson to the effect that the Constitution had 
moved away from a hierarchical conception of tiers of government to a new vision of local 
government as a sphere which is interdependent, inviolable, and possesses ‘the constitutional 
latitude within which to define and express its unique character … A municipality enjoys 
original and constitutionally entrenched powers, functions, rights and duties that may be 
qualified or constrained by law and only to the extent that the Constitution permits.’679 
 
The Constitutional Court in Lagoonbay declined to decide the issue of the constitutional 
validity of sections 16 and 25 of the LUPO, but during the course of her judgment Mhlantla AJ 
remarked that: 
 
This Court’s jurisprudence quite clearly establishes that: (a) barring exceptional circumstances, national and 
provincial spheres are not entitled to usurp the functions of local government; (b) the constitutional vision of 
autonomous spheres of government must be preserved; (c) while the Constitution confers planning responsibilities 
on each of the spheres of government, those are different planning responsibilities, based on ‘what is appropriate 
to each sphere’; (d) ‘planning’ in the context of municipal affairs is a term which has assumed a particular, well-
established meaning which includes the zoning of land and the establishment of townships (d); and (e) the 
provincial competence for ‘urban and rural development’ is not wide enough to include powers that form part of 
‘municipal planning’. At the very least there is therefore a strong case for concluding that, under the Constitution, 
the provincial Minister was not competent to refuse the rezoning and subdivision applications.680 
 
This dictum was quoted and approved by the Constitutional Court in Habitat Council. For all 
the reasons set out in Lagoonbay, the Court concluded that section 44 of the LUPO does not 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. ‘The provincial appellate capability impermissibly usurps 
the powers of local authorities to manage “municipal planning”, intrudes on the autonomous 
sphere of authority the Constitution affords municipalities, and fails to recognise the 
                                                 
678 Ibid paras 9.  
679 City of Cape Town & another v Robertson & another 2005 (2) SA 323 (CC) para 60. 
680 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 46 cited at para 12 of Habitat Council. 
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distinctiveness of the municipal sphere’681 (emphasis supplied). The Court based its reasoning 
on the decision in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case that ‘municipal planning’ includes 
the zoning of land and the establishment of townships.682 It concluded that: ‘Municipalities are 
responsible for zoning and subdivision decisions, and provinces are not.’683 These decisions 
are better suited to municipalities who face citizens daily and must base their decisions on 
information available locally, such as whether services will be available for new 
developments.684 
 
Having decided that section 44 of the LUPO was invalid, the Constitutional Court turned to 
consider whether there were any circumstances in which provinces are permitted to hear 
appeals against land-use decisions. It held that all municipal planning decisions lie within the 
competence of municipalities. This follows from the analysis of the judgment in Gauteng 
Development Tribunal.685 The power of provinces does not lie in a veto or appeal right over 
subdivisions and zoning decisions but in the coordinate powers to withhold or grant approval 
of their own. (Here the footnotes in the judgment indicate that the Court had in mind provincial 
powers over structure plan approvals as well as certain authorisations in terms of the 
NEMA.686) 
 
Dealing with the content of the ‘oversight’ powers of provinces, the dicta in the First 
Certification Judgment was approved. In that case the Constitutional Court stated that the 
monitoring power does not bestow ‘additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on the 
domain of [local government] beyond perhaps the power to measure or test at intervals [local 
government] compliance with national and provincial legislative directives or with the 
                                                 
681 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
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Constitution itself’.687 This system ‘prescribes a hands off relationship between local 
government and other levels of government’ on the one hand, but on the other hand, 
‘acknowledges the requirement that higher levels of government monitor [local government] 
functioning and intervene where such functioning is deficient or defective … This is the hands-
on component of the relationship’.688 
 
The Constitutional Court made the important observation that:  
 
[R]egulating’ in section 155(7) means creating norms and guidelines for the exercise of a power or the 
performance of a function. It does not mean the usurpation of the power or the performance of the function itself. 
This is because the power of regulation is afforded to national and provincial government in order ‘to see to the 
effective performance by municipalities of their functions.689 
 
Both the provincial government and the city urged the Constitutional Court to use the 
opportunity to provide content to the functional power of ‘provincial planning’ in order to guide 
and assist local and provincial government with review and reform in the planning area. The 
Court declined to do so, preferring to exercise judicial economy. It pointed to the constitutional 
mechanism to refer legislation (both Bills and statutes) to the Constitutional Court for a 
declaration of constitutional validity.690 
 
Some final points bear mentioning as they are important in the context of the debate on 
constitutional allocation of powers and the practical difficulties faced by provincial and local 
government in the country. The provincial Minister urged the Constitutional Court to suspend 
the declaration of invalidity for practical reasons because historically provincial departments 
had large and well-resourced planning departments whilst many municipalities lacked the 
capacity to deal with planning matters. The Court agreed that the lack of planning capacity in 
municipalities deserves serious consideration but held that this does not justify the suspension 
of the declaration of invalidity. In its view, ‘the province must, as the Constitution envisages, 
                                                 
687 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 372-3. 
688 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
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Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
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promote the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to perform 
their functions and manage their own affairs.’691 
 
In the result, the Constitutional Court confirmed paragraph 1 of the order of the Western Cape 
High Court which declared section 44 of the LUPO unconstitutional and invalid. The Court 
declined to suspend the declaration of invalidity but limited the retrospective effect of the 
declaration.692 
 
5.7.4 Analysis 
 
Humby argues that the approach of the Constitutional Court in Habitat is ‘partial and faulty’ 
and ‘supports…concentration of power in the municipal sphere’.693 She contends that the 
approach of the Western Cape High Court was more in keeping with the constitutional 
allocations of powers between the spheres and the system of intergovernmental relations set 
out in the Constitution and the legislation, as it recognised and preserved a role for provincial 
government in zoning and subdivision matters. She states that the Constitutional Court 
judgment fails to locate local government powers within the spectrum of concepts and 
mechanisms intended to temper municipal powers. On the far end of the scale is the extreme 
power of intervention in section 139, but she argues that there is a whole spectrum of powers 
including ‘supporting’, ‘strengthening’, ‘promoting’ local government capacity, ‘regulating’, 
and ‘monitoring’. Although the right of appeal in section 44 of the LUPO is problematic, she 
contends that the appellate power in section 44 could have been ‘tailored to suit the provinces 
middle-ground powers of support, promotion and regulation.’694 
 
On the issue of the definition of ‘municipal planning’, Humby asserts that the Constitutional 
Court has taken a leap in logic when it states that all municipal planning and subdivision 
applications fall within the powers of local government. She also criticises the Court’s refusal 
to consider the meaning of ‘provincial planning’ in the course of its judgment, saying that the 
                                                 
691 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape v 
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practical effect of the Court’s judgment is that it has in fact hollowed out the concepts of 
‘provincial planning’, ‘urban and rural development’ and ‘ regional planning’.695 
 
Finally, Humby points to a number of practical difficulties resulting from the decision in 
Habitat. The first of these relates to the absence of any mechanism which the province can use 
to enforce provincial strategic plans and spatial development frameworks. For example, the 
Spatial Land Use and Management Act (SPLUMA) merely provides that where there is an 
inconsistency between a provincial and a municipal spatial-development framework, the 
Premier must take the necessary steps to support the revision of the SDF in accordance with 
the procedures laid down in the intergovernmental-relations legislation.696 She argues that a 
further difficulty relates to the lack of capacity in planning departments in local and district 
municipalities, a factor which favours a role for provincial oversight outside of the well-
resourced metropolitan municipalities.697 
 
5.8 Tronox KwaZulu-Natal Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and 
 Development Appeal Tribunal & others698 
 
5.8.1 Introduction 
 
In this matter Tronox Sands approached the High Court for an order declaring section 45 and 
chapter 10 of the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act (PDA) unconstitutional on 
the ground that these sections, by providing for an appeal from municipal planning decisions 
to a provincial body, constitute interference by provincial government in municipal planning 
decisions.699 Tronox had applied to the Umlalazi Municipality under Chapter 4 of the PDA for 
prospective land-use rights for areas situated outside a scheme for its Fairbreeze mine. The 
application was granted by the municipality on 19 February 2014. The Mtunzini Conservancy 
and the Mtunzini Fish Farm were aggrieved by the municipality’s decision and lodged appeals 
with the appeal tribunal against the decision.700 
                                                 
695 Ibid at 184. 
696 Spatial Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013. 
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Section 45 of the PDA provides a right of appeal to the appeal tribunal for persons who have 
applied for the development of land situated outside the area of a scheme or who have submitted 
written comments with respect to a proposal to develop land. Tronox argued that the 
establishment of the appeal tribunal was unconstitutional because its functions constitute 
provincial intervention in municipal land-use decisions contrary to the constitutional allocation 
of powers between local and provincial government. In support of its challenge, Tronox relied 
on the decisions of the Constitutional Court in the Gauteng Development Tribunal and Habitat 
Council cases.701  
 
The MEC argued that provincial department officials were precluded from sitting on the 
tribunal which was composed entirely of independent persons. It argued that the tribunal 
provided a useful internal appeal mechanism about which none of the municipalities in 
KwaZulu-Natal had complained. 702 
 
5.8.2 The High Court decision 
 
Lopes J found that when Cameron J stated in Habitat that provincial governments may not 
have a veto power over a municipality’s zoning application, he had precisely this situation in 
mind. The fact that provincial officials are precluded from membership of the tribunal is 
irrelevant. Lopes J set out the applicable principles pointed out in Lagoonbay:  
 
[T]he jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court clearly establishes that: 
(a)  barring exceptional circumstances, national and provincial spheres are not entitled to usurp the functions 
of local government; 
(b)  the constitutional vision of autonomous spheres of government must be preserved; and 
(c) while the Constitution confers planning responsibilities on each of the spheres of government, those are 
different planning responsibilities based on ‘what is appropriate to each sphere’.703 
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Applying these principles, Lopes J held that the present matter was indistinguishable from 
Habitat and accordingly that the operation of section 45 and Chapter 10 usurps the functions 
of a municipality and constitutes provincial interference in the municipality’s constitutional 
power over municipal planning. However, the High Court limited the declaration of invalidity 
to section 45 and declined to extend the declaration to chapter 10 as, in its view, this did not 
form part of the relief sought by Tronox.704  
 
A declaration of invalidity has no force and effect unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court. The High Court, therefore, extended the interdict it had granted preventing the appeal 
tribunal from hearing the Mtunzini Conservancy and Mtunzini Fish Farm appeals. Applying a 
similar approach to that of Cameron J in Habitat, Lopes J declined to suspend the declaration 
of invalidity but limited the retrospective application of the order to allow pending appeals to 
be finalised.705 
 
5.8.3 The Constitutional Court decision706 
 
In the Constitutional Court, the main question to be decided was whether section 45 of the PDA 
was constitutionally valid. In addition to an order confirming the invalidity of section 45, 
Tronox sought an order declaring the two pending appeals unlawful and void ab initio. Its 
arguments were similar to those in the High Court. The MEC for Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs in KwaZulu-Natal opposed the confirmation application and appealed 
against the High Court decision, based on the reasons advanced in the High Court. The 
eThekwini Municipality intervened, arguing for the invalidity of all the other appeal provisions 
in the PDA together with section 45.707 
 
Applying its decisions in Gauteng Development Tribunal, Habitat Council, and Lagoonbay, 
the Constitutional Court held that section 45 impermissibly interferes in municipalities’ 
exclusive constitutional powers. Accordingly, section 45 was held to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid. The retrospective application of the order was suspended by the Court 
                                                 
704 Ibid paras 62-63. 
705 Ibid para 11. 
706 Tronox KwaZulu-Natal Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal & 
others 2016 (3) SA 160 (CC). 
707 Tronox KwaZulu-Natal Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal & 
others 2016 (3) SA 160 (CC) paras 14-17.  
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which ordered that all pending appeals be finalised but directed that the appeal tribunal must 
uphold the municipalities’ IDPs in considering all pending applications.708 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
To recapitulate, this chapter began by noting that the Constitution has located various aspects 
of the planning function in the local, provincial, and national spheres of government. Thus 
‘municipal planning’ and the related functions of ‘building regulations’ are local government 
competencies; whilst ‘regional planning and development’ and ‘urban and rural development’ 
fall within the area of concurrent national and provincial competence. Finally, the functional 
area of ‘provincial planning’ is located in Schedule 5 Part A which lists functional areas of 
exclusive provincial competence. 709  
 
What emerges most clearly from the jurisprudence is the confirmation of the status of local 
government as an autonomous sphere of government in its own right. The preceding discussion 
of the jurisprudence relating to the planning functional area has shown that the courts have 
reasoned from the premise that local government is an autonomous sphere of government 
possessing original legislative and executive powers under the Constitution.710 In relation to 
planning, the courts have tended to define the functional areas of planning with reference to 
the meaning of ‘municipal planning’.  
 
Beginning with the minority judgment of Yacoob J in Wary Holdings, a line of reasoning has 
developed which defines ‘municipal planning’ as being concerned with rezoning and 
subdivision.711 In the Gauteng Development Tribunal decision, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed this approach and held that the constitutional drafters intended to use the term 
                                                 
708 Tronox KwaZulu-Natal Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal & 
others 2016 (3) SA 160 (CC) paras 61-2. 
709 Constitution. 
710 See, e.g., City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 
(6) SA 182 (CC) paras 44-49 and Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning of the Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC) para 46 cited at para 
12 of Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The 
Habitat Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, 
Western Cape v City of Cape Town and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC).  
711 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) para 131. 
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‘planning’ in its commonly understood sense.712 The next question which the Court considered 
in Gauteng Development Tribunal was whether the contested powers could be said to form part 
of ‘urban and rural development’ in Schedule 4 Part B. The Court held that to construe any of 
the provincial functional areas in a manner which encompasses areas of local government 
competence would be inconsistent with the constitutional scheme for the allocation of powers 
as set out in the Schedules read with section 41 of the Constitution which requires the spheres 
to respect the functions of other spheres and not to encroach upon another sphere’s functional 
integrity.713 
 
In Gauteng Development Tribunal and subsequent cases, the approach has been to define the 
ambit of the functional areas of ‘urban and rural development’, ‘provincial planning’, and 
‘regional planning and development’ by reference to the meaning of ‘municipal planning’. So, 
in essence, the question of the content of the provincial and national planning related functional 
areas is determined by first eliminating what they are not. ‘Municipal planning’ entails land 
use, rezoning, and subdivision. Consequently, by definition ‘provincial planning’, ‘regional 
planning’, and ‘urban and rural development’ cannot be concerned with these matters.714 
 
This advances the matter somewhat, but greater clarity is needed. This much is clear from the 
Habitat case where both the provincial government and the City of Johannesburg urged the 
Constitutional Court to use the opportunity to provide content to the functional power of 
‘provincial planning’ in order to guide and assist local and provincial government with review 
and reform in the planning area. Unfortunately, the Court felt compelled to decline this request 
as it was constrained by the principle of judicial restraint.715 In the Gauteng Development 
Tribunal case Nugent JA did give some indication of what the functional area of ‘urban and 
rural development’ could entail when he held that it could include ‘the establishment of 
financing schemes for development, the creation of bodies to undertake housing schemes or to 
build urban infrastructure, the setting of development standards to be applied by municipalities 
and so on’.716 
                                                 
712 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) para 59.  
713 Ibid. 
714 Ibid paras 44-49. 
715 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
Cape v City of Cape Town and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC)  para 24.  
716 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC). 
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What has emerged clearly from the jurisprudence is that the Constitutional Court will interpret 
the powers of provincial and national government to intervene in local government functional 
areas by locating those powers within the wider context of the constitutional scheme for the 
allocation of powers between the spheres. In this regard, in Habitat the Court remarked that 
provinces’ powers must be interpreted in the context of the constitutional duty to monitor and 
support municipalities. The monitoring power does not bestow additional or residual powers 
of provincial intrusion on the domain of municipalities, beyond the power to measure or test at 
intervals compliance with national and provincial legislative directives or with the Constitution 
itself. This system ‘prescribes a hands off relationship between local government and other 
levels of government’, on the one hand; but ‘acknowledges the requirement that higher levels 
of government monitor [local government] functioning and intervene where such functioning 
is deficient or defective’, on the other hand.717 Clearly, the interpretation of provincial and 
national government powers will take place within the parameters set by the Constitutional 
Court in the line of judgments discussed above. This reasoning has an application wider than 
the planning-related competences and can be applied to all areas where there is overlap or 
concurrency of powers.  
 
A further interesting observation which emerges from the case law is the manner in which the 
Constitutional Court locates division-of-power disputes within the framework of cooperative 
governance in its reasoning. It appears that the Court’s jurisprudence accords with the 
cooperative model of intergovernmental relations. Earlier, it was argued that section 41(1) of 
the Constitution reflects the cooperative model. 718 It is further submitted that the line of cases 
discussed in this chapter show that the courts have generally affirmed the status of local 
government as an autonomous sphere as set out in the Constitution.  
 
In the next chapter, the interrelationship between the planning and environment functions is 
discussed with reference to the interesting case of Le Sueur & others v eThekwini Municipality 
& others.719 
  
                                                 
717 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 372-3. 
718 See section 5.7 above. 
719 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
EXPANDING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANDATE: THE 
‘MUNICIPAL PLANNING’ AND ‘ENVIRONMENT’ EXAMPLE AND 
THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, some of the challenges surrounding the manner in which the Constitution has 
allocated responsibilities between the spheres is examined. In the first part, the recent case of 
Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others720 is investigated. The evolution of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence with regard to the local government competence of 
‘municipal planning’ is underpinned by the thinking that decentralisation of powers acts as a 
countervailing force to centralisation. This thinking, which is supported by a vast amount of 
literature, holds that there are theoretical advantages to local management – for example, local 
governments are more aware of local factors and thus able to make decisions which best suit 
the local environment. Certainly, this thinking is evident in the interesting case of Le Sueur.721 
What is significant about this case is that the High Court interpreted a local government 
functional area (‘municipal planning’) as wide enough to encompass a competence which the 
Constitution has allocated exclusively to national and provincial government (‘environment’). 
The case has generated a vast amount of academic commentary on the interpretation due to its 
importance. 
 
In the latter part of this chapter the interaction between the obligations in the Bill of Rights and 
the constitutional allocation of powers and functions between the spheres is discussed. The 
adoption of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution demonstrates the commitment of the drafters 
to establishing a new order based on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The 
inclusion of a justiciable Bill of Rights is a centre-piece of the new order ushered in with the 
adoption of the new Constitution. In order further to demonstrate its commitment to human 
rights, the South African government has signed and ratified a number of international human 
rights treaties  It is trite that the delivery of services to citizens is underscored and informed by 
                                                 
720 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6. 
721 Ibid. 
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the commitment of the state to the inherent dignity and worth of its citizens. The Constitution 
has ushered in an era where citizens have recourse to the courts in instances where the state 
fails to live up to its obligations set out in the Constitution. These court challenges are often 
founded in the Bill of Rights. A study of the division-of-powers provisions of the Constitution 
would not be complete without an examination of their relationship to and interaction with the 
Bill of Rights. Accordingly, the latter part of this chapter examines the interaction between 
human rights, service delivery and the allocation of powers in terms of the Constitution. 
 
6.2 Expanding the Local Government Mandate: The ‘municipal planning’ 
and ‘environment’ example: Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality 
& others722 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
The eThekwini Municipality established the eThekwini Environmental Services Management 
Plan as a policy directive of council in order to protect the biodiversity of an interconnected 
system of open spaces of land and water which were considered to have a high value. As a 
policy directive, the eThekwini Environmental Services Management Plan did not have the 
force of law – a factor which presented challenges from an enforcement viewpoint. In response 
to these difficulties, the municipality passed a resolution to integrate the plan into its town 
planning scheme as a layer known as the Durban Municipality Open Space System (D-MOSS). 
This decision meant that property owners were required to obtain an environmental 
authorisation from the municipality before developing properties within D-MOSS areas.  
 
The applicants owned properties within the jurisdictional area of eThekwini Municipality 
which were affected by the D-MOSS amendments to the eThekwini Town Planning Schemes. 
Aggrieved by the actions of the municipality, the applicants approached the High Court for an 
order declaring the council resolutions to adopt split zonings and a further resolution to 
introduce the D-MOSS, unconstitutional and requesting the Court to set them aside.  
 
The Minister of Environmental Affairs, the MEC: Agriculture and Environmental Affairs 
KwaZulu-Natal, and the MEC: Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs KwaZulu-
                                                 
722 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6. 
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Natal, were cited as co-respondents with eThekwini Municipality. The City of Cape Town was 
admitted as amicus curiae. It made common cause with eThekwini Municipality because of its 
‘overlay zones’ which were similar in operation to the D-MOSS system. The MEC: 
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs opposed the application, while the Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and the MEC: Agriculture and Environmental Affairs KwaZulu-
Natal filed notices indicating that they intended to abide the Court’s decision. 
 
The applicants based their application on the ground that the resolutions had been adopted 
under a repealed Ordinance and were accordingly invalid. The alternative argument on behalf 
of the applicants related to the constitutionality of the proposed D-MOSS schemes. The 
applicants contended that in so far as the D-MOSS amendments related to environmental 
matters, these amendments were unconstitutional as the eThekwini Municipality lacked the 
authority to legislate on environmental matters.  
 
6.2.2 The constitutional challenge to the D-MOSS scheme 
 
The applicants contended that ‘environment’ is listed in Schedule 4, Part A of the Constitution 
as a functional area of concurrent national and provincial competence. The amendment to the 
town planning scheme, which is a legislative instrument, is accordingly unconstitutional and 
invalid because municipalities lack legislative authority in terms of the Constitution to legislate 
on matters related to the ‘environment’ functional area. Further, the NEMA, which was enacted 
to give effect to section 24 of the Constitution, dealing with the environment, makes no 
reference to environmental impact procedures being carried out by municipalities nor does it 
empower municipalities to create their own processes to protect the environment. The 
applicants argued that the functions of national and provincial government, as the 
constitutionally mandated spheres in matters relating to the environment, were distinct and 
different from the powers allocated to municipalities in terms of section 156(2) of the 
Constitution read with Schedules 4 Part B and 5 Part B.  
 
The applicants referred to the Gauteng Development Tribunal case as authority for the 
proposition that ‘municipal planning’ is defined as ‘the control and regulation of land use at a 
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municipal level, the zoning of land and establishment of townships’.723 They argued that none 
of the constitutionally-mandated local government functional areas involve the areas of 
‘environment’, ‘nature conservation’, or ‘biodiversity’. Further, any possible overlap between 
the regulation of land use and other functional areas cannot be interpreted as conferring powers 
on local government to legislate in the functional area ‘overlap’. 
 
The High Court disagreed as, in its view, the applicant’s approach was unduly narrow. 
Beginning with an examination of the Bill of Rights, the judge noted that the obligation to 
uphold the Bill of Rights is binding on all spheres of government and all organs of state. Section 
24(b) of the Bill of Rights provides that everyone has the right to have the environment 
protected through legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation and promote conservation. In addition, section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution 
requires that local government ‘promote a healthy and safe environment.’ These duties are 
binding on local government when it exercises its powers set out in Schedules 4 Part B and 5 
Part B to the Constitution.  
 
It is within the context of the constitutional provisions outlined above that the functional area 
of ‘municipal planning’ falls to be examined and assessed. It must also be noted that the 
Constitution envisages the possibility that local government may exercise powers other than 
those conferred by Schedule 4 Part B and Schedule 5 Part B in that section 156(4) provides for 
the possibility of the transfer of provincial and national government functions to local 
government if those functions relate to local government and would be most effectively 
managed at that level (provided that the municipality has the capacity to do so).  
 
The High Court noted further that section 156(5) of the Constitution provides that: ‘[A] 
Municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for 
or incidental to, the effective performance of its functions’ (emphasis supplied). The judge 
remarked that although the Constitution allocates the environmental function to both national 
and provincial government, it is apparent that: ‘Local Governments in the form of 
municipalities are in the best position to know, understand and deal with issues involving the 
environment at local level.’724 
                                                 
723 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) quoted in Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6. 
724 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 para 19. 
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At this point, the judge approved the submission by eThekwini Municipality that ‘the 
environment is an ideal example of an area of legislative and executive authority or power 
which had to reside in all three levels of Government and, therefore, could not be inserted in 
Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 and was instead inserted in Part A of Schedule 4’ (emphasis 
supplied).725 Quoting with approval the dicta in Wary Holdings that two spheres of control can 
co-exist even if they overlap, ‘and even if, in respect of the approval of sub-division of 
“agricultural land” the one may in effect veto the decision of the other. It should be borne in 
mind that the one sphere operates from a municipal perspective and the other from a national 
perspective-each having its “own constitutional and policy considerations”.’726 
 
The High Court then quoted Maccsand with approval. In particular, the statement in that case 
that the functional vision in the Constitution is not one in which the functions can be said to 
exist in ‘hermetically sealed compartments’.727 The Constitution envisages overlap, and it is in 
this context that cooperative governance is relevant. This view was confirmed in the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal case referred to above.728 The Court in that case explained the meaning 
of ‘municipal planning’ as control and regulation of land use which includes the zoning of land 
and the establishment of townships.729 
 
The High Court went on to point out that municipalities have historically always exercised 
legislative authority over environmental affairs under the banner of ‘municipal planning’. The 
drafters of the Constitution were aware of this when the Constitution was drafted. The Local 
Government Transition Act provided for ‘a right to an environment which is not detrimental to 
his or her wellbeing’.730 The powers of the transitional metropolitan councils in Schedule 2 to 
the Act included the ‘co-ordination of environmental affairs’ and ‘the management and control 
                                                 
725 Ibid. 
726 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & another (trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust & 
SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs (intervening) 2009 (1) 
SA 337 (CC) quoted in Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 
para 47. 
727 MaccSand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town & others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) quoted in Le Sueur & another v 
eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 para 54. 
728 See 5.3 above. 
729 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) quoted in Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 para 57. 
730 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 para 22.  
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of environmental affairs.’731 The judge also pointed to the fact that the amendments to the Local 
Government Transition Act required the drafting of an IDP in compliance with Chapter 1 of 
the Development Facilitation Act which requires policy, administrative practice, and laws to 
promote integrated land development with respect to a number of features including 
‘environmentally sustainable land development practices and processes.’732 All of this, the 
judge reasoned, points to the fact that ‘when the functional areas were allocated in Schedules 
4 and 5, the framers of the Constitution knew what “municipal planning” encompassed’. 
Although these arrangements were intended to be transitional, section 245 of the interim 
Constitution provided that ‘local government shall not be restructured otherwise than in terms 
of the Local Government Transition Act 1993’. The High Court pointed out further that the 
Municipal Systems Act733 deals with integrated development planning and recognises in 
section 23(1)(c) that there is an obligation on local government ‘together with other organs of 
State to contribute to the progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in section 
24 … of the Constitution.’ This, according to the judge ‘is a clearly legislative mandate from 
national legislature in regard to environmental matters’.734 
 
The High Court found further support for this position in section 2(4)(f) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations which require 
SDFs to ‘contain a strategic assessment of the environmental impact of the SDF’.735 Referring 
to the central role of the IDP, the Court quoted with approval the statement by the SCA in 
Maccsand that the location of zoning schemes within the context of IDPs and SDFs reflects 
the central role that municipalities play in land-use planning in their areas of jurisdiction. He 
reasoned that it is no doubt appropriate for them to do so given their knowledge of local 
conditions.736 
 
The High Court pointed out that the D-MOSS amendments were effected in accordance with 
the municipality’s IDP. There was no suggestion that these amendments conflict with any 
provincial or national policy. Furthermore, the Minister of Environmental Affairs, and the 
                                                 
731 Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993.  
732 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 para 22. 
733 Act 32 of 2000. 
734 Ibid para 24. 
735 Local Government Municipal Planning and Performance Management Regulations GNR 796 dated 2 August 
2001 s 4(f). 
736 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 para 27. 
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MEC: Cooperative Governance, KwaZulu-Natal, had not contradicted the standpoint of 
eThekwini Municipality nor complained that the municipality has traversed into an area of 
exclusive provincial and national competence. In the Court’s view this was a clear indication 
‘that it is impossible as a matter of accepted town planning practice to divorce environmental 
and conservation concerns from town planning principles’.737 Accordingly, the Court held that 
the eThekwini Metro had succeeded in proving that before the advent of the Constitution, 
‘municipal planning’ involved the power to regulate land-use whilst taking into account the 
need to protect the natural environment (amongst other things). The Court held further that ‘it 
is impossible to separate environmental and conservation concerns in town planning practice 
from a “municipal planning” perspective’.738  
 
Turning to a consideration of more recently enacted legislation, the High Court pointed out that 
the NEMA principles apply to all organs of state. In the provincial context, section 2.2 of the 
KwaZulu-Natal Environmental Implementation Plan published in terms of the NEMA lists 
‘functional areas of competence with environmental relevance’ for municipalities, and includes 
‘municipal planning’ (emphasis supplied).739 It also recognises that implementation of 
environmental governance will occur through the IDP. This indicates that provincial policy 
recognises the importance of environmental matters within ‘municipal planning’. Going 
further, the NEMA recognises the power of municipalities to legislate – section 33 allows  a 
person to institute a private prosecution in respect of any duty laid down in a law or municipal 
by-law ‘where that duty is concerned with the protection of the environment and the breach of 
that duty is an offence’ (emphasis supplied).740 The High Court also pointed to the role of 
municipalities in the Environmental Management Framework Regulations741 which lay down 
requirements for SDFs, including the requirement that SDFs must guide and inform the 
municipality on conservation of both the built and natural environment. The Court concluded 
that: 
 
NEMA therefore recognises the role of municipalities and municipal duties with regard to the environment in its 
municipal planning function. It is clear therefore, that municipalities are entitled to regulate environmental matters 
from micro level for the protection of the environment.742 
                                                 
737 Ibid para 29. 
738 Ibid para 33.  
739 Ibid para 35.   
740 Ibid para 36.  
741 GG No 35769 published 10 October 2012. 
742 Ibid para 37. 
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Accordingly, the High Court held as follows: 
 
It is clear from the aforegoing … that … municipalities have traditionally been involved in regulating 
environmental matters at the local level and that their functions at this level has been recognised by the drafters 
of the Constitution. Hence, although environmental matters stood as the apparently exclusive area for national 
and provincial governance at those levels, it is clear that the authority of the municipalities at local government 
level to manage the environment at that level has always been and is still being recognised. It is inconceivable 
that the drafters of the Constitution intended by the manner in which the Constitution was framed to exclude 
municipalities altogether from legislating in respect of environmental matters at the local level. In any event, it is 
clear that national and provincial legislation in respect of environmental issues recognises the part to be played 
by municipalities at the Local Government level in managing and controlling the environment.743  
 
The High Court was satisfied that municipalities are in fact authorised to legislate in respect of 
environmental matters to protect the environment at local level, and that the D-MOSS 
amendments in no way transgress or intrude upon the exclusive purview of the national and 
provincial governance in respect of environmental legislation.744 
 
6.2.3 Analysis 
 
In simple outline, The High Court’s reasoning in Le Sueur can be summarised as follows: 
(a)  Municipalities have always had the power to deal with environmental matters as a 
consequence of their competence to deal with municipal planning matters. 
(b)  The Local Government Transition Act and the transitional arrangements recognised 
local government’s power over environmental matters. 
(c) Therefore, the drafters of the Constitution understood that municipalities historically 
had the competence to deal with environmental matters. 
(d)  It is impossible to separate ‘municipal planning’ from environmental considerations. 
(e)  Provincial policy and national legislation (in the form of the NEMA and the regulations 
made in terms of NEMA) recognise the role of local government in environmental 
matters. 
(f) Therefore, local government has the power to legislate in environmental matters. 
 
                                                 
743 Ibid para 39.  
744 Ibid paras 39-40. 
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It is submitted that both the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the High Court in Le 
Sueur are problematic. In the course of his reasoning, it is submitted that the judge makes a 
number of errors and leaps of logic in order to support his conclusion – a conclusion which 
cannot be supported on a proper interpretation of the Constitution and the jurisprudence which 
has developed in this area. 
 
The first and most obvious error relates to the finding that ‘the environment is an ideal example 
of an area of legislative and executive authority or power which had to reside in all three levels 
of Government and, therefore, could not be inserted in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 and was 
instead inserted in Part A of Schedule 4’ (emphasis supplied).745  
 
The location of a matter within Schedule 4 Part A to the Constitution does not indicate that the 
legislature intended it to be regulated by all three spheres. With respect, had that been the 
intention of the drafters of the Constitution, they would have located it in Part B of either 
Schedule 4 or 5. It is further submitted that the statement indicates a fundamental lack of 
understanding of the manner in which the Constitution allocates powers between the spheres.  
 
In terms of the constitutional scheme, the location of a matter in a sphere over which local 
government has competence means that provincial and national government will likewise have 
legislative authority over that matter within the confines of the scheme set out in the 
Constitution. The limits of national and provincial governments’ powers to ‘regulate’ local 
government’s exercise of authority in these circumstances, have been covered extensively in 
previous chapters. Suffice to say here that this power is limited and, broadly speaking, those 
limitations (on the legislative front) require national and provincial government to limit any 
Part 4 B or Part 5 B legislation to norms and standards or to framework legislation.  
 
The conclusion of the Constitutional Court in the Gauteng Development case that the 
‘constitutional scheme propels one ineluctably to the conclusion that, barring functional areas 
of concurrent competence, each sphere of government is allocated separate and distinct powers 
which it alone is entitled to exercise’ applies equally in this case.746 As a result, it is also 
                                                 
745 Ibid para 20.  
746 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal & others 2010 (6) SA 182 
(CC) para 56. 
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submitted that the reasoning of the High Court in Le Sueur blurs the lines between the 
functional areas in a manner which creates confusion rather than clarity. 
 
The fact that municipalities may historically have had the power to deal with environmental 
matters does not support the conclusion that the drafters of the Constitution intended to confer 
that power on municipalities. The plain text of the Schedules contradicts this finding. It is 
submitted that the drafters of the Constitution intended the national and provincial government 
to legislate over environmental matters. Had they intended otherwise, they would have stated 
this expressly. The argument that a function was previously exercised at a particular level has 
been held to be irrelevant to the interpretation of the Schedules. Going further, the 
Constitutional Court in Habitat in fact refused to suspend the declaration of invalidity for 
practical reasons because historically provincial departments had large and well-resourced 
planning department whilst many municipalities lacked the capacity to deal with planning 
matters.747 This consideration was correctly considered to be irrelevant. It is equally irrelevant 
to the matter at hand in the Le Sueur case. 
 
The next premise on which the High Court based its decision – that it is impossible to separate 
the functional areas of environment and planning – does not support the conclusion the Court 
reached. The fact is that the Constitution did not intend the functional areas to be entirely 
separate, hence the elaborate scheme for the allocation of powers and the numerous provisions 
spelling out the manner of interaction between the spheres. The leap of logic from the premise 
that it is impossible to separate the two functional areas from one another, to the conclusion 
that this means that the one functional area contains the other, it is submitted, is a leap too far. 
It is submitted that the Court displayed a fundamental flaw in its understanding of the 
constitutional design in its initial premise where it held that the drafters placed ‘environment’ 
in Schedule 4A because they intended it to be regulated by all the spheres. This flawed 
understanding is again reflected in this finding.  
 
The final factor which the High Court found persuasive was the fact that provincial policy and 
national legislation – in the form of the NEMA and the regulations made in terms of it – 
recognises the role of local government in environmental matters. Here again, it is submitted 
                                                 
747Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v The Habitat 
Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western 
Cape v City of Cape Town and Others 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC). 
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that the Court erred. Absent a finding that there has been an express delegation of authority to 
legislate over environmental matters, it was not competent for the Court to infer that national 
government had given implied authority to local government to legislate over a matter which 
the Constitution has clearly allocated to another sphere. This interpretation undermines the 
supremacy of the Constitution. It is far more likely that the policy and legislation relied upon 
reflect the flawed understanding of the constitutional allocation of powers on the part of 
drafters, than the assumption which the Court appears to make that they reflect some sort of 
intention on the part of the drafters of the legislation to confer authority on local government.  
 
6.2.4 Academic commentary 
 
Du Plessis and Van der Berg characterise Le Sueur as the moment when the judiciary was 
called upon to assess the implications of the location of ‘environment’ in Schedule 4 Part A of 
the Constitution with reference to the functional area of ‘municipal planning.’748 The authors 
welcome the decision contending that it: 
(a)  confirms that municipalities have a significant role to play in environmental matters; 
(b)  indicates that the role of municipalities in environmental matters is not limited to the 
provision of water, sanitation, electricity, storm water and air quality management; and 
(c)  confirms that a municipality may use its planning instruments for the purposes of local 
environmental governance. 
 
Accordingly, in their view, the development of the law is significant and welcome from an 
environmental law point of view. The authors’ only concern is that the High Court did not spell 
out whether the extent of original and assigned municipal authority over the ‘environment’ 
functional area is limited to being an incidence of ‘municipal planning’. They contend that the 
‘loose and haphazard’ way in which the applicants and the Court referred to constitutional 
authority to legislate, leaves the environmental and planning law fraternity in some doubt as to 
the ambit of local government’s planning and ‘original and assigned environmental “authority” 
and “duties”’.749 
 
Freedman sets out three categories of municipal legislative authority: 
                                                 
748 Du Plessis & Van Der Berg (2014) 25(3) Stell LR 580.  
749 Ibid at 590. 
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(a)  Original powers (powers derived directly from the Constitution). 
(b)  Assigned powers (powers assigned to municipalities in terms of national or provincial 
legislation). 
(c)  Those powers reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of a 
municipality’s functions (incidental powers in terms of s 156(5) of the Constitution).750 
 
Having set out the constitutional categories, he agrees that the decision in Le Sueur was based 
on the first two categories – the original legislative and the assigned legislative powers 
categories. Freedman contends that the High Court relied primarily on the first ground ‘that the 
functional area of “municipal planning” encompasses “environmental matters”.’ The decision 
rests on the second category of assignment only as an alternative ground.751 
 
In his view, the judgment correctly finds that national and provincial government have by 
implication assigned legislative authority over environmental matters as part of municipal 
planning to local government. The argument in support of this contention is as follows: In 
Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government752 the 
Constitutional Court had to decide (amongst other issues) whether the NA could assign a matter 
that fell outside of Schedules 4 and 5 to provinces by implication. The Constitutional Court 
decided that any assignment by the NA to the provincial sphere must be express. Its decision 
was based on the ground that section 104(1)(b)(iii) of the Constitution states that a provincial 
legislature has the authority to pass legislation on any matter outside Schedules 4 and 5 that 
has been ‘expressly’ assigned to it by national legislation. The word ‘expressly’ cannot be 
interpreted to include the word ‘impliedly.’753 Third, the law provides that when Parliament 
assigns powers to the provinces it must do so in a manner that creates certainty as to the nature 
and extent of the powers assigned. Fourth, all ‘spheres of government and all organs of state 
within each sphere must not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in 
terms of the Constitution’.754 
 
                                                 
750 Freedman (2013) 17 PER/PELJ 556, 612. 
751 Ibid. 
752 Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government (CCT 94/10) [2012] ZACC 3, 
2012 (4) SA 58 (CC).  
753 Freedman (2013) 17 PER/PELJ 556, 579. 
754 Ibid. 
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Freedman also indicates that the Constitutional Court pointed out that the qualifier ‘expressly’ 
in section 104(1)(b) stands in stark contrast to the absence of such a qualifier in section 
156(1)(b) of the Constitution which deals with the assignment of matters over which 
municipalities have executive and administrative and, therefore, legislative authority. He 
contends further that ‘the implication is that while the power to pass legislation on a matter that 
falls outside Schedules 4 and 5 cannot be assigned by implication to the provincial legislatures, 
it can be assigned by implication to the municipal councils.’755 
 
Freedman also has difficulty with the High Court’s first ground dealing with original legislative 
powers. In his view it is not clear whether ‘municipal planning’ can be interpreted to include 
‘environment’ – such a finding would potentially upset the division of powers in the 
Constitution’s Schedules. The second difficulty with the original ground, Freedman argues, is 
that the overlap between ‘environment’ and ‘planning’ cannot be used as the basis for a finding 
that ‘planning’ includes legislative authority over the ‘environment.’ He correctly points out 
that this would contradict the finding of the Constitutional Court in Gauteng Development 
Tribunal that the functional areas are ‘distinct’.756 In the third place, he notes that there could 
be unintended practical consequences to including ‘environment’ within ‘municipal planning’. 
 
Freedman argues that while ‘municipal planning’ cannot encompass ‘environment’, this does 
not mean that the functional area of ‘municipal planning’ does not include aspects of 
environmental matters. Unfortunately, the judgment did not examine this matter more closely 
because the High Court did not examine the subject matter of D-MOSS in detail. He concludes 
that while Le Sueur is correct in finding that ‘municipal councils have the authority to pass 
legislation dealing with environmental matters as part of their power to pass legislation dealing 
with municipal planning, it has not set out the scope and ambit of this power as clearly as it 
could have.’757 
 
In Freedman’s analysis the judgment rests on section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution. As support 
for this conclusion he points to the judgment in the Premier of Limpopo case where the 
Constitutional Court drew attention to the qualifier ‘expressly’ in section 104(1)(b)(ii) and the 
                                                 
755 Ibid at 581. 
756 Ibid at 589. 
757 Ibid at 592. 
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absence of such a qualifier in the corresponding section dealing with assignments to local 
government – section 156(1)(b).758 It has been argued in the discussion above that the 
applicable section is 156(4) and not section 156(1)(b). This contention rests on three premises. 
First, there is a distinction between section 156(1)(b) and section 156(4) – the former deals 
with assignment of executive matters not listed in the Schedules; while section 156(4) refers to 
the assignment of matters listed in Part A of Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5. Since 
‘environment’ is a Part A matter, any assignment of this power would need to satisfy the 
requirements of section 156(4). Second, interpreting section 156(1)(b) to allow implied 
assignment of Schedule 4 Part and Schedule 5 Part A matters, undermines legal certainty. As 
the Court in the Limpopo Premier case pointed out: 
 
It is a requirement of the rule of law, one of the foundational values of our constitutional democracy, that when 
Parliament assigns its legislative powers to the provinces it must do so in a manner that creates certainty about the 
nature and extent of the powers assigned. This will enable the provinces to exercise those powers in accordance 
with, and within the limits of, the terms of assignment … The public should be left with no doubt about which 
sphere of government has legislative competence with regard to the matter concerned.759  
 
This reasoning applies equally to the present case. The rule of law and legal certainty are 
undermined if a provision in a statute can be interpreted so as to override the express allocation 
of a power to national and/or provincial government by virtue of its placement in Schedule 4 
Part A or Schedule 5 Part A. Finally, the interpretation of national and provincial legislation in 
a manner which permits implied assignment undermines the supremacy of the Constitution and 
introduces the possibility that the constitutional scheme for the allocation of powers can be 
circumvented merely by passing legislation or adopting policy. 
 
It is submitted that any interpretation which introduces the possibility of implied amendment 
of the Constitution’s Schedules introduces the likelihood that the public will be unsure of the 
legislative roles of the various spheres. The decision in Le Sueur, it is submitted, has in fact 
introduced further uncertainty into this complex area of law. 
 
                                                 
758 Premier: Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature & others 2012 (4) SA 58 (CC). 
759 Premier, Limpopo Province v Speaker of the Limpopo Provincial Government (CCT 94/10) [2012] ZACC 3, 
2012 (4) SA 58 (CC) paras 36-37.   
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Bronstein begins her review of the decision in Le Sueur by placing the allocation of powers to 
local government in its constitutional context.760 She supports a restricted view of the ambit of 
local government legislative authority. Citing Yacoob J in Swartbooi & others v Brink, she 
argues for a restricted interpretation of section 156(2) which sees the power to make by-laws 
as being expressly granted for the sole purpose of the effective administration of those matters 
that a municipality has the right to administer.761 De Visser disagrees with this interpretation 
which views ‘municipal law making …as subservient and instrumental to its administrative 
role’.762 Steytler and De Visser conceive of local government’s legislative power as wider than 
that which prevailed under parliamentary sovereignty. The argument put forward in earlier 
chapters, supports the interpretation by Steytler and De Visser. This view sees national and 
provincial government as having only supervisory power over matters in Part B of both 
Schedules. This affords municipalities a realm of legislative authority which cannot be usurped 
by other spheres.763  
 
Bronstein contends that the comments of the Constitutional Court in Gauteng Development 
Tribunal show a clear regard for the autonomy of local government, but this ‘cannot be read to 
infer that there is a realm of legislative autonomy that is inherently in the domain of local 
government and cannot be usurped’.764 Her argument proceeds from this assumption. On this 
view, the legislative assignment of powers to local government to legislate in areas related to 
municipal planning assumes central importance.  
 
Bronstein argues that the D-MOSS amendments were legislative acts and that the failure to 
acknowledge this is a flaw in the analysis presented in Le Sueur.765 Since the acts were 
legislative and not executive in character, section 156(1) cannot be the source of the 
municipality’s power in this instance. In her view, the amendment can also not fit under the 
incidental power in section 156(5). She explains that: 
 
                                                 
760 Bronstein (2015) 3 SALJ 639, 643. 
761 Swartbooi & others v Brink 2006 (1) SA 203 (CC) para 15. 
762 De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South Africa (2005) cited in Bronstein (2015) 
3 SALJ 639. 
763 Steytler N, De Visser J & Bennet TW ‘Part III: The State and its Subdivisions’ in Murray C & Kirkby C (eds) 
South Africa: International Encyclopedia of Laws - Constitution (2014) 175. 
764 Bronstein (2015) 3 SALJ 639, 645.  
765 Ibid 659. 
 
  
208 
 
This is because the incidental power to ‘exercise any power concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or 
incidental to, the effective performance of its functions’ cannot randomly be used to imbue the city with an entire 
undefined area of legislative authority over planning. In order to determine whether the incidental power applies, 
one first has to establish what powers the city actually has over planning. One then has to establish how the 
legislative power to enact D-MOSS can be considered incidental to those powers. If the power to make D-MOSS 
is correctly characterised as legislative, it would be circular to say that the right to exercise legislative authority 
in the area of municipal planning is simply incidental to the city’s acknowledged executive and administrative 
powers. If that were the case, why does the Constitution not say so?766 
 
Taking the argument further, it becomes necessary to locate the power for the D-MOSS 
amendments not in the Constitution, but in the assignment of legislative power from the 
legislature. For this to work, the source of the legislative assignment needs to be clearly 
identified. Therefore, in Bronstein’s view, the main weakness in the reasoning in Le Sueur is 
that it does not show that the amendment was validly passed either in terms of a constitutional 
power or in terms of a legislative assignment to the city. It is problematic that there is no clear 
indication of the origin of the power to make the contested amendment.767 
 
Bronstein’s argument against implied assignment is compelling. She correctly asserts that 
assignment must be express. However, her argument is based on a restricted interpretation of 
the powers of local government – an interpretation which is at odds with the basis of this thesis. 
It is submitted that whilst she is correct that an express assignment is necessary, the need for 
this assignment is based on the wording of section 156(4) of the Constitution and not on the 
reasons she advances. This is because the drafters of the Constitution inserted section 156(4) 
which requires a municipality’s consent to the assignment of a Schedule 4 or 5 Part A matter 
as a measure to protect local government from ‘functional creep’. The section is intended to 
cater for functional areas which ‘necessarily relate to local government’ and ‘would most 
effectively be administered locally’. This section is also on all fours with the facts of the present 
case. It is within this context that the support of the MEC: Agriculture and Environmental 
Affairs KwaZulu-Natal and the MEC: Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs is 
relevant. If this interpretation is correct then the application of section 156(4) to the matter by 
national, provincial and local government could easily have resolved the matter without the 
necessity for judicial intervention. 
 
                                                 
766 Bronstein (2015) 3 SALJ 645. 
767 Ibid at 661–663. 
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Presenting yet another interpretation of the High Court’s judgment in Le Sueur, Humby points 
out that the Court situated the contested power within the ambit of section 156(1)(b) when he 
noted that ‘although matters relating to the environment may be said … to be the primary 
concern or sphere of National and Provincial responsibility … Local governments are in the 
best position to know, understand and deal with issues involving the environment at local 
level.’768 She points to the fact that Gyanda J highlighted section 156(5) of the Constitution 
which provides that a municipality has the right to exercise any power concerning a matter 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of its functions.769 
 
After reviewing Bronstein’s argument (which is outlined above), Humby argues that ‘the 
precedent established by Gyanda J’s reasoning is not so much that municipalities are authorised 
to legislate on environmental matters, but that they are authorised to do so as an incident of 
municipal planning, an original constitutional power.’770 As an original power is not the same 
as an assigned power, in Humby’s view the assignment procedures find no application to the 
functional area of municipal planning. 
 
Humby contends further that the enactment of town planning schemes is a ‘hybrid form of 
legislation’ that is neither legislative nor executive in character.771 This makes section 156(5) 
of the Constitution the best choice for the source of municipal legislative authority in this case. 
In Ex Parte, Western Cape Provincial Government: In re: DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North 
West Provincial Government, the Constitutional Court held that the exercise of incidental 
powers is constitutional if the powers are inextricably linked and foundational to powers 
allocated in terms of the Constitution.772 She points to Steytler and De Visser who contend that 
a purposive approach must be applied to the interpretation of section 156(5) which links to 
local government’s developmental mandate and increases efficacy in an existing functional 
area. But, this must not result in an increase in the functional ambit of local government.773 
Humby argues that, given the now settled meaning of ‘municipal planning’ as including land-
                                                 
768 Humby (2014) 17(4) PER/PELJ 1659, 1666–7. 
769 Ibid. 
770 Ibid 1677. 
771 Ibid 1679.  
772 Ex Parte, Western Cape Provincial Government: In re: DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial 
Government 2001 (1) SA 500 (CC). 
773 Steytler & De Visser J ‘Local Government’ in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa 48. 
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use control – it is difficult to see how the power to legislate on environment could not be seen 
as ‘necessary for’ or ‘incidental to’ municipal planning.774  
 
Humby’s conclusion is that Gyanda J was wrong to locate the source of municipal legislative 
authority in respect of environmental matters in section 156(1)(b) and 156(4) of the 
Constitution in that these provisions relate to assignment of powers not original constitutional 
powers. She nevertheless welcomes the judgment which she characterises partly as an 
extension of local environmental governance on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.775 
 
The difficulty with Humby’s reliance on section 156(5) is quite simply this – Gyanda J did not 
rely on this section for his conclusion but rather on sections 156(1)(b) and 156(4). In the final 
analysis Freedman, Bronstein, and Humby agree that section 156(1) of the Constitution cannot 
support the reasoning in Le Sueur. Further, there is a broad agreement, which includes even Du 
Plessis and Van der Berg, that the Le Sueur judgment has done little to introduce clarity into 
the law relating to the constitutional allocation of functions between the spheres. 
 
6.2.5 Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that the judgment in Le Sueur has precipitated some of the difficulties in 
interpreting the allocation-of-powers provision in the Schedules. A review of the academic 
commentary on the judgment reflects the difficulty in reaching agreement on the correct 
interpretation. It can be argued that what Le Sueur indicates most clearly is how difficult the 
interpretation of the constitutional Schedules becomes in practice. The practical complexities 
of delineating the boundaries of the overlapping powers of ‘municipal planning’ and 
‘environment’ led the High Court in Le Sueur to the illogical conclusion that the functional 
area of planning includes the separate and distinct functional area of environment. The decision 
throws into stark relief the fact that there is a practical misalignment between the 
developmental mandate of local government in the Constitution, and the allocation of powers 
to local government in terms of the Constitution. What is also clear from the decision is that 
the plethora of legislation that has been enacted over the last twenty years adds a further layer 
of complexity, as does the old-order legislation which remains on the statute books. The 
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existence of old-order laws which are aligned to the previous constitutional scheme, alongside 
new-order legislation is a recipe for confusion. The task of discerning the ambit of the 
legislative mandates of the three spheres in this environment is daunting.  
 
In relation to the ‘municipal planning’ function, a final point bears mention. The long-awaited 
Spatial Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA)776 has been enacted. It is hoped that this 
legislation will create certainty in relation to the ambit and meaning of the interrelated functions 
of municipal planning’, ‘building regulations’, ‘regional planning and development’, and 
‘urban and rural development’. A detailed study of the provisions of the SPLUMA is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth noting that earlier versions of the Bill and its 
regulations were revised following submissions from eThekwini Municipality (and possibly 
other municipalities) to the effect that many of its provisions were unconstitutional.  
 
Undoubtedly, the long wait for planning legislation was partly due to the legislative 
complexities created by the constitutional allocation of powers in relation to this functional 
area. The legislature must have taken great care to ensure that the constitutional scheme for the 
allocation of powers has been given effect within the SPLUMA. Nevertheless, the possibility 
that the SPLUMA in its current form may contain constitutionally impermissible sections 
cannot be dismissed. Some areas of concern include the following: 
(a)  The inclusion of detailed procedures governing municipal processes, e.g., Chapter 6 
prescribes the manner in which municipalities must consider land use and development 
applications in detail. In this respect the SPLUMA reads more like primary legislation 
than legislation setting norms and standards. 
(b)  The prescriptive nature of the Schedules – e.g., Schedule 1 apparently confers authority 
on the provinces to determine procedures for the approval of a vast array of municipal 
planning decisions including township establishment, land-use scheme amendments, 
subdivision of land applications, etc. 
 
The question of alignment between the SPLUMA, the NEMA, and existing provincial 
legislation is also an area of concern and a source of possible conflict. In relation to the 
enactment of the SPLUMA, Bronstein points to the existence of provincial legislation on 
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planning in a number of provinces and remarks that the SPLUMA’s enactment ‘is a recipe for 
intense and disruptive legislative conflict between national and provincial legislation.’777 The 
SPLUMA does provide for municipalities to pass their own by-laws to regulate their planning 
processes, adding a further layer of complexity. The enactment of the SPLUMA places an 
obligation on municipalities to apply existing national legislation impacting on planning such 
as the NEMA and the Municipal Systems Act provisions which govern the formulation of IDPs 
together with existing provincial legislation and existing by-laws and policies. This complex 
legislative environment does little to promote certainty. 
 
The possibility of a constitutional challenge to the SPLUMA was mentioned obiter by the 
Constitutional Court in the Tronox case.778 In this matter the Constitutional Court declined the 
MEC for Local Government and Co-operative Affairs’ request to ‘read in’ to the the PDA in 
order to save it. The ‘reading in’ contended for by the MEC was based on section 51(1) of the 
SPLUMA which provides that a municipality ‘may…authorise that a body or institution 
outside of the municipality or in a manner regulated in terms of provincial legislation, assume 
the obligations of an appeal authority in terms of this section.’ The Court declined to effect the 
reading in, remarking that ‘…section 51(6) of SPLUMA, which allows municipalities to 
delegate their final say in planning and land use matters to an external body, could itself face a 
constitutional challenge one day’.779 
 
These practical difficulties which arise from the constitutional scheme for the allocation of 
responsibilities with respect to the planning function, work themselves out in everyday life in 
a manner which impacts profoundly on the administration of government at all levels. The 
expense of moving from processes created in terms of the Planning Ordinance to the PDA 
processes and now to the SPLUMA and SPLUMA by-law processes in the eThekwini 
Municipality, for example, has been substantial. What is more difficult to quantify, but is 
perhaps even more significant, is the impact of all of this uncertainty on the citizenry and on 
service delivery. It is submitted that greater certainty needs to be introduced into the 
constitutional allocation of powers between the three spheres of government and that this 
certainty can only be introduced, it is submitted, by way of an amendment to the Constitution. 
                                                 
777 Bronstein (2015) 3 SALJ 649. 
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6.3 The Impact of Human Rights 
 
6.3.1 The Constitutional Allocation of Powers with regard to ‘housing’ 
 
(a) Introduction 
 
Section 7 of the Constitution affirms that the Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in 
South Africa. The state is placed under an obligation to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights’. What is the impact of this obligation on the constitutional allocation 
of powers? Where a right has been infringed, are the three spheres jointly responsible or can a 
distinction be made between them based on the spheres’ functional responsibilities in terms of 
the Constitution? 
 
‘Housing’ is listed in the Schedules as an area of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
competence. Other functional areas with an impact on the ‘housing’ function which are local 
government competencies include ‘building regulations’, ‘water and sanitation services limited 
to potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and sewage disposal systems’, 
‘electricity’,  and ‘refuse removal’. In terms of the Constitution, the primary responsibility for 
the fulfilment of the right of access to housing lies with national and provincial governments.  
 
Section 26 of the Constitution provides: 
 
(1)  Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2)  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve 
the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3)  No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of Court made 
after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. 
 
Both section 7 and section 26 place an obligation on the state to realise the rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights, and the right of access to housing respectively. In Grootboom, the 
Constitutional Court held that the national government bears the overall responsibility for 
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ensuring that the state complies with its constitutional obligation to provide access to 
housing.780 In relation to the roles of the three spheres with respect to housing, the Court stated: 
 
… the Constitution creates different spheres of government: national government, provincial government and 
local government … The Constitution allocates powers and functions amongst these different spheres emphasising 
their obligation to co-operate with one another in carrying out their constitutional tasks. In the case of housing, it 
is a function shared by both national and provincial government. Local governments have an important obligation 
to ensure that services are provided in a sustainable manner to the communities they govern. A reasonable 
programme therefore must clearly allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government and 
ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources are available.781  
 
Consequently, a coordinated state housing programme must be a comprehensive one 
determined by all three spheres of government in consultation with each other as contemplated 
in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. It may also require framework legislation at national level, a 
matter that need not be considered further in this study as there is national framework 
legislation in place. Each sphere must accept responsibility for the implementation of particular 
parts of the programme, but the national sphere of government must assume responsibility for 
ensuring that laws, policies, programmes, and strategies are adequate to meet the state’s section 
26 obligations. In particular, the national framework must be designed so that these obligations 
are met. It should be emphasised that national government bears an important responsibility in 
relation to the allocation of national revenue to the provinces and local government on an 
equitable basis. Furthermore, national government must ensure that executive obligations 
imposed by the housing legislation are met.782 
 
De Visser argues that a qualification must be made to local government’s responsibilities in 
terms of the Bill of Rights to the effect that local government ‘is responsible for the fulfilment 
of a socio-economic right by taking legislative, administrative, or budgetary measures only if 
the subject matter first, falls within the competencies set out in Schedules 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution, or, has been assigned to local government by national or provincial legislation’ 
(emphasis supplied).783 
                                                 
780 Government of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 66 
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This means that the nature of the obligations imposed on the three spheres by the Bill of Rights 
varies greatly. Some rights fall within the competence of local government, while others 
intersect with local government competences in a more indirect way. For example, the right of 
access to sufficient water intersects squarely with the local government competence of ‘water 
and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and domestic waste-water and 
sewage disposal systems’. An indirect intersection between a municipal functional area and a 
constitutional right occurs where the functional area does not cover the right directly, but the 
municipality plays an important contributory role in the realisation of the right – e.g., in the 
right to housing.784 
 
(b)  Housing legislation 
 
National and provincial governments have enacted legislation and adopted policy in order to 
regulate the provision of housing. The primary legislation regulating the provision of housing 
is the National Housing Act.785 The Act outlines the government framework for housing and 
sets out the responsibilities of the three spheres with respect to housing.  
 
In terms of the duties of national government, the Act provides that the national government, 
acting through the Minister of Housing, must establish and facilitate a sustainable housing-
development process in consultation with MECs and the national organisations representing 
municipalities. The Minister has the overall responsibility to determine policy, set broad 
national housing delivery goals, and facilitate the setting of provincial housing delivery goals 
(and local government housing goals where this is appropriate). He or she must also set norms 
and standards in respect of housing and establish the institutional framework necessary for 
funding and the negotiation of funding allocations. As regards provincial government, national 
government must assist provinces to develop the administrative capacity required for the 
effective performance of their housing-development duties. National government is required 
to support and strengthen the capacity of local government to manage its own affairs and to 
exercise its powers and perform its duties in respect of housing development.786 The Minister 
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is also given the power to publish a National Housing Code – a comprehensive policy to guide 
the three spheres of government in the provision of housing.787 
 
In terms of the Act, provinces must promote and facilitate the provision of adequate housing 
within the framework of national housing policy. Provinces must consult with organised 
provincial local government organisations, develop provincial policy, and support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to perform their duties in respect of housing.788 
 
Section 9 of the National Housing Act sets out the functions of municipalities with regard to 
housing development. It requires that municipalities situate their duties in respect of housing 
within the context of the IDP and places an obligation on municipalities to take all reasonable 
and necessary steps within the framework of national and provincial policy to ensure that: 
(a)  the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction have access to adequate housing on a 
progressive basis; 
(b)  conditions not conducive to the health and safety of the inhabitants of its area of 
jurisdiction are prevented or removed; and 
(c)  services in respect of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, storm water drainage, and 
transport are provided in a manner which is economical and efficient.  
 
Municipalities are required to set housing goals, to identify and designate land for housing 
development, and to initiate, plan, coordinate, facilitate, and enable appropriate housing 
development within their areas of jurisdiction. Municipalities must also provide bulk 
engineering services and plan and manage land-use development. 
 
In terms of section 10, municipalities may apply for accreditation for the purposes of 
administering one or more national housing programmes. An accredited municipality may 
administer the programme and exercise the powers and duties of the provincial housing 
development board for the accredited programme/s, subject to the direction of the MEC. The 
question which arises is whether the National Housing Act assigns responsibility for the 
housing function to municipalities. De Visser argues that it does not for the following reasons: 
                                                 
787 Ibid s 4. 
788 Ibid s 7. 
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(a)  The duties which the Housing Act imposes on municipalities relate to the functions 
which are ancillary to housing such as water, sanitation, electricity, storm water 
drainage, etc. 
(b)  The other functions relate to the position of local government at the point of delivery – 
for instance municipal planning, setting of housing delivery goals, and creating and 
maintaining an environment conducive to the provision of housing. 
(c) Where municipalities act as administrators through the accreditation process, they are 
funded through the province and are under the direction of the MEC. Therefore, this 
arrangement is one of agency and not of assignment.  
 
He concludes that the scheme for allocating functions laid down in the Housing Act does not 
amount to assignment in terms of section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution but is on an agency 
basis.789 
 
The authorities surveyed do not appear to support the opposite view – that the National Housing 
Act has assigned powers over housing to the local government sphere. However, it can be 
argued that certain provisions of the Housing Act point toward the conclusion that national 
government intended to shift responsibility for housing downwards. What is not clear is 
whether the mechanism of assignment or delegation or agency or some other hybrid means was 
the vehicle used to effect the downward shifting of the function. This is due to the apparent 
conflation of these concepts in the Act. 
 
As the Constitutional Court affirmed in Grootboom, the primary obligation to provide housing 
falls on national government and provincial government, whilst local governments must ensure 
that services are provided to communities.790 Reading the obligation on the state to provide 
access to housing with the National Housing Act and the constitutional allocation of powers 
between the spheres, it is submitted that the minimum obligations of local government in 
relation to housing can be interpreted to include: 
 
(a)  making land available; 
(b)  providing basic water services; 
(c)  providing basic sanitation; and 
                                                 
789 De Visser (2003) 7(1) Law, Democracy and Development 209. 
790 Government of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) para 39. 
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(d)  facilitating the realisation of the right to shelter, by: 
(e)  facilitating communication between the residents and the provincial housing department, including the 
resolution of conflicts; and 
(f)  assisting the provincial housing department on any relevant matter, this may include playing a co-
ordinating role in the implementation of the realisation of the right to shelter.791 
 
The Constitutional Court made it clear in Grootboom that the national government bears overall 
responsibility for housing provision but each sphere of government must accept responsibility 
for the implementation of particular parts of the housing function.792 This does not mean that 
functions and powers may be strictly divided but that the various state actors must cooperate 
to ensure the fulfilment of the constitutional obligation to provide access to housing as they are 
equally responsible for the realisation of those rights.793 Whilst national government bears 
responsibility to ensure the adequate provision of funding for housing development, this does 
not affect the application of the right between the individual and the state. The courts are 
unlikely to entertain a defence based on the division of powers and responsibilities between the 
spheres. As De Visser points out, ‘a municipality cannot absolve itself of the responsibility it 
has to provide basic services to its residents by claiming that adequate budgetary support is not 
forthcoming from national government. The courts are not likely to entertain such a defence 
since it would mean that the most vulnerable in society become victims of failing 
intergovernmental relations.’794 The Constitutional Court was called upon to decide on this 
matter first in Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others and later in the case of City of 
Johannesburg Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties.795 
 
6.3.2 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg796 
 
In this case the Constitutional Court had to decide a matter involving the relationship between 
a public body (City Power, an entity of the City of Johannesburg), and residents of a building 
within the city with whom the city had no direct contractual relationship. The facts were briefly 
that the applicants resided in a building in Johannesburg which they rented from a landlord, 
                                                 
791 Ibid at 210. 
792 Ibid para 40. 
793 Ibid at 214. 
794 Ibid. 
795 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
796 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC). 
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Nel. Nel, in turn, contracted with City Power for the supply of electricity to the buildings. Nel 
fell into arrears with the city which terminated the electricity supply to the building without 
giving notice to the residents. The residents were without electricity for one year by the time 
the Constitutional Court heard the matter. The city’s by-laws provided only for notice to 
‘customers’. In this case, Nel, the landlord, was the customer and so the city argued that they 
were under no obligation to give notice to the applicants. The High Court accepted this 
argument, but in the Constitutional Court it was held that whether the applicants were 
customers or not was not decisive of the matter.  
 
The Constitutional Court framed the issue as one concerning the relationship between a public 
service provider and users of its service. Accordingly, this case concerned the special cluster 
of relationships that exist between a municipality and its citizens which is fundamentally 
cemented by the public responsibilities a municipality bears in terms of the Constitution and 
legislation in respect of persons living within its jurisdiction. At this point, administrative law 
principles operate to govern the relationship beyond the law of contract. 
 
The city argued that administrative paralysis may result if it is required to give notice to non-
customers in the manner contended by the applicants. This argument was rejected by the 
Constitutional Court which held that: 
 
The spectre of administrative paralysis is a legitimate concern. Administrative efficiency is an important goal of 
democracy, and Courts must remain vigilant not to impose unduly onerous administrative burdens on the state 
bureaucracy. In my view, however, the issue of administrative efficiency primarily concerns the content of the 
duties imposed under administrative law. The latter is fundamentally determined by the relationship that exists 
between the administrative state and its citizens and should not be delimited. Practical concerns should not be 
decisive in determining the scope of administrative action, but must inform the content of procedural fairness.797 
 
The Constitutional Court did not consider the impact of the right to housing, but instead held 
that the real issue was whether the contractual relationship that exists between a public service 
and members of the public gives rise to rights that require the application of section 3 of the 
PAJA.798 
 
                                                 
797 Ibid para 29. 
798 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
  
220 
 
The Constitutional Court’s reasoning in this matter is important as it indicates the manner in 
which similar matters will be approached by the courts in future. The Court adopted a purposive 
approach, giving effect to the spirit of the Constitution and the duty incumbent upon state 
institutions to provide services in an efficient, impartial, and effective manner. It emphasised 
the objects of local government in the Constitution, the developmental duties of municipalities 
in terms of the Constitution and the Municipal System Act, and the specific obligation to 
provide electricity placed upon municipalities by the Housing Act. It held that taken together, 
all of these duties imposed a public law obligation on the municipality to provide electricity 
and a concomitant right on residents of the municipal areas to receive it.799 Next the Court 
turned to consider whether this public law right was sufficient to entitle residents to procedural 
fairness in terms of the PAJA if the municipality intended to terminate a right which they 
already enjoyed.  
 
The Constitutional Court stated that the notion of rights includes not only vested, private-law 
rights but also legal entitlements that have their basis in the constitutional and statutory 
obligations of government. The preamble to the PAJA states that the objectives of the Act 
include the promotion of an efficient administration and good governance. The Act aims to 
‘create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration.’800 
These objectives give expression to the founding values of our Constitution, which provides in 
section 1 that: 
 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.  
 
The Constitutional Court stated that section 195 of the Constitution enumerates the basic values 
and principles governing public administration and affirms our constitutional commitment to a 
responsive and accountable administration. It further emphasised the following principles 
which are relevant to procedural fairness set out in section 195(1): 
                                                 
799 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 47. 
800 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000: Preamble.   
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• Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. 
• People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate 
in policy making. 
• Public administration must be accountable. 
• Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information. 
 
Taken together, the Constitutional Court held that the values and principles described above 
require government to act in a manner that is responsive, respectful, and fair when fulfilling its 
constitutional and statutory responsibilities. This responsibility is especially important for the 
delivery of public services, and more so for municipalities which are at the forefront of 
government interaction with citizens.  
 
Applying this reasoning, the Constitutional Court held that when City Power supplied 
electricity to the applicants, it did so in fulfilment of the constitutional and statutory duties of 
local government to provide basic municipal services to all persons living within its 
jurisdiction. In depriving them of a service they were entitled to and were receiving, City Power 
was obliged to afford them procedural fairness before taking a decision that would materially 
affect their rights. Accordingly, the Court found that the applicants were entitled to notice of 
the intended termination in terms of the PAJA. 
 
The decision in Joseph has been criticized by human rights lawyers for being unduly focussed 
on proceduralism to the detriment of substantive human rights. It is argued that the case 
represents a missed opportunity to develop socio-economic rights (the right to housing) 
because the Constitutional Court focussed on administrative law and adopted a formalistic 
approach rather than consider the plight of the citizens impacted by the case. 801 The view, 
shared by Dugard and Langford amongst others, is that the preferable approach would have 
been for the Court to interpret the right to housing as encompassing a right to basic municipal 
services such as electricity.802 This, however, ignores that fact that from the outset, the 
                                                 
801 Bilchitz ‘Substantive Reasoning in Administrative –Law Adjudication’ (2010) CCR 111 
802 Dugard & Langford ‘Art or science? Synthesising Lessons from Public Interest Litigation and the Dangers of 
Legal Determinism’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 39,51 
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applicants characterised the matter as involving the infringement of their administrative law 
rights and not an infringement of the right to housing.803 
 
It is submitted that the value of the case lies in its applicability to a wide range of situations 
where good governance and procedural fairness may find application. This case shows that the 
courts will take a purposive approach to the adjudication of similar cases brought before it. 
This is demonstrated by the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the rigid, positivistic approach 
taken by the High Court when it characterised the matter in contractual terms. It is clear that 
the state’s responsibility to provide accountable government weighed heavily with the Court. 
Of particular importance for future cases, is the manner in which the Court located the dispute 
within the developmental duties and objects of local government as set out in the Constitution. 
This lends support to the argument advanced in this thesis that the state must use planning and 
intergovernmental-relations processes which operate from the bottom-up. It is submitted that 
this approach to planning and intergovernmental relations will give effect to developmental 
local government and improve the effectiveness of the state administration. Service delivery 
and democratic governance will be best served by this approach which places communities at 
the centre of government planning and decision-making. Of course, for this to be effective, the 
operational inefficiency of the ward committees in local government will have to be addressed. 
It is submitted that attending to the functioning of ward committees must be a priority in the 
intergovernmental reform process which this thesis proposes.  
 
6.3.3 City of Johannesburg Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties804 
 
The decision in this case presents a further development of the reasoning in Joseph v City of 
Johannesburg.805 In this case, the city raised the allocation of the housing responsibility in the 
Constitution to provincial government in order to deny that it was under an obligation to 
provide the applicants with housing. The argument was rejected by the Constitutional Court. 
The facts of the case were that in 2004 Blue Moonlight purchased a commercial property called 
‘Saratoga Avenue’ in Berea, Johannesburg. At the time of purchase, the property was occupied 
                                                 
803 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 402-4; Murcott ‘The Role of Administrative Law in 
enforcing Socio-economic rights: Revisiting Joseph (2013) SAJHR 481 
804 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & another (CC), 
2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
805 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg & others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC).  
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by 86 people (referred to by the Court as ‘the occupiers’). After posting eviction notices on two 
occasions, Blue Moonlight began eviction proceedings in the High Court under the Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (the PIE Act).806 The occupiers 
opposed the application on the basis that they would be rendered homeless and applied to join 
the City of Johannesburg to the proceedings by reason of its constitutional and statutory duties 
in relation to housing. In the High Court, the city’s housing policy was found to be 
unconstitutional to the extent that it discriminated against people in desperate need of housing 
who are subject to eviction by private landowners. The SCA upheld the High Court’s order and 
ordered the city to provide the occupiers with ‘temporary emergency accommodation’. The 
city appealed against the SCA’s order to the Constitutional Court. 
 
The occupiers’ case was based on section 26 of the Constitution and on the right to equality. 
The Constitutional Court was accordingly called upon to consider the obligations of the local 
government sphere in relation to the right of access to housing. The Court noted that the duty 
to provide housing in section 26 of the Constitution falls on all three spheres of government. 
The city’s application to join the provincial government had been refused in both the High 
Court and the SCA. In this regard, the Constitutional Court noted that in view of the intertwined 
responsibilities of the three spheres of government it would have been preferable for all to have 
been joined. However, the absence of provincial government was not fatal. The Court 
considered the obligations and conduct of the city as the ‘joinder of the city as the main point 
of contact with the community is essential.’807 
 
The city argued that its role in relation to the provision of housing is secondary to that of the 
provincial government. It relied on the provisions of chapter 12 of the Housing Code to support 
its contention. Chapter 12 provides for assistance to people who find themselves in need of 
emergency housing for reasons beyond their control. The definition of an emergency situation 
includes where people are ‘evicted or threatened with imminent eviction from land or from 
unsafe buildings, or situations where pro-active steps ought to be taken to forestall such 
consequences.’ The city contended that in terms of the constitutional allocation of powers, 
housing appears in Schedule 4 Part A. There is nothing in Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 which 
places an obligation on local government to provide housing. The Housing Act requires local 
                                                 
806 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
807 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & another 2012 (2) 
SA 104 (CC) para 45. 
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governments merely to act as a point of delivery. Local government is entirely dependent on 
national and provincial government and confined to acting within the parameters of national 
and provincial policy. The city argued that it was not obliged to fund emergency 
accommodation. It stated that chapter 12 was adopted pursuant to the decision in Grootboom, 
which clearly placed the obligation to fund housing on national government. Therefore, once 
the city’s application for funding to provincial government was refused, its constitutional 
mandate in respect of emergency housing was exhausted.808  
 
The Constitutional Court held that the city’s reliance on Grootboom to support its contention 
that local government was not primarily responsible for the achievement of the right of access 
to adequate housing was misplaced.809 This was because while Yacoob J described the division 
of roles between the three spheres, he did not thereby ‘delineate absolute and inflexible division 
of governmental responsibilities between the spheres’.810  When Grootboom was decided there 
was no express provision requiring that emergency housing be provided. The essential question 
before the Court, therefore, was whether the nation-wide housing policy was able to cater for 
those in immediate need. National policy was required to fill in the gaps in the legislation and 
it was in this light that the Court held that for there to be effective implementation, it was 
necessary for national government to provide adequate budgetary support.811  Accordingly, the 
Court held that: 
 
The City’s submission that national or provincial government is the primary duty-bearer in relation to funding 
emergency housing is cogent only to the extent that, but for the existence of a national emergency housing policy 
and budget, the attempt of a local authority to fulfil the right of access to adequate housing would be empty. There 
is no basis in Grootboom for the assertion that local government is not entitled to self-fund, especially in the realm 
of emergency situations in which it is best situated to react to, engage with and prospectively plan around the 
needs of local communities.812 
 
In order to justify its reasoning, the Constitutional Court pointed to a section of Chapter 12 of 
the Housing Act which requires municipalities to ‘initiate, plan and formulate applications for 
projects relating to emergency housing situations.’813 Further, the Court noted that the Housing 
                                                 
808 Ibid para 49-50. 
809 Ibid para 54. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Ibid para 56. 
812 Ibid para 57. 
813 Housing Act 107 of 1997: s 9(1) (f).  
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Code requires that ‘the provision for possible emergency housing needs must be identified 
through pro-active planning or in response or reaction to a request for assistance from other 
authorities of the public’.814 In such a case, the municipality must investigate and assess 
whether the situation requires intervention and, if so, ‘whether the municipality can itself 
address the situation utilising its own means.815 The Court accordingly held that, apart from its 
entitlement to approach the province for assistance, ‘the City has both the power and the duty 
to finance its own emergency housing scheme’.816 
 
The implications of these two judgments for the constitutional division of powers are far 
reaching. The Constitutional Court has essentially taken the reasoning in Joseph v City of 
Johannesburg one step further. It is clear from this, that the Court will not entertain arguments 
based on administrative efficiency, neither will it allow government spheres to escape 
responsibility for providing public services by relying on the fact that the Constitution assigns 
responsibility for that function to another sphere. The Court intended to hold the public 
administration accountable for service delivery as required by section 195 of the Constitution. 
This means that it is imperative for government to address the inefficiencies in its 
administration in order to improve service delivery. Failure to do so in the face of increasing 
rights-based litigation will mean that more and more funds will be diverted from service 
delivery to the defence of costly litigation. 
 
6.4 Human Rights Advocacy 
 
In addition to increasing litigation in the domestic sphere, there is also the spectre of referrals 
to United Nations (UN) treaty bodies which must be faced. An increasingly active civil society 
is referring human rights matters to UN treaty bodies. A recent example occurred where the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at the University of Witwatersrand submitted a 
shadow report to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Working Group on the South African 
state’s progress in giving effect to the right to housing. In this shadow report CALS points out 
                                                 
814 Depart of Human Settlements: National Housing Code s 4.  
815 Ibid s 4.2. 
816 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd & another 2012 (2) 
SA 104 (CC) para 67. 
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that it has been five years since the decision in Blue Moonlight and ‘the City of Johannesburg 
has failed to adequately address the crisis in the inner city…’817 
 
The submission argues that whilst the South African state should be commended for ratifying 
a number of regional and global human rights instruments which recognise socio-economic 
rights, there is a gap between policy and implementation and the state is failing to meet its 
international obligations to provide an ‘adequate standard of living’ to its citizens. The CALS 
submission proposed the following recommendations to the UPR Working Group:818 
 
1. … 
2.  The State and all three spheres of government must ensure that they comply with their constitutional 
obligation in the provision of housing, water and sanitation and in doing so, that they eradicate poverty 
and instil equality and dignity to previously disadvantaged communities. 
3.  The City of Johannesburg should be providing households with low income rental that is affordable and 
protective of people’s rights to dignity and privacy. 
4.  The City of Johannesburg must ensure that all accommodation protects the rights of women and children, 
in that there is a safe environment and enhances family life. 
5.  There must be political will applied to the cases and that Court orders are implemented. 
 
The submission ends with the observation that ‘governmental stakeholders should inject 
political will and understand the plight of its people, this will accelerate service delivery and 
address the challenges that plague our country’.819 
 
South Africa has lost much of the status it once enjoyed in the international community. The 
elevation of service delivery failures to the global human rights community further calls the 
reputation of the country into question. It is submitted that human rights advocacy and litigation 
should galvanise the state into action. It is clear that there are inordinate failures in service 
delivery. Where these failures have their roots in administrative and systemic inefficiencies in 
government, there is an obligation on the government to act; this should not be left to the courts 
to attempt to resolve. 
 
                                                 
817 Submission by Centre for Applied Legal Studies to the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review 
regarding the Republic of South Africa, October 2016. 
818 Ibid 11.  
819 Ibid 12. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The result of the Constitutional Court’s decisions discussed above is that it is now beyond 
doubt that the obligation to provide adequate housing in emergency situations rests on local 
government, even where the emergency situation is caused by an eviction initiated by a private 
property owner as happened in the Blue Moonlight case. It is clear also that the constitutional 
rights in the Bill of Rights are justiciable against the state as a whole and that the courts will 
not entertain defences based on the division of powers between the spheres. Of particular 
importance, too, is the characterisation of the disputes as involving the state’s obligation to 
provide a responsive and accountable administration. The centrality of developmental local 
government to the provision of services emerges clearly from the Court’s reasoning. As in Blue 
Moonlight, in Le Sueur the eThekwini Municipality relied on the argument that section 24 
(environment) was also binding on local government as a consequence of the duty to provide 
developmental local government.820 
 
The proximity of local government to the community means that it is increasingly likely that 
municipalities will be joined in litigation based on the constitutional obligations of the state. 
From these two cases it is reasonable to argue that litigation in respect of the rights in the Bill 
of Rights is likely to result in an extension of the powers and functions of local government. 
The impact of this must be taken into account in assessing the efficacy of the constitutional 
division of powers. Where the Constitutional Court extends local government’s responsibilities 
as it did in the Blue Moonlight case by imposing an obligation on local government to fund 
emergency housing from its own resources, it impacts on government planning and budgeting 
processes. Ever more responsibilities are shifting downwards and resources ought to follow 
this downward trend. Failing this, municipalities will simply rob Peter to pay Paul, leaving 
other services under funded in order to deal with new areas of responsibility. In the long term, 
this will negatively impact on service delivery.  
 
It is submitted that government should address the manifest shortcomings in the constitutional 
design which have been exposed by twenty years of practice. The failure to do so has had 
negative impacts on service delivery which cannot be ignored. The manner in which the courts 
are currently interpreting the constitutional division of powers in one direction, while the 
                                                 
820 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6. 
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legislature interprets it in another, cannot be allowed to continue unchecked. It is incumbent 
upon the executive to initiate a process of reform aimed at improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the government. The final chapter sets out recommendations which may be 
beneficial in guiding such a process. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ERA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
It is accepted that the transformation of the public service is a condition precedent to the 
transformation of South African society. The unitary nature of the apartheid administration 
resulted in a public service in which authority was highly centralised. Backed by the system of 
parliamentary sovereignty and a statute book which delegated extensive powers to the 
executive, the nature of the apartheid state was essentially authoritarian. In the result, ‘apartheid 
state culture’ required that public servants follow orders without question. This was particularly 
the case in the justice and security arms of the state which committed among the worst 
injustices in furtherance of the aim of maintaining white hegemony and control.  
 
The drafters of the Constitution realised that in order for the vision of a democratic, 
constitutional state to be realised, the public service would need to be transformed to reflect a 
culture of constitutionalism. This would require a paradigmatic shift from the organisational 
culture which prevailed under the apartheid government. Accordingly, the drafters included 
provisions aimed at the regulation of the country’s public service in the Constitution. These 
provisions require that government departments reflect an ethos which promotes the realisation 
of human rights.  
 
It is consequently submitted that an examination of the public service is an important part of 
any investigation into the constitutional practice of the state since the adoption of the 
Constitution. This discussion is both significant and relevant to current developments in South 
African public discourse in that the extent to which the public service reflects these 
constitutional values is an important indicator of the extent to which the constitutional scheme 
is being successfully implemented. This chapter examines the state of the public service 23 
years after the adoption of the Constitution. 
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7.2 The Constitution, the Public Administration, and the Public Service 
 Commission 
 
Section 197 of the Constitution establishes a public service for the Republic within the 
administration. The right of state employees to support any political party is protected by the 
Constitution which outlaws partisan behaviour towards officials based on political 
affiliation.821 The regulation of the public service is governed by legislation. The national and 
provincial spheres which constitute the public service, are governed by the Public Service 
Act.822 However, the local sphere of government has legislative and executive authority over 
personnel practices in its own sphere and so falls under different legislation.823 In this thesis, 
the term ‘public administration’ means the administrative arm of the state including national, 
provincial, and local governments. By contrast, ‘public service’ refers only to the national and 
provincial government departments. 
 
In Chapter 1, the supremacy of the Constitution, the rule of law, and human rights were briefly 
discussed. In furtherance of these aims, the Constitution provides that ‘public administration 
must be governed by the democratic values and principles enshrined in the Constitution.’  The 
basic values and principles governing the public administration are laid down in the 
Constitution.824 These basic values and principles include: 
 
(a)  A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained. 
(b)  Efficient, economic and effective use of resources must be promoted. 
(c) Public administration must be development-oriented. 
(d)  Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably, and without bias. 
(e)  People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy making. 
(f)  Public administration must be accountable. 
(g) Transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible, and accurate information. 
(h)  Good human-resource management and career-development practices, to maximise human potential 
must be cultivated. 
(i)  Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and 
personnel-management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the 
imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation.825 
                                                 
821 Constitution: s 197(3). 
822 Public Service Act 30 of 2007. 
823 Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
824 Constitution: s 195(1). 
825 Ibid s 195(1)(a)-(i). 
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After setting out the constitutional values which govern the public administration, the 
Constitution establishes the PSC with the aim of maintaining an effective administration with 
a high standard of professional ethics.826 The PSC is required to perform its functions without 
fear, favour, or prejudice. These functions include: 
 
(a)  to promote the values and principles set out in section 195, throughout the public service; 
(b)  to investigate, monitor and evaluate the organisation and administration, and the personnel practices, of 
the public service; 
(c) to propose measures to ensure effective and efficient performance within the public service; 
(d)  to give directions aimed at ensuring that personnel procedures relating to recruitment, transfers, 
promotions, and dismissals comply with the values and principles set out in section 195; 
(e)  to report in respect of its activities and the performance of its functions, including any finding it may 
make and directions and advice it may give, and to provide an evaluation of the extent to which the values 
and principles set out in section 195 are complied with;  
(f)  either of its own accord or on receipt of a complaint – 
(i)  to investigate and evaluate the application of personnel and public administration practices, and 
to report to the relevant executive authority and the legislature; 
(ii)  to investigate grievances of employees in the public service concerning official acts or 
omissions, and recommend appropriate remedies; 
(iii)  to monitor and investigate adherence to applicable procedures in the public service; and 
(iv)  to advise national and provincial organs of state regarding personnel practices in the public 
service, including those relating to the recruitment, appointment, transfer, discharge, and other 
aspects of the careers of employees in the public service; and 
(g)  to exercise or perform the additional powers or functions prescribed by an Act of Parliament.827 
 
It is interesting to note that the powers given to the PSC include the powers of monitoring, 
evaluation, and investigation. The PSC is empowered to propose measures, give advice, and 
make recommendations.828 In contrast to the Public Protector, the PSC does not have the power 
to recommend appropriate remedial action.829 In addition, its reports are not required to be 
made public.830 PSC commissioners may be removed from office by a simple majority vote as 
opposed to the Public Protector and Auditor-General who may only be removed by a resolution 
supported by a two thirds of the members of the NA.  
                                                 
826 Ibid s 196.  
827 Ibid. 
828 Ibid. 
829 Ibid s 182(C) read with s 196(4). 
830 Ibid s 182(5).  
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A further point which bears mentioning is the entrenchment of the right to fair labour practices 
enshrined in section 23 of the Constitution. As a consequence of this right, state employees are 
afforded the full protection of labour law and are no longer restricted to remedies based in 
administrative law.831  
 
7.3 Constitutional Principle XXIX and the PSC  
 
Recognising the importance of the public administration to the new constitutional order, CP 
XXIX provides that:  
 
The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, an Auditor-General and a 
Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests of the maintenance of 
effective public finance and administration and a high standard of professional ethics in the public service. 
 
It is significant that the wording of CP XXIX groups the PSC together with the Reserve Bank, 
the Auditor-General, and the Public Protector. Between the First and Second Certification 
Judgments, significant changes were made to the structure, powers, and functions of the 
PSC.832 Many of these changes diminished the status of the PSC when compared to the earlier 
provisions in the NT. In this part, the reasoning of the Constitutional Court with regard to the 
provisions governing the PSC in both judgments is examined.  
 
The interim Constitution provided for a national PSC to exist by side-by-side with provincial 
PSCs. However, the NT removed the power of the provinces to pass a law establishing 
individual provincial PSCs. In the First Certification Judgment, the Constitutional Court held 
that the basic powers and functions of the single PSC established by the NT had not been clearly 
set out, and that this made it difficult to assess the import of the changes made by the NT.833 In 
order to address this, the CA amended the constitutional text by the addition of procedures for 
                                                 
831 However, members of the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, and the South African 
Secret Service are excluded from the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 which was passed to give effect to s 23 of 
the Constitution. 
832 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC). 
833 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 
(CC) para 183. 
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the appointment and removal of commissioners, by defining the functions of the PSC, and by 
specifying its size and composition.  
 
This point will be revisited later. It is significant that like the NT, the AT provided for a single 
PSC so removing the power to establish provincial PSCs which featured in the interim 
Constitution. In order to remedy this, the AT provided that each province could nominate one 
representative to the PSC. The remaining five commissioners were to be appointed by the NA, 
to which the PSC reports.  
 
It is interesting to note that during argument it was raised that the role of the PSC is similar to 
that of the Public Protector and the Auditor-General, and that the procedures laid down for the 
protection of the independence of the PSC should be similar to those set for the Public Protector 
and Auditor-General. These procedures require a resolution of at least two thirds of the 
members of the NA to remove the Public Protector and the Auditor-General. By contrast, a 
commissioner of the PSC may be removed by a simple majority of the provincial legislature or 
the NA.834 
 
This argument was rejected by the Constitutional Court which found that ‘the functions of the 
PSC are materially different to those of the Public Protector and the Auditor-General’ who 
‘perform sensitive functions which require their independence and impartiality to be beyond 
question, and to be protected by stringent provisions in the Constitution.’835 In the Court’s 
view, the PSC’s main work was routine and supervisory. Although it did have ‘supervisory and 
watchdog functions’, the PSC’s ‘primary function was to promote a high standard of 
professional ethics in the public service’.836 The Court found that the functions of the PSC 
could not be equated with those of the Public Protector and the Auditor General.837 In the 
Court’s view the PSC’s functions were materially different from those of the Public Protector 
which include the ‘investigation of sensitive and potentially embarrassing affairs of 
government, whilst the Auditor-General (AG) has a crucial role to play in ensuring that there 
is openness, accountability and propriety in the use of public funds’.838  The Court reasoned 
                                                 
834 Ibid para 139. 
835 Ibid para 142. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Ibid. 
838 Ibid. 
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further that the removal of one of fourteen commissioners would not necessarily impact 
significantly on the work of the PSC. In its view the political ramifications of removing a 
commissioner would operate to constrain arbitrary action.839 
 
As mentioned above, the powers of the PSC were significantly altered between the interim 
Constitution and the Constitution. The cumulative effect of these changes reduced the role of 
the PSC significantly. One of the most important changes involved the removal of the power 
to make peremptory directions and recommendations. Significantly, the NT removed the 
control of the public service from the PSC and gave it the provincial and national executives, 
subject to monitoring by the PSC.840 
 
The Constitutional Court stated that the changes to the nature and functions of the single PSC 
under the AT, made comparison difficult particularly because it complicated the weighing 
process which had to be undertaken. In summary, the factors which the Court regarded as 
important were:841 
(a)  The provinces lost autonomous power to appoint their own commissions. 
(b)  The collective powers of the provinces had been extended by the establishment of the 
single PSC. This extension had not fully compensated the provinces for the loss of 
power to create their own commissions. 
(c) Part of the power which previously vested in a provincial service commission now 
vested in the provincial executive. 
(d)  The residue of the power would be transferred to the single PSC. A significant part of 
the residual power concerns directions in regard to practices, which under the interim 
Constitution were in any event subject to national norms and standards. 
 
After weighing all these factors, the Constitutional Court concluded that ‘there had been a small 
diminution in the powers of the provinces arising out of the alteration in the functions of the 
PSC, the change in composition, and the disestablishment of the provincial service 
commissions.’842 Accordingly, the Constitutional Court was satisfied that: 
                                                 
839 Ibid.  
840 Ibid para 188. 
841 Ibid para 197. 
842 Ibid para 198. 
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(a)  the amendments to the NT contained in AT 146(2) and (4) effectively restored the 
balance referred to in the preceding paragraph; 
(b)  the amendments to provincial police powers contained in AT 205-8 increased the 
powers in respect of police services compared with those accorded to the provinces in 
terms of the NT; 
(c) the provisions of the AT in regard to the PSC did not materially affect the balancing 
process; 
(d)  the combined effect of the changes made in the AT was such as to produce a conclusion 
different to that at which it arrived in respect of the NT. In particular, those relating to 
provincial police powers and to the terms of the override in AT 146 played a material 
role in this change of assessment; and 
(e)  in the result, the powers and functions of the provinces in terms of the AT remain less 
than or inferior to those accorded to the provinces in terms of the interim Constitution 
but not substantially so.843 
 
As a result, the Constitutional Court certified that the amended constitutional text passed by 
the Constitutional Assembly on 11 October 1996 complied with the Constitutional Principles 
contained in the interim Constitution. 
 
It is submitted that the reasoning of the Constitutional Court which underpins the decision in 
respect of the PSC matter may be flawed. In the first instance, it is submitted that the inclusion 
of the PSC in CP XXIX was not accorded sufficient weight by the Court.844 There is nothing 
in this wording to suggest that the PSC should be given lesser protection by limiting the 
procedures for its independence and impartiality in the way in which the AT does. Secondly, 
the Court’s reasoning that the work of the PSC differs materially from that of the Public 
Protector and the Auditor-General is, with respect, flawed for a number of reasons. In the first 
instance, the PSC is tasked with maintaining ethics and professionalism in the public service. 
The importance of this assumes greater significance today with the large number of ethically 
compromised public officials being exposed daily in the media and in the parliamentary 
enquiries which are underway at the time of writing. 
                                                 
843 Ibid para 204. 
844 CP XXIX provides that: ‘The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, 
an Auditor-General and a Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the 
interests of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of professional 
ethics in the public service.’ 
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Thirdly, the Constitutional Court attached weight to the fact that in contrast to the NT, the AT 
afforded provinces the majority of places in the PSC. This, according to the Court, gave 
provinces a majority voice. With respect, this assessment does not sufficiently take account of 
a number of factors which impact on the provinces’ ability to advance provincial interests in 
the PSC. It is not a foregone conclusion that the provinces would adopt a common position on 
matters under deliberation. There are significant differences between the provinces in terms of 
size, language, geographic location, distribution of resources, and the like. The distribution of 
financial resources and the extent to which provinces rely on funding from central government 
may also play a part – as may political factors. In this regard, at the time of writing there is 
only one province which is not controlled by the ruling party. This may mean that in practice, 
the strongest unifying factor across the majority of provinces in the PSC would be political 
affiliation. This external locus of influence may have a greater impact on proceedings within 
the PSC than any other common interest which may emerge amongst provinces. 
 
7.4 Public Administrative Practice 
 
7.4.1 Introduction 
 
The culture in the public administration is important. It has been pointed out that in order for a 
Constitution to succeed in cementing democracy, it must be sustained by a democratic culture 
and an enabling social and economic environment.845 It goes without saying that the culture in 
the public service is an important indicator of the success of constitutionalism. Public servants 
are responsible for carrying out all of government’s functions – from health care, through to 
the administration of social grants and the provision of education. The extent to which 
government departments exhibit a culture which reflects basic democratic values and principles 
impacts on the ability of the state to deliver services in a humane, honest and compassionate 
manner.  
 
Recognising the importance of the public administration, the government has invested 
considerable effort in developing a legal and policy framework aimed at building a professional 
and ethical administration. These laws and policies include the: 
                                                 
845 Simeon (1998) 13 SA Public Law 42, 46. 
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• Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; 
• Public Service Act;846 
• Labour Relations Act;847 
• White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service;848 
• White Paper on Transforming the Public Service;849 
• White Paper on Public Service Training and Education;850 
• Skills Development Act;851 
• Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council Resolutions;852 
• Senior Management Services Handbook;853 
• Public Service Management Act;854 
• Code of Good Practice on the Integration of Employment Equity into Human Resource 
Policies and Practices;855 and 
• Public Service Regulations.856 
 
The question addressed in this chapter is the extent to which the implementation of these laws 
and policies has resulted in a public service that reflects a commitment to constitutionalism? 
Unfortunately, the Constitution does not require the PSC to publish its investigations and 
reports.857 As a result, the PSC releases only certain of its reports. It is submitted that this lack 
of transparency impacts negatively on effective oversight and accountability in the public 
administration. In the result, it is necessary to draw on PSC reports (where available), 
parliamentary committee minutes, reports of NGOs, information from government department 
websites, news reports, and the like in order to address this important question.858 
                                                 
846 Public Service Act 103 of 1994. 
847 Labour Relations Act 6 of 1995. 
848 DPSA ‘White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service’ (1995).  
849 DPSA ‘White Paper on Transforming the Public Service’ (1997). 
850 DPSA ‘White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service’ (1997). 
851 Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. 
852 Resolution 13 of 1998. 
853 DSPA ‘Senior Management Services Handbook’ (2003). 
854 Public Service Management Act 1 of 1999. 
855 DPSA ‘Code of Good Practice on the Integration of Employment Equity into Human Resource Policies and 
Practices’ (2005). 
856 Public Service Regulations 2016 GNR 877 of 29 July 2016 GG 40167. 
857 Constitution: ss 195 and 196. 
858 See www.dpsa.gov.za.www.psc.gov.za  accessed on 22 July 2019; Toxopeus M ‘Understanding water issues 
and challenges 1 Department of Water and Sanitation’ Research Project into Water available at 
https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsfs-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-challenges-i-department-of-water-
and-sanitation accessed on 22 July 2019. See also ‘Fisheries Department rots from the top: Report of GroundUp’ 
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7.4.2 The Role of the Department of Public Service and Administration  
 
Earlier in this chapter, the oversight role of the PSC was introduced. Here the role and efficacy 
of the government department tasked with management of the public service is discussed. 
Within the public sector, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) bears 
the primary responsibility for ensuring that the country has an ethical, professional, and 
effective public service.859 This includes the authority to establish norms and standards to 
ensure the effective functioning of the public service. In this regard, the DPSA has overseen 
the development of an extensive network of inter-related laws and policy frameworks 
governing the public sector.860 However, the extent to which the regulatory framework has 
been successful is open to question. 
 
In the first place, the human-resources environment within the DPSA itself appears to be 
dysfunctional. In the result, the ability of the department to implement public service policy in 
the rest of the administration is thrown into doubt. A startling indication of the state of affairs 
at the DPSA is contained in a recent report by the DPSA leadership in the Public Service and 
Administration, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Parliamentary Oversight 
Committee.861 The relevant committee meeting was also attended by the PSC and DPME who 
made various submissions.  
 
The committee discussed the state of retention of Heads of Departments in the public sector, 
challenges at the politico-administrative interface, and challenges with implementation of 
government’s performance monitoring system. The DPSA emphasised the importance of the 
performance management system in creating an accountable culture linked to a transparent 
reward system. The system in place requires that poor performance be effectively managed 
                                                 
available at https://m.news24.com.SouthAfrica/News/fisheries-department-rotting-from-the-top-20181113 
accessed on 22 July 2019.Public Service and Administration Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 
Meeting of 25 October 2017 available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/ accessed on 22 July 
2019.Public Accounts (SCOPA) Committee Meeting of 28 November 2018 available at https://pmg.org.za/ 
committee-meeting/27688 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
859 See www.dpsa.gov.za accessed on 22 July 2019. 
860 Public Service Act 103 of 1994; Public Service Regulations, 2016 GNR 877 of 29 July 2016; Public 
Administration Management Act 11 of 2014 available at www.dpsa.gov.za/legislation.php#7 accessed on 22 July 
2019. 
861 Public Service and Administration, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 25 October 2017 
available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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through personal development plans and training.862 Unfortunately, the picture which emerged 
from the presentations was that government’s performance management system was 
dysfunctional. The PSC chairperson registered the PSC’s concern that the DPSA and the 
DPME had not implemented a ‘legitimate and transparent process’ to evaluate HoDs – some 
had not been evaluated for three years. He explained further that a process of deviation which 
had been allowed by the departments in order to assess HoDs for progression purposes only, 
had been applied in an uneven and chaotic manner.863 
 
This led to a discussion on the topic of the tensions at the politico-administrative interface, the 
impact of the dysfunctional performance system on the career incidents of DGs, and the 
turnover rate for DGs and HoDs in the public sector. The PSC linked tensions at the politico-
administrative interface with the high turnover rate in the senior management levels of 
government. The DPSA informed the public service parliamentary oversight committee that 
between 2004 and 2014, the average DG held his or her position for only 2,4 years of his or 
her five-year contract.864 This problem may be even more serious at the level of Deputy-
Directors General.865  
 
In her response, the Minister for Public Service and Administration highlighted the following: 
                                                 
862 Ibid. 
863 Advocate Sizani appearing before the Public Service and Administration, Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation Committee ibid. 
864 Ibid. 
865 This study found that 59 per cent of DDG posts were vacant. A high replacement rate for DDGs was confirmed 
by the authors of the study by the DPSA. Thirty-five per cent of senior management posts were found to be vacant 
Development Network Africa ‘Public Sector Constraints – A critical Review’ June 2007 available at 
www.dnaeconomics.com/assets/Usematthew/Capacity_constraints_in_the_public_sector-20=1_06_2007.pdf 
accessed on 22 July 2019. When Dr Ndudane took up a DDG position at the Department of Forestry and Fisheries 
in 2016, she was the eleventh DDG to fill the role seven years. See  
https://m.news24.com.SouthAfrica/News/fisheries-department- rotting-from-the-top-2018113 accessed on 22 July 
2019. A string of resignations at senior management level in the Department of Water and Sanitation is reported 
at https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nomvula-axes-dg-after-just-six-months-20170715 accessed on 22 
July 2019. The suspension of four DDGs at the Department of Water and Sanitation is reported at 
https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/fourth-water-department-deputy-suspended-as-director-general-snubs-
mps-979414 accessed on 22 July 2019. The suspension of the DDG for Policy, Planning and Clean Energy at the 
Department of Energy is reported at: https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/energy-minister-suspends-
ddg/ accessed on 22 July 2019. The suspension of two DDGs at the DPSA is reported at 
https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1689865/muthambi-suspends-public-service-and-administration-dept-
cfo-and-ddg accessed on 22 July 2019. The suspension of the DG is reported on, together with the dismissal of 
two DDGs in the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services at 
https://mfin24.com/Tech/News/Telecoms-DG-suspended-for-60-days-20150807 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
hhtps://techcentral.co.za/vilikazi-latest-ddg-out-at-telecoms/5860 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
https://techcentral.co.za/another-ddg-bites-the-dust/56865/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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(a)  The matters raised by the PSC and DPME during discussions had arisen from an 
apparent lack of leadership in the DPSA.866  
(b)  The Minister’s impression was that the department had lost sight of its role in driving 
efficiency in the public sector.  
(c)  Critical programmes affecting staff morale, such as the employee satisfaction survey 
and the client satisfaction survey, had been discontinued.  
(d)  Surveys which had been conducted in recent years were not published because the 
results reflected poorly on the department. 
(e) The organisational development branch of the department had not completed the 
organograms of various departments. As a result, these departments could not fill 
vacancies, forfeiting money back to the fiscus as a result. 
(f)  The department had a bloated, top-heavy structure.  
(g)  It was not clear what work some of the chief directors were doing. 
(h)  Decisions in the department were based on personal issues instead of objective 
considerations. 
(i)  Powers were not appropriately delegated which led to slow work progress. 
(j)  Key management controls such as the performance management system were not 
operational. Employees had not been assessed for some time which impacted on work 
morale.  
 
The Minister’s report painted a worrying picture of the DPSA. The apparent dysfunction 
extends to key management controls such as the performance management system which has 
broken down within the department. The DPSA bears responsibility for implementing the 
Performance Management and Development System for the Public Service (PMDS) 
throughout the administration, and yet the system was not implemented within the DPSA itself.  
The PSC has identified performance management in the public service as one of its key 
concerns.867 This concern is based on previous studies which showed that performance 
                                                 
866 This includes the breakdown of performance monitoring in the public service generally and amongst senior 
managers (DGs) in particular. Tensions at the politico-administrative interface, unwarranted suspensions and 
disciplinary actions against DGs by Ministers. 
867 ‘Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Performance Management and Development System for the Public 
Service’ Executive Summary at vi available at www.psc.gov.za/documents/reports/2018PMDS/%20Report%20 
_%20Final.pdf accessed on 22 July 2019. See the comments of the PSC Chairperson to the Public Service and 
Administration, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee Meeting of 25 October 2017 available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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management in the public sector is poorly managed and implemented in most departments. The 
PSC found that this has resulted in poor performance and poor morale.868 In June 2018 the PSC 
published its report on the evaluation of the efficacy of the PMDS.869 The report studied 
implementation of the PMDS in six national departments.870 The aim of the research was to 
establish the underlying reasons for the ineffective implementation of the PMDS.871 
 
The study found that a variety of factors impacted negatively on the implementation of the 
PMDS. Some of the challenges were administrative, such as the under-staffing of units tasked 
with implementing the PMDS in the various departments.872 The study identified a correlation 
between poor implementation of the PMDS and failure to achieve targets. This link was 
observed even where departments had received clean audits and had spent their entire 
budgets.873 Participants reported that the system was plagued by subjective and inconsistent 
application. In some instances the system was used to punish or reward. On the other hand, an 
over emphasis on financial reward was detrimental. Supervisors reported that staff expected to 
be rewarded even for meeting the minimum requirements of their jobs.874 
 
While negative conduct, such as favouritism on the part of supervisors, was reported by 
participants, an interesting trend which emerged in a number of departments, was that 
employees’ self-scores were seldom reduced by supervisors. Two departments reported no 
reduction in scoring. In the one department where supervisors did reduce scores, they claimed 
that their failure to provide reasons for the reduction was due to the fear of being bullied or 
sabotaged by their subordinates. One department reported that supervisors avoided 
performance management altogether as they wished to avoid conflict. Some supervisors did 
                                                 
868 ‘Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Performance Management’ ibid at 1 and ‘Development System for the 
Public Service’ at 1 available at www.psc.gov.za/documents/reports/2018PMDS/%20Report%20_%20Final.pdf 
accessed on 22 July 2019. 
869 ‘Evaluation of the Effectiveness’ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
870 The Basic Education, Health, Human Settlements, Transport, Rural Development and Land Reform and the 
Water and Sanitation Departments were selected by the PSC because their mandates are important for service 
delivery. See ‘Evaluation of the Effectiveness’ ibid accessed on 22 July 2019. 
871 Ibid Executive Summary at vi accessed on 22 July 2019. 
872 The Department of Basic Education had ten practitioners responsible for 750 officials. The Department of 
Health had six officials for 1 834 employees, while the Department of Human Settlements had three staff members 
for 600. In the Department of Rural Development, the ratio was 6:5400, while the Department of Transport was 
2:650, and the Department of Water and Sanitation 6:700. See ‘Evaluation of the Effectiveness’ ibid at 33 accessed 
on 22 July 2019. 
873 Ibid at 41. 
874 Ibid at 41. 
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not award any bonuses for fear of retaliation from staff. Two departments reported that staff 
who did not receive bonuses retaliated, for example, by engaging in a ‘go-slow’.875 
 
The investigation presents a worrying picture of the public administration. Of particular 
concern is the apparent failure of the relevant organisational and institutional process 
effectively to regulate the public service. A failure in government’s performance management 
system means that one of the primary management controls driving service delivery is absent. 
The failure of the DPSA to complete and publish diagnostic surveys is equally worrying. This 
may be a major contributor to the apparent dysfunction in the public service environment 
emerging with increasing frequency from news reports into the various commissions of inquiry 
underway at the time of writing.876 
 
7.4.3 The link between Discipline and Dysfunction 
 
One department, which has been subjected to various investigations into allegations of 
maladministration since 2008, is the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS).877 According 
to research, the department faces severe institutional and governance problems which 
compromise its ability to perform its duties.878 The department was restructured from the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry into the Department of Water and Environmental 
Affairs in 2009. In 2013, it was again reconfigured to include the sanitation function.879 In 
2019, the department was again restructured, this time to combine the water and sanitation 
                                                 
875 Ibid at 41. 
876 Commission of Inquiry into Tax Administration and Governance by the SARS (Nugent Commission of 
Inquiry); Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector 
(Zondo Commission of Inquiry); Commission of Inquiry into Allegation of Impropriety Regarding the Public 
Investment Corporation (Mpati Commission of Inquiry); and the Life Esidimeni Arbitration (Moseneke 
Arbitration). 
877 Toxopeus M ‘Understanding water issues and challenges I: Department of Water and Sanitation’ Research 
Project into Water at 6 available at https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsfs-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-
challenges-i-department-of-water-and-sanitation accessed on 22 July 2019. 
878 The Friederich Naumann Foundation has funded a research project into water in South Africa. See 
https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsfs-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-challenges-i-department-of-water-
and-sanitation accessed on 22 July 2019. 
879 Toxopeus M ‘Understanding water issues and challenges I: Department of Water and Sanitation’ Research 
Project into Water at 1 available at  https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsfs-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-
challenges-i-department-of-water-and-sanitation accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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functions with human settlements (housing).880 These constant changes may contribute towards 
instability with negative effects on governance.881 
 
Toxopeus highlights poor financial management in DWS and the water trading entity which 
both received qualified audit opinions from the Auditor-General. She points out that there 
appears to be an extremely high staff turnover combined with an ageing workforce and an 
inability to attract and retain skilled staff. 882 Top management is plagued by instability due to 
frequent changes in leadership. There have been eight DGs in nine years at DWS. This trend 
also applies to DDGs, with frequent suspensions in top management.883 At one stage during 
2017, four DDGs were simultaneously placed on suspension.884 She argues that the instability 
at management level contributes to lack of accountability and an environment which disregards 
financial controls. The cumulative effect of these factors is compromised service delivery.885 
 
The culture of disregard for financial controls apparently also extends to a disregard for 
accepted human-resource practices. In October 2018 it was reported that the DDG for national 
water resources infrastructure, Ms Makhatini had been suspended on the basis of various 
charges relating to projects in her branch. The branch in question is responsible for 80 per cent 
of the department’s R15 billion budget. This same DDG had previously been suspended in 
2017 for four months without charges being brought.886 According to reports Ms Makhatini 
was later summarily dismissed by the department without a disciplinary hearing.887 
                                                 
880 See https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/319988/full-list-here-is-ramaphosa-new-cabinet/ accessed on 
22 July 2019 
881 Toxopeus M ‘Understanding water issues and challenges I: Department of Water and Sanitation’ Research 
Project into Water available at https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsfs-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-
challenges-i-department-of-water-and-sanitation accessed on 22 July 2019. 
882 Ibid at 2 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
883 Ibid. During the period from 2016 to 2018, the media exposed instability in the top management at the 
Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS). DG Margaret-Ann Diedericks resigned in June 201. She was 
replaced by Gorbachev Mashitso six months later. Mashitso, himself was suspended after only six months in the 
job, but not before he had suspended four DDGs. See https://m.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/nomvula-axes-dg-
after-just-six-months-20170715 accessed on 22 July 2019.https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/fourth-water-
department-deputy-suspended-as-director-general-snubs-mps-9794149 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
884 See https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/fourth-water-department-deputy-suspended-as-director-general-
snubs-mps-9794149 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
885 Toxopeus M ‘Understanding water issues and challenges I: Department of Water and Sanitation’ Research 
Project into Water at 2 available at https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsfs-briefs/understanding-water-issues-and-
challenges-i-department-of-water-and-sanitation accessed on 22 July 2019. 
886 See https://businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-10-15-water-official-suspended-for-refusing-to-let-unit-serve-
as-honey-pot/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
887 See https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-10-20-water-deputy-fired-because-of-lack-of-trust-and-
confidence/ accessed on 22 July 2019.  
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On 28 November 2018, the top management and the executive of the DWS appeared before 
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA). The SCOPA had met with the Special 
Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Department of National Treasury on the previous day to 
discuss the financial problems at DWS which included unbudgeted projects, unauthorised 
expenditure, budget overruns, and the departmental overdraft. From discussions in the 
committee, it appeared that there were 40 unbudgeted projects costing R1, 3 billion. The water 
trading entity account was overdrawn to the tune of a further R3 billion. This overdraft had 
been incurred despite the law not allowing departments to incur overdrafts. In total DWS had 
made a R12 billion loss in the 2017/2018 financial year.888 
 
The oversight committee met with officials and the then Minister until deep into the night with 
little progress. Eventually, the meeting ended with members of Parliament (MPs) expressing 
their frustration at and dissatisfaction with what they perceived as officials’ unwillingness or 
refusal to answer questions. From discussions in the committee the following emerged:889 
(a)  Officials claimed that they had incurred the irregular expenditure on the authority of a 
ministerial directive. The SCOPA MPs accused officials of trying to hide behind the 
ministerial directive when they were responsible for advising the Minister. 
 
(b)  The officials present in the committee could not satisfactorily explain where large sums 
of money had gone. It was not clear whether the department’s objectives for the 
unbudgeted projects had been achieved and whether value for money had been 
obtained. In addition, certain costs which were flagged as suspicious could not be 
explained. For instance, the figures revealed that furniture for a Technical and 
Vocational Training (TVET) College had been budgeted for, whereas the DWS had 
contracted with existing colleges for the project. Why was it necessary to buy furniture 
and equipment if the colleges already existed? In another case, boreholes cost R1,4 
million each and plumbing students were provided with laptops costing R18 000 each. 
 
(c) There appeared to be a high turnover rate amongst top management and this negatively 
impacted on officials’ ability to answer questions. For example, the Acting DG had 
                                                 
888 Minutes of the meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) on 28 November 2018 
available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/27688 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
889 Ibid. 
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only been in the post for six months and the Acting Chief Financial Officer (CFO), for 
an even shorter period. As a result they could not account for decisions taken by the 
former officials. 
 
(d)  Reporting lines appeared to be in disarray. The documents revealed that the DDG for 
Water Planning Information and Management was responsible for the ‘War on Leaks’ 
project. This project raised the DWS’s overdraft to R3 billion. The DDG explained to 
the committee that although the project appeared to be under her responsibility, in fact 
it was not. This was because she had been moved out of her branch for a period. While 
she was out of her post, the manager responsible for that project was instructed to report 
directly to the DG. 
 
(e)  Questionable HR processes and apparent unfair treatment towards senior management 
were exposed during the course of proceedings. The Acting DG (who holds the 
substantive post of DDG for Water Planning Information and Management) explained 
that although she had been in the department for a long time, she could not explain what 
had happened because she had been moved out of her post for a period by the previous 
DG for a period of ten months. The previous DG announced the transfer (to another 
province) during an EXCO meeting, without informing her in advance. Litigation 
between the side-lined DDG and the former DG continued until that DG resigned. 
Thereafter, the affected DDG was returned to her post. 
 
(f) It appeared that no official had been held to account for the financial mismanagement. 
The former CFO was charged but resigned before the disciplinary hearing. The DG 
who was the accounting officer in terms of law, was never charged but had resigned 
from the department. 
 
Discussions in the committee revealed a dysfunctional environment. It is interesting that the 
project which caused the largest expenditure was run by a manager who reported directly to 
the former DG. The responsible DDG was moved out of her post and could not provide the 
necessary oversight. The CFO and the DG who were responsible at that time had resigned. The 
SCOPA laid the blame for all this squarely at the door of the officials. The Acting DG came in 
for a particularly tough time. The irony of it all was that the Acting DG was the very DDG 
moved out of her post during the time that the questionable practices occurred. During this 
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time, the former DG (who resigned without facing charges) assumed her responsibilities.890 
What emerges from the SCOPA investigation minutes is the link between a poor human-
resources environment and deterioration in governance and management controls. The 
consequence is compromised service delivery. 
 
Unfortunately, many of the characteristics of the dysfunctional administrative environment 
exposed at the parliamentary oversight committees discussed above, are prevalent throughout 
government departments and entities. At the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF), media reports have exposed what appears to be a power struggle involving the DG, 
one of the DDGs, and the Minister.891 The war between the DG and DDG has involved a 
number of forensic investigations, suspensions of both officials at various times, and ongoing 
court cases which have cost the department millions to date.892 The department is responsible 
for managing the R6 billion fishing industry, including a lucrative shadow industry. Poached 
abalone is reportedly the country’s third largest fisheries export. The allegations, charges, and 
investigations in the ongoing saga revolve around lucrative tenders in the department.893 
 
At local government level, a spate of suspensions and resignations amongst senior management 
were reported on during the period 2016-2018. In the eThekweni Metropolitan Municipality, 
the city manager left his position prior to the termination of his contract.894 Next, the deputy 
city manager for community and emergency services resigned, followed by the Metro Police 
head who took early retirement. At the same time, the municipality lost its head of legal services 
and head of electricity, whilst the head of health was again suspended.895 In August 2017, the 
head of the city’s Parks, Recreation and Culture Department was suspended;896 and in 
November 2018, the municipality dismissed its new head of legal services following a 
disciplinary process.897 In May 2019 the municipality’s mayor, the chair of the Human 
                                                 
890 Ibid. 
891 See https://m.news24.com.SouthAfrica/News/fisheries-department-rotting-from-the-top-2018113 accessed on 
22 July 2019. 
892 Ibid. 
893 Ibid. 
894 See https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2016-12-22-sibusiso-sithole-adked-to-leave-position-as-
ethekweni -city-manager-immediately/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
895 See https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/ethekweni-manager-hit-by-staff-exodus-10343238 accessed on 22 
July 2019. 
896 See https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ethekweni-official-cries-foul-over-cancelled-multi-million-
conference-20170815 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
897 See www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news/item/1652-head-of-legal-gets-his-marching-orders 
accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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Settlement’s Committee, and two senior managers were charged with corruption involving a 
R201 million tender.898 
 
7.4.5 Politicisation of the Public Administration 
 
Recent revelations before the Zondo Commission of Inquiry appear to reveal an environment 
in which executive instructions trump legal provisions. The Commission recently heard 
evidence of how public officials were instructed by one Mr Kolane, then Chief of Protocol in 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, to ignore rules and regulations on the basis 
of the Cabinet and the President having authorised their doing so.899 The former DG in the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Ms Sindane testified that the 
government task team investigating the Gupta landing at Waterkloof had absolved the 
executive of any responsibility for the incident. This was because in the view of the task team 
the ‘name-dropping’ officials (including Mr Kolane) were to blame for abusing the positions 
of power of the Ministers by mentioning their names.900 Mr Kolane was the only person 
disciplined for this breach of procedure – he was promoted to the position of Ambassador to 
the Netherlands shortly after pleading guilty. Under cross-examination, Ms Sindane denied that 
the investigating task team had come up with a report which exonerated the executive in 
exchange for senior government positions.901 
 
It is submitted that the current public service appears to operate on much the same principles 
as its apartheid counterpart with its emphasis falling on executive powers. The new 
constitutional legal and policy framework appears to have done little to constrain abuses of 
power. Reports of instances of executive abuse of authority abound in the media. A recent 
                                                 
898 See https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2019-05-14-ethekweni-mayor-zandile-gumede-to-appear-
on-corruption-charges  accessed on 22 July 2019. 
899 Former Director-General Sindane referred in her evidence to recorded conversations in which Koloane was 
heard referring to ‘Number One’ and telling other officials that the President and members of Cabinet gave 
permission for Gupta landing at Waterkloof Air Force Base in 2013. See 
www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-07-03-state-capture-bruce-koloane-ignored-rukes-to-let-guptas-land-at-
waterkloof accessed on 22 July 2019. 
900 Ibid. 
901 The investigating task team members were: Tom Moyane who was promoted to the position of South African 
Revenue Service Commissioner; Thulani Dlomo who became Ambassador to Algeria; Clinton Swemmer who 
became a South African diplomat to the United Nations; and Nonkuleleko Sindane who became head of a private 
company which benefits from state contracts. See https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/state-
capture/2150374/probe-into-gupta-plane-landing-was-not-a-whitewash-of-zuma-sindane/amp/ accessed on 22 
July 2019. 
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Treasury report found that Transnet provided security personnel for a former Minister without 
following any internal processes. No assessment was undertaken to determine whether the staff 
were necessary, and the board was neither informed of the appointments, nor did it authorise 
them. The two security staff were appointed without following recruitment processes and were 
provided with vehicles belonging to Transnet to perform their duties.902 
 
The former Acting CEO of South African Airways (SAA), Ms Mpshe, testified at the State 
Capture Inquiry that the previous SAA chairperson, Ms Myeni, subjected the senior 
management team at the airline to constant, irregular interference. Most of this interference 
concerned irregular instructions on who to appoint, who to promote, and who to discipline. 
Procurement processes were also the subject of constant interference. Ms Mpshe testified that 
she was considered to be ‘obstructive’ as she was reluctant to carry out unlawful instructions.903 
What happens to obstructive officials in an environment where senior managers are told who 
to appoint and who to discipline? And what happens to senior managers who refuse unlawful 
instructions?  
 
According to the chairperson of the PSC, cases of unjustified disciplinary action against DGs 
and HoDs are not uncommon. He informed Parliament that ‘where HoDs were instructed to 
carry out unlawful actions and they refused their Executive Authority would discipline 
them’.904 This has led to a great deal of tension at the point of interaction between senior 
managers and political principals – often termed the ‘politico-administrative interface’. 
 
7.4.6 Victimisation and Harassment in the Public Administration 
 
The severity and frequency of unwarranted disciplinary action against DGs has led the PSC to 
release a statement condemning this practice and calling on Ministers to exercise restraint. The 
statement expressed concern about the destabilising effect of the high turnover rate on 
departments which can negatively impact service delivery.905 In many cases senior managers 
                                                 
902 See www.timelive.co.za/politics/2018/2018-11-16-transnet-funds-used-to-guard-public-enterprises-minister-
gigaba-treasury/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
903 See https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/state-capture/2149348/saa-ex-acting-ceo-tells-of-constant-
irregular-interferebce-by-myeni-kwinana/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
 904PSA Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 25 October 2017 available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
905 Public Service Commission statement on the increased turnover rate of Director-Generals and Heads of 
Department available at http://www.psc.gov.za/pressstatements/2017/18072017.asp accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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resign from employment rather than face the exorbitant costs of defending themselves. 
Departments tend to use senior counsel in the disciplinary process and many officials cannot 
bear the cost of legal representation in these circumstances. Unfortunately, this impacts on their 
career prospects as an impression of guilt is created by their resigning under a cloud of 
suspicion. It becomes difficult to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. The PSC was 
not able to provide the portfolio committee with statistics on the number of cases involving 
litigation between HoDs and Ministers. However, it did register its concern that government 
lost seven out of ten cases.906 
 
The treatment of senior managers in the public sector was recently highlighted by the ‘protest 
suicide’ of Mr Garane, a senior manager in Parliament. Mr Garane’s family told the media that 
he had committed suicide after enduring twenty months of bullying by his boss, a former ANC 
MP. After exhausting all his internal remedies, Mr Garane shot himself in his office in 
Parliament in order to ‘protest against (1) politicisation of administration, (2) gross abuse of 
power, (3) complete disregard of human rights and dignity.’907 His suicide note was posted on 
Facebook by a former colleague in order to draw attention to Parliament’s institutional culture. 
The National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU) stated that it was not 
surprised by Mr Garane’s death because it regularly dealt with cases of victimisation, bullying, 
and abuse of power by senior management in the national legislature.908 
 
It is submitted that the Garane incident exposes the failure of the institutional mechanisms 
designed to regulate human-resource matters in the public service. Mr Garane followed all the 
correct procedures to draw attention to the alleged bullying to which he was subjected. First, 
he lodged a grievance which was considered by his boss’s immediate superior. In his records, 
he stated that the response he received to his grievance was that ‘Parliament is a political 
environment’. Mr Garane interpreted this to mean that ‘political appointees…were free to do 
as they wished with the lives of those below them’.909 The complaint eventually ended up with 
the Speaker and Chairperson of the NA and NCOP respectively, who also failed to take 
appropriate action. In desperation, Mr Garane made a protected disclosure to the Public Service 
                                                 
906 Ibid. 
907 See https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-10-01-death-in-peoples-house-the-family-needs-answers-
from-parliament-about-lennox-garanes-working-conditions/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
908 See https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/news/2018-09-24-parliamentary-manager-shot-himself-over-unrepentant-
bully-of-a-boss/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
909 Ibid. 
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and Administration, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee.910 None of these 
avenues provided an appropriate remedy. Commentators have pointed to the underlying issue 
– Parliament’s bosses are accountable only to the political parties who appointed them. There 
is accordingly no effective oversight of employees’ career problems. 911 
 
Following Mr Garane’s suicide, the PSC was tasked with investigating the circumstances 
surrounding his death. His family unsuccessfully wrote to the PSC requesting it to extend its 
investigation to include organisational, administrative, and personnel practices affecting the 
organisational culture in Parliament. In this letter, the family also expressed concern about a 
potential conflict of interest in the PSC’s reporting structure. They registered concern about the 
PSC’s powers, the nature of its directives, and its remedial actions. 912 The PSC did not respond 
to the family. Instead, the family later discovered through the media, that the PSC had 
completed a preliminary report and released it to Parliament’s presiding officers without 
informing the family. According to the PSC, the family were not regarded as ‘an affected party’ 
in terms of the relevant procedures.913 It appears that the ‘affected persons’ in Parliament who 
were given access to the preliminary report included the very people who had dealt with Mr 
Garane’s various grievances and complaints in the first place. The facts in this matter illustrate 
many of the negative consequences of the NT’s transfer of oversight over the public service to 
the executive. It is submitted that the manner in which commissioners are appointed 
exacerbates the problem as it may have the effect of increasing executive control thereby 
diminishing the independence of commissioners. 
 
In 2019, the PSC released a report on bullying in the public service. The report found that 
public servants faced victimisation, bullying, discrimination, intimidation, harassment, sexual 
harassment, and cyberbullying.914 The report was not made public. However, from subsequent 
reports it appears that the findings of the report support the view expressed by the Garane 
family concerning the lack of effective remedies for public servants who are subject to 
                                                 
910 Ibid. 
911 See https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-10-01-death-in-peoples-house-the-family-needs-answers-
from-parliament-about-lennox-garanes-working-conditions/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
912 See https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/we-were-blindsided-by-release-of-preliminary-report-family-
of-man-who-took-his-life-at-parliament-20190314 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
913 Ibid. 
914 See https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/damning-report-exposes-bullying-in-the-public-service-19058290 
accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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victimisation. The PSC found that employee-relations staff in government did not process 
grievances against senior managers to conclusion for fear of victimisation.915 This effectively 
removes the primary institutional mechanism available to employees to address unfair 
treatment.  
 
A recent PSC round table issued the following recommendations aimed at addressing unfair 
treatment in the workplace:916 
(a)  The PSC should visit departments in order to investigate the underlying causes of 
grievances. They should not rely solely on statistics from the grievance database. 
(b)  Unions should conduct training to educate members. 
(c) The DPSA must report all cases where disciplinary measures against senior managers 
have not been implemented to the PSC and Parliament. Ministers and HoDs must 
account to Parliament for failure to implement disciplinary measures. 
(d)  Employees must be brave enough to challenge unfair treatment in the workplace 
through the relevant organisational processes and the courts since this is the only way 
to end unfair treatment. 
 
It is submitted that the nature and content of these recommendations reflect weaknesses in the 
organisational and institutional processes intended to regulate the public service. They merely 
reiterate existing processes. There is a disturbing failure to interrogate the underlying reasons 
for institutionalised unfair treatment. It is worrying that the onus for resolving the issue has 
been shifted to affected employees who may lack the psychological or financial resources to 
stand up against a system which appears to be failing. 
 
7.4.7 Professionalism in the Administration 
 
An area of key concern is the need to promote a culture of professionalism in the public sector. 
The values in the public sector have been highlighted by the Esidimeni tragedy, in which the 
actions of the Gauteng Department of Health and Social Development caused the death of an 
                                                 
915 Ibid.  
916 Public Service Commission ‘Report on the Roundtable Session on Understanding and Ending Unfair Treatment 
in the Workplace’ (2019) available at psc.gov.za/documents/reports.asp accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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estimated 143 mentally ill patients.917 The Health Ombud’s ‘Report into the circumstances 
surrounding the deaths of mentally ill patients: Gauteng Province’ found that:918 
(a)  A ‘high level’ decision was taken to terminate the Life Esidimeni contract. Three key 
people were identified – the MEC, the HoD, and a director in the Gauteng Health 
Department; 
(b)  Once the decision had been taken, it was implemented in a hurried and chaotic manner. 
Chronic mentally ill patients were transferred from Life Esidimeni Hospital to NGOs 
which were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to manage their care. At the time the report 
was released, 94 patients had died. The number subsequently rose to 143 patients; 
(c) The department ignored widespread professional expert warnings and advice against 
the transfer project; 
(d)  There was prima facie evidence that the conduct of the officials and NGOs violated the 
National Health Act and the Mental Health Care Act; and919 
(e)  The actions of the officials involved in implementing the project showed a disregard 
for the rights of the patients and their families, including the right to dignity, the right 
to life, right to freedom and security of the person, right to privacy, right to protection 
from an environment that is not harmful to their health and well-being, right to access 
to quality health care services, sufficient food and water and right to administrative 
action that is reasonable, lawful and procedurally fair. 
 
During the hearings into what had occurred, Dr Mkhatshwa, former Life Healthcare managing 
director, testified that the culture in the health department was politicised to the extent that 
professional ethics and standards had been subverted. He recounted how he had begged 
Gauteng health department officials not to move mentally ill patients from his facility. He 
testified that it saddened him to see doctors violate their oath of office and succumb to political 
pressure.920  
 
                                                 
917 See http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/life-esidimeni-death-toll-rises-to-143-20171110 10 
November 2017 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
918 Health Ombud: South Africa ‘The Report into the Circumstances surrounding the deaths of mentally ill 
patients: Gauteng Province’ available at https://sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Esidimeni%20full%20report.pdf 
accessed on 22 July 2019. 
919 National Health Act 61 of 2003; Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 
920 See http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/News/life-esidimeni-death-toll-rises-to-143-20171110 10 
November 2017 accessed on 22 July 2019.http://www.thenewage.co.za/ex-md-tried-to-stop-removals/ 19 October 
2017 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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This tragedy raises important questions about the prevailing culture in the public service. Why 
exactly, did officials not express their professional views to their bosses? Why were the views 
of professionals and NGOs who warned against the transfer of the patients not heeded? Were 
they too afraid to defy an instruction? Were they overwhelmed by the challenges inherent in 
the public health environment? Did the officials lack basic care and professional ethics? What 
is the prevailing culture in the department? 
 
A recent PSC investigation into professional ethics in health care facilities in the KZN province 
is instructive. The study was undertaken in response to complaints from citizens and the media 
relating to service levels at hospitals and clinics in KZN.921 The key finding was that the 
Department of Health is not responsive and professional in delivering on its mandate because 
the ‘cultivation of a professional ethics is not a deliverable against which the Department could 
measure performance.’922  
 
The PSC found that the province adopted a mechanical, bureaucratic, and compliance-based 
approach to its role in respect of hospitals and clinics. The emphasis was on process compliance 
and the meeting of targets. Qualitative methods of monitoring and evaluation such as 
inspections were not used. Instead, districts acted as conduits for policy messages from the 
provincial and national spheres. The provinces saw their role as less management and more 
‘rule by compliance enforcement’.923 This involved drafting plans, ensuring that structures met 
these plans, and measuring achievements according to generic targets unrelated to the real-life 
situation in the hospitals and clinics. Consequently, there was a lack of care, agency, 
professionalism, and responsiveness displayed by officials in the sector.924 
 
It was further found that the provinces adopted a blanket approach to challenges – e.g., the 
implementation of a blanket ban on the filling of ‘non-critical’ posts. This had a severe impact 
on services which was exacerbated by local differences in capacity, resources, and geographic 
location of health facilities. Management at the coalface expressed frustration with the non-
responsiveness of provincial offices when it came to equipment, recruitment, and financial 
                                                 
921 ‘Investigation into Health Care Facilities in KwaZulu-Natal: A special focus on Professional Ethics' March 
2018 available at www.psc.gov.za/documents/reports/2018/SUMMARY%20Report%20on%KZN%20Health% 
20facilities accessed on 22 July 2019. 
922 Ibid. 
923 Ibid.  
924Ibid. 
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delegation.925 Conditions in the hospitals as regards maintenance of infrastructure, and in some 
cases even cleanliness, were found to be below the level expected in the health sector. In 
addition, poor staff attitudes were highlighted by the study as an area of major concern.926 The 
PSC expressed the view that the lack of professionalism displayed implied a ‘professional 
prejudice’ against the ordinary citizen. The lack of regard for efficiency was attributed to the 
fact that indigent citizens are less assertive of their rights.927 
 
The PSC study did not expressly deal with the constitutional division of powers with respect 
to the health function. However, the study did highlight certain areas of difficulty between the 
health care facilities at the coalface of service delivery, and the provincial and national 
governments. It did not unpack the relationship between concurrency, working conditions, and 
the issue of professional ethics. 
 
‘Health Services’ is a Schedule 4 Part A competence – it is an area of concurrent national and 
provincial competence. But ‘municipal health services’ is an area of local government 
competence in terms of Part B of Schedule 4. The difficulty lies in defining where ‘municipal 
health services’ end and ‘health services’ begin. This is not merely a theoretical question; the 
implications for service delivery are serious for those who rely on the public sector for health 
care. 
 
On the issue of division of powers between the spheres, the PSC study notes that: 
 
A District model of decentralization is adopted in the Health sector in South Africa. This does not mean that health 
becomes a key mandate of local government. It simply means that the Provincial Department of Health makes it 
decentralised presence in line with District Municipal Boundaries.928 
 
This comment alludes to the difficulty of concurrency in the management of health in South 
Africa.  
 
                                                 
925 Ibid at 17.  
926 Ibid. 
927 Ibid at 18.  
928 Ibid at 19. 
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Health is regarded by the FFC as one of the four main unfunded mandates.929 The FFC found 
that there were major challenges with regard to funding for infrastructure and stock as a result 
of the ‘downward creep’ of health functions to the municipal level.930 The PSC report 
highlighted serious challenges regarding infrastructure and stock at certain hospitals. The inter-
relationship between the health institution, the districts, national and especially provincial 
government, was highlighted by the PSC. The findings point to a high level of dissonance 
between the three spheres regarding their respective roles in the management of the health 
function. It is submitted that this has translated into an environment in which the work 
conditions of public servants in the health sector have deteriorated. This has impacted on 
morale and professional ethics. Unfortunately, the citizen suffers the consequence in the form 
of compromised service delivery. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
This part of the thesis has considered the practice of the administration in the new constitutional 
order. It is argued that the culture and ethos in the public service falls short of the values 
envisaged by section 195 of the Constitution. The reasons for this are complex and varied. It 
appears that there has not been a successful transition from the centralised authoritarian culture 
of the apartheid public service, to a culture and practice which promotes constitutional values. 
This can be traced, in part, to an incomplete re-alignment of the institutions of state with the 
allocation of functions and powers in the Constitution, but also to political factors. The 
prevailing culture is impacted by tension at the politico-administrative interface, unclear 
reporting lines to ministries, and failures in human resource and management controls. 
 
Earlier, it was submitted that the Constitutional Court had erred in certifying that the changes 
made to the NT satisfied the requirements of the NT. To recapitulate, CP XXIX requires that: 
 
                                                 
929 Financial and Fiscal Commission ‘The Impact of Unfunded Mandates on Intergovernmental Relations 
2012/2013 Policy Brief’ 265 available at www.ufh.ac.za/journals/index/php/apsdpr/article/download/10/10  
accessed on 22 July 2019. 
930 The FFC Study found that Health care facilities were often inadequate, but their extension, upgrading and 
maintenance are for the account of local government. There is not enough money for stock, equipment and records 
required for primary health care (e.g. needles, syringes and dressings), which have to be funded by the local 
government budget. See also Financial and Fiscal Commission ‘The Impact of Unfunded Mandates on 
Intergovernmental Relations 2012/2013’ Policy Brief at 25 available at www.ufh.ac.za/journals/ 
index/php/apsdpr/article/download/10/10 accessed on 22 July 2019. 
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The independence and impartiality of a Public Service Commission, a Reserve Bank, an Auditor-
General and a Public Protector shall be provided for and safeguarded by the Constitution in the interests 
of the maintenance of effective public finance and administration and a high standard of professional 
ethics in the public service. 
 
It is submitted that the insulation of the public service from executive control may have been 
what was intended by CP XXIX, and if that was indeed the case, the Constitution has failed to 
achieve this goal. It can be argued that insofar as the Constitutional Court read into CP XXIX, 
a lesser protection for the PSC when compared to the protection offered to the Public Protector 
and Auditor-General, it erred both in its reasoning and in its conclusion. There are important 
policy reasons why the independence and impartiality of the public service must be protected 
and maintained. It is submitted that this is an area which could benefit from legislative reform. 
 
It is further submitted, that the decision by the Constitutional Court to allow the changes which 
were effected to the provisions governing the PSC between the interim Constitution, NT and 
AT, has had a significant impact on the evolution of provincial government as a sphere of 
government. It is also submitted that the creation of a ‘single public service’ in the German 
tradition, has had the effect of cementing the power of central government over the provinces 
in the South African context. By centralising control over the administration in the executive, 
the ability of provinces to develop autonomously has been limited. Taken together with other 
factors such as the fiscal dependence of the provinces on national government, this aspect of 
the constitutional system has had a significant effect in reinforcing the unitary aspects of the 
constitutional design. 931 
 
There is a case to be made for the revision of the provisions of the Constitution which establish 
the PSC. It is notable that the PSC had significant powers to issue binding directions under the 
interim Constitution. It is submitted that the weaker, investigative and reporting powers have 
done little to insulate the public service from executive abuse. It is further submitted that the 
manner in which the law gives the executive extensive control over personnel matters has 
contributed to the current state of affairs in the public administration. It has led to politicisation 
of matters which could be more readily resolved if they were dealt with administratively. 
Blurred and non-existent reporting lines between ministries and departments have become so 
                                                 
931 This aspect is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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commonplace that the PSC produced a report into the practice of Minister’s advisors usurping 
the role of HoDs.932 
 
Perhaps one of the most striking examples of political interference involves the former Minister 
of Social Development’s creation of a parallel work stream to deal with the South African 
Social Security Agency (SASSA) matter. The former CEO of the SASSA gave evidence in the 
Constitutional Court that the former Minister created parallel decision-making and 
communication processes which bypassed the responsible officials at the SASSA.933 
 
It is submitted that the issue of executive interference requires urgent attention. It is submitted 
that the Code of Conduct for councillors contained in the Local Government Municipal 
Systems Act is exemplary in how it draws a distinction between the political and administrative 
arms in the local government sphere. Clause 11 of the Code provides:934 
A councillor may not except as provided by law – 
(a)  interfere in the management or administration of any department of the municipal council unless 
mandated by council; 
(b)  give or purport to give any instruction to any employee of the council except when authorised to do so; 
(c) obstruct or attempt to obstruct the implementation of any decision of the council or a committee by an 
employee of the council; or 
(d)  encourage or participate in any conduct which would cause or contribute to maladministration in the 
council. 
 
It is submitted that the public service, constituted at provincial and national levels of 
government, may benefit from similar protection. It is recommended that the Constitution and 
legislation governing the public service be amended to provide a check against possible abuse 
of authority.  
 
7.6 Recommendations  
1. It is recommended that consideration be given to amending the Constitution and Public 
Service legislation in order to provide the Public Service Commission with similar 
                                                 
932 PSA ‘Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 25 October 2017’ available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/ accessed on 22 July 2019. 
933 See https://groundup.org.za/article/former-social-grants-boss-accuses-minister-parallel-decision-making/ 
accessed on 22 July 2019. 
934 Local Government Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 Schedule 1. 
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protections to those afforded the Reserve Bank, the Auditor-General and the Public 
Protector. 
2. The procedure for the appointment and removal of PSC Commissioners should be 
revised so as to ensure greater independence for the commission. 
3. The PSC administration should be entirely independent of the executive. The 
appointment of the DG of the PSC and all budget-related matters must be managed and 
controlled independently. 
4. The powers of the PSC should be amended to include the power to make peremptory 
findings and recommendations on public service matters. 
5. The reports of the PSC should be made public. 
6. The PSC should be given the power to follow up on the implementation of its reports. 
Departments which fail to implement the finding in reports should be reported to 
Parliament. 
7. The Executive Ethics Code should be amended in order to regulate the politico-
administrative interface more effectively. This may require a proper delineation of 
matters falling within the executive versus those under administrative control.935 
8. Matters concerning the appointment, career incidents, and management of discipline of 
public servants should be removed from executive control. 
9. The culture of non-compliance with legal prescripts governing the public service should 
be addressed first within the DPSA before it is progressively implemented in the rest 
of the public administration.  
10. The DPME should address challenges with its performance system and resolve these 
with input from all government departments. Attention should be given to the nature of 
performance targets and how effectively they measure departmental services. The 
emphasis needs to shift from rigid compliance to qualitative outputs. 
11. The DPSA engagements in managing the public administration need to shift from being 
‘model’ or ‘programme’ based to being people based in order to reflect the values of 
constitutionalism and human rights The morale and working conditions of public 
servants requires urgent attention. A change in the way the DPSA approaches its 
mandate will result in similar changes throughout government and will positively 
impact the quality of service given by public servants to citizens. Programmes to affect 
                                                 
935 Executive Members Ethics Act 194 of 1998; Executive Ethics Code: Proclamation R 41 2000 Government 
Gazette 41 Regulation 8853. 
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a shift in the mind-set of managers at provincial and national government should be 
developed and implemented. Managers need to move away from formulaic, 
compliance-based models towards interaction, engagement and innovation. 
Management is not about ‘rule by compliance’.  
12. Measures to address employee wellbeing and professional development should be 
developed. Perceptions of favouritism and bias on the part of management should be 
addressed. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on creating a fair, depoliticised 
environment. 
13. Mechanisms to increase the security of tenure of DGs and DDGs should be put in place. 
In this regard, consideration should be given to appointing DGs on a permanent basis 
in order to increase stability in the administration. Mechanisms to constrain the abuse 
of disciplinary processes against DGs and DDGs should be developed. This may 
include removal of this power from individual ministries. 
14. Programmes to address the authoritarian culture prevalent in the public service should 
be developed and implemented to transform government departments from within. An 
understanding of the Constitution and the rule of law should be fostered amongst public 
servants. 
15. Measures to address professionalism in the public sphere should be improved. At the 
same time, measures to de-politicise the public administration should be prioritised. 
This could include workshops and training for DGs and Ministers as outlined in the 
NDP. 
16. The conduct of members of the executive in government departments should be 
subjected to oversight to ensure compliance with the Constitution and the law. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has evaluated the constitutional division of powers in the South African Constitution 
in the light of intergovernmental relations practice, judicial interpretation, legislative and 
administrative practice, and the impact of political factors. In so doing, the primary object has 
been to consider whether the system works.  
 
The argument advanced is that there are shortcomings in how the constitutional vision for the 
division of powers has been implemented by government in the 23 years that have passed since 
the 1996 Constitution was enacted. This can be seen by comparing the judicial interpretation 
of the constitutional division of powers, on the one hand, and legislative and administrative 
practice, on the other. This is partly due to institutional design elements in the Constitution 
which draw together federal and unitary elements resulting in a kind of institutional 
schizophrenia. This is compounded in some instances by a lack of understanding by national 
government and the provinces of their roles in relation to local government. Factors such as 
political will, the incomplete transition of the public service from one constitutional system to 
another, and political and administrative practice also play a part. It is argued that there is a 
need to intervene to reinforce the constitutional vision.  
 
8.2 Summary of Observations and Findings 
 
Chapter 2 examined the history of the drafting of the Constitution as well as the theoretical 
underpinnings of the system of constitutional administration adopted by the drafters of the 
Constitution. It was observed that the South African system is hybrid in nature, representing a 
compromise reached during the negotiation process. As a result it has both federal and unitary 
design elements. It embraces a form of decentralised government with three spheres all 
possessing constitutionally entrenched autonomy. An important feature of this model is the 
entrenchment of the principle of subsidiarity and the concept of developmental government. 
The inclusion of developmental local government underscores the importance of participatory 
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democracy and has a significant impact on the implementation of the division of powers and 
the law and practice of government between the spheres.  
 
This chapter also looked at the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in the Certification 
Judgments.936 It was argued that the Constitutional Court was willing to accept the reduction 
of provincial powers when measured against the Constitutional Principles, which perhaps in 
retrospect has contributed towards the gradual centralisation of power in national government 
to the detriment of the provinces. In this regard, the removal of provincial PSCs between the 
interim Constitution and the Constitution and the creation of a single public service has 
contributed towards the reduction in provincial autonomy. Finally, it was observed that the 
decision to place many aspects of the administration and the PSC under executive control and 
to trust in the ability of political considerations to constrain abuses of power which may arise, 
may have been misguided. It is submitted that the large number of public officials who would 
have had to have been involved in the questionable practices currently being revealed by the 
various commissions of inquiry underway in South Africa, is cause for concern.937 The 
institutional failures which allowed this state of affairs to develop should be addressed in order 
promote ethical conduct and good governance in public service institutions. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the intergovernmental relations system. It noted that the system of 
intergovernmental relations contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution is similar to the 
integrated system found in the German Basic Law of 1949. A distinct tendency towards 
centralisation in the practice of intergovernmental relations can be seen. The fiscal dependence 
of the provinces, and the existence of own revenue resources at the local government sphere, 
together with the impact of judicial decisions, have influenced intergovernmental relations 
between the spheres. This has resulted in a reduction in provincial autonomy. Local 
government, however, has resisted centralisation. The observation was made that the day-to-
day practice of intergovernmental relations in the state is adversarial and competitive, and that 
government departments are not complying with the spirit of cooperative governance enshrined 
                                                 
936 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC). 
937 Commission of Inquiry into Tax Administration and Governance by the SARS (Nugent Commission of 
Inquiry); Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector 
(Zondo Commission of Inquiry); Commission of Inquiry into Allegation of Impropriety Regarding the Public 
Investment Corporation (Mpati Commission of Inquiry); and the Life Esidimeni Arbitration (Moseneke 
Arbitration). 
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in the Constitution. It is submitted that a number of institutional changes to the administration 
together with institutional flaws in the design of the intergovernmental relations legislation and 
institutions, have hampered the developmental of an effective system. It is argued that the 
intergovernmental relations system in its present form is ineffective, and further, that the 
failures in intergovernmental relations are negatively impacting on government’s ability to 
fulfil its constitutional mandate of developing an efficient and accountable public service which 
meets the needs of South African citizens.  
 
Chapter 4 considered the formulation of the division-of-powers provisions in the Constitution 
and examined a number of problems arising from their formulation and implementation. The 
problems inherent in concurrency – such as duplication, lack of clarity and overlap, lack of 
accountability, and ineffective service delivery – were examined through the lens of four case 
studies drawn from local government. It was argued that government legislative practice has 
resulted in a deluge of poorly co-ordinated and often incoherent laws drafted in isolation by 
various national and provincial government departments. Local government is often not 
consulted in the manner required by the Constitution. This shows that the implementation of 
the constitutional allocation of powers has not been translated into state legislative practice 
which respects the constitutional status of local government. The argument advanced is that 
the cumulative outcome of all of these factors has been detrimental to good governance, 
accountability, and service delivery. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined judicial interpretation of the division-of-powers provisions. The 
jurisprudence confirms the status of local government as an autonomous sphere of government 
– the courts have tended to define the functional areas of planning by reference to the area of 
‘municipal planning’. In the Le Sueur case – discussed in Chapter 6 – the High Court 
interpreted a local government functional area as sufficiently wide to encompass a competence 
which is assigned by the Constitution to the other two spheres.938 A trend in which the courts 
give effect to subsidiarity can be discerned from the jurisprudence, and this underscores the 
importance of decentralisation as a counter-force to centralisation. The argument is put forward 
that the decision in Le Sueur, and the many differing academic opinions it has engendered, 
highlight the difficulty inherent in interpreting the Schedules to the Constitution. It is submitted 
                                                 
938 Le Sueur & another v eThekwini Municipality & others (9714/11) [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 at para 6. 
  
263 
 
that there is a need to revisit the formulation of the division-of-powers provisions in the 
Constitution. 
 
The chapter also looked at the interaction between human rights and the division-of-powers 
sections of the Constitution. Two Constitutional Court cases in which the administrative 
arrangements of government and the division of powers between the spheres arose, were 
discussed.939 It is submitted that the courts have made it clear that they will not be limited by 
the allocation of responsibilities under the Constitution when deciding cases. Their approach 
is purposive and emphasises the constitutional duties resting on the state as a whole to provide 
services to its people. It is submitted that the implications of this approach for government 
planning, administration, and budgeting are very serious, and that government should take heed 
of these developments and initiate a process to review and realign how responsibilities are 
divided between the spheres. It is further submitted that the international obligations which 
South Africa has willingly undertaken place an obligation on the state to ensure their fulfilment. 
It is argued that a failure to address the deficiencies in state administration which are hampering 
service delivery carries serious reputational risk. 
 
In Chapter 7, whether the public administration promotes the constitutional values of 
accountability, respect for the rule of law, and a culture which promotes respect for human 
rights and human dignity is assessed. It is argued that despite an impressive array of law and 
policy intended to regulate the administration, there has been no corresponding change in the 
culture of the public service, which continues to display a centralised and an authoritarian 
approach. This may be ascribed to a number of factors which have negatively impacted on 
effective implementation of the legal and policy frameworks.  
 
It is further argued that certain aspects of the institutional apparatus of the public administration 
fall short of the requirements of the Constitution. This has resulted in undue executive influence 
over administrative and human-resource practices within the public sector to the detriment of 
independence and accountability.  
 
                                                 
939 Joseph & others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC). 
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This final Chapter offers recommendations to address the shortcomings identified. 
 
8.3 Recommendations 
 
8.3.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout this thesis, various recommendations have been made to improve aspects of the 
functioning of the administration which emerged during the discussions. In the following 
section these are crystallised into a proposal aimed at improving the efficiency and efficacy of 
the administration in all three spheres. 
 
It is submitted that for effective service delivery the current institutional design of the 
administration is not optimal. Accordingly, a number of suggestions are made in order to 
address the shortcomings inherent in the current system. Most of these recommendations seek 
to effect changes to the structure, functioning, and processes which regulate intergovernmental 
relations in the administration. Certain of the changes address the institutional arrangements of 
government; others look at relations around specific processes, such as the drafting and 
adoption of legislation. Still others look to address the attitudes, skills, and behaviour of 
officials in all spheres with a view to improving intergovernmental relations. The aim of all of 
these proposed interventions is to improve the efficacy of government and in so doing, to 
improve governance and advance service delivery. 
 
8.3.2 Division of Powers 
 
First, the concurrent lists of power contained in the Schedules should be repealed. A revised 
constitutional allocation of powers should be introduced. For instance, two new lists of powers 
could replace the current lists - List A, outlining national powers and list B, outlining local 
government powers. The powers in List B should automatically reside only in Metropolitan 
Municipalities. (This list can be based on the current powers exercised by municipalities in 
practice including libraries, housing, etc.)List B powers can be exercised by Category B and C 
municipalities but only where they have demonstrated a clear capacity to do so based on 
objectively identifiable criteria. Henceforth, Category A municipalities should automatically 
have the power to legislate over the affairs in List B. 
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The legislative authority of provinces may be limited to the drafting of model by-laws, or by-
laws applicable to Category B and C municipalities within their jurisdiction. The content of 
these by-laws should be mutually agreed upon, and must respect the constitutional status of 
local government. This will alleviate the widespread problem of smaller municipalities where 
there are no by-laws in place either because they lack the skills to draft them, or because they 
cannot afford the cost of promulgation in the Government Gazette. 
 
Second, a process to review the functionality of all Category B and C municipalities should be 
established using objective criteria. Based on functionality, the number of municipalities 
should be rationalised. Smaller local municipalities with very limited capacity should be 
disestablished and the number of these municipalities should be reduced. Municipalities which 
lack capacity should be absorbed into larger municipalities.  
 
8.3.3 Provincial Administrations 
 
First, a process to review the alignment of constitutional functions with the administrative 
arrangement of government should be undertaken. This process must ensure that function and 
administrative capacity are correctly aligned. Particular attention should be paid to the 
provincial departments which should be assessed and rationalised.  
 
Second, the Premiers’ offices should be strengthened to become the centre for administration 
in a region. This includes administrative oversight of provincial programmes and monitoring 
and implementation. Provincial departments should report administratively to the Premier’s 
office in their provinces and not to the national line department. The latter results in piecemeal 
planning and implementation. All programmes and policies should be approved at a central 
coordination point in the Premiers’ offices. This will improve coordination, policy coherence, 
monitoring, and accountability. 
 
Third, provincial departments should be reorganised to focus on service delivery at local 
government level – not only by managing local government to deliver services but by active 
involvement in the delivery of services in medium and low capacity municipalities. For 
instance, a mechanism may be designed which allows provincial departments of local 
government to better support service delivery in medium- and low-capacity municipalities. 
Latent human-resource capacity in provincial departments may be deployed, by agreement to 
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medium- and low-capacity municipalities either by placement in the municipality or on a 
‘shared services’ basis. 
 
8.3.4 Planning, Monitoring and Budgeting 
 
First, planning cycles across all government departments in all the spheres should be 
synchronised and aligned. 
 
Second, the Premiers’ offices should be the administrative centre of all planning and budgeting 
within their respective provinces. In coordinating planning and budgeting they should be 
assisted by the Provincial Treasury and the Department of Local Government in the provinces. 
 
Third, all government programmes must appear in the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of 
the municipal area in which they will be implemented. This is the bottom-up planning 
envisaged by the constitutional vision for participatory democracy based on developmental 
local government. 
 
It is submitted that the system proposed above will not take power away from national levels 
of government but will simply allow better coordination of policies across all spheres. National 
Treasury retains control of the budgeting process. The individual provincial planning processes 
being coordinated via the Premier’s office will improve coherence in government planning. At 
a national level, the plans and budgets of the provinces and the management of cooperative 
governance should be coordinated through the Presidency, the National Treasury, National 
Department of Local Government, the Constitutional Development Branch of the Department 
of Justice and Constitutional Development, and the Department of Monitoring and Evaluation 
in the Presidency.  
 
8.3.5 Legislation and Policy 
 
First, the lack of coordination between national and provincial departments in the area of 
legislation within their mandates impacting on local government should be addressed as a 
matter of priority. 
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Second, a more inclusive consultative process for the drafting of legislation and policy 
impacting on local government should be implemented. Local governments must be included 
in the process of drafting and development of any laws that they are required to implement. 
 
Third, a coordination structure with responsibility for coordinating legislation and clearing it 
for constitutionality and coherence with government policy and compatibility with existing 
policies and laws across government departments, should be developed. (This is distinct from 
the technical process of certifying a Bill for constitutionality as performed by the Premier’s 
offices and the office of the chief state law advisor located in the Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development.) 
 
Fourth, all old-order legislation still on the statute books should be rationalised and either 
redrafted to bring it into line with the Constitution or repealed. 
 
Fifth, the Local Government legislation should be reviewed and simplified. All laws which 
conflict with the Constitution must be repealed. 
 
Sixth, the composition and functioning of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) should 
be reviewed and revisited. A system needs to be adopted which promotes the advancement of 
provincial interests over party political concerns. 
 
Seventh, the discretion to introduce legislation affecting the provinces in the National 
Assembly (NA) as opposed to the NCOP, should be removed from the Constitution so that it 
becomes compulsory for all section 76 legislation first to be introduced in the NCOP. 
 
8.3.6 Intergovernmental Relations 
 
First, the Cabinet Cluster system should be reviewed in order to address the many problems 
with the system identified in this study. 
 
Second, the understanding of local government officials of the powers and functions of local 
government, the link between policies, laws, and budgets and of the meaning of the 
constitutional value of cooperative governance needs to be addressed. The department 
mandated with constitutional implementation and oversight of cooperative governance should 
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ensure that all government officials are trained and equipped on the Chapter 3 requirements of 
the Constitution. 
 
Third, the alignment of government departments with the functional allocation of 
responsibilities needs to be addressed via a comprehensive process which includes an 
assessment of capacity in both local government and provincial and national departments. 
 
Fourth, the independence of the PSC should be strengthened. There is a need to examine 
whether the PSC should not be granted greater independence and powers similar to other 
Chapter 9 institutions. 
 
Fifth, the reform of the PSC must examine the politico-administrative interface and the need to 
address ethics and organisational discipline in the public service. These actions are crucial to 
the improvement of service delivery. 
 
Sixth, the functioning of ward committees at municipal level should receive urgent attention in 
order to improve democratic participation by citizens in municipal decision making. 
 
8.3.7 Public Administration Reforms 
 
The following changes are recommended: 
 
First, the Department of Public Service and Administration should get its house in order as a 
matter of urgency. All department-specific recommendations made in this part should be 
implemented first in the DPSA. 
 
Second, the culture of non-compliance with legal prescripts governing the public service should 
be addressed first within the DPSA before it is progressively implemented in the rest of the 
public administration. Most importantly, the performance management system must be 
implemented universally. 
 
Third, the DPME should address challenges with its performance system and resolve these 
with input from all government departments. Attention must be given to the nature of 
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performance targets and how effectively they measure departmental services. The emphasis 
needs to shift from rigid compliance to qualitative outputs. 
 
Fourth, the DPSA engagements in managing the public administration need to shift from being 
‘model’ or ‘programme’ based to being people based. The morale and working conditions of 
public servants requires urgent attention. 
 
Fifth, a change in the way the DPSA approaches its mandate will result in similar changes 
throughout government. Programmes to effect a shift in the mind-set of managers at provincial 
and national government should be developed and implemented. Managers need to move away 
from formulaic, compliance-based models towards interaction, engagement and innovation. 
Management is not about ‘rule by compliance’.  
 
Sixth, measures to address employee wellbeing and professional development should be 
developed. Perceptions of favouritism and bias on the part of management must be addressed. 
Greater emphasis needs to be placed on creating a fair, depoliticised environment. 
 
Seventh, the provisions for the appointment and removal of PSC Commissioners should be 
revised so as to ensure greater independence for the commission. 
 
Eighth, the PSC administration should be entirely independent of the executive. The 
appointment of the DG of the PSC and all budget-related matters should be managed and 
controlled independently. 
 
Ninth, the powers of the PSC should be amended to include the power to make peremptory 
findings and recommendations on public service matters. 
 
Tenth, the Executive Ethics Code should be amended in order to regulate the politico-
administrative interface more effectively. This may require a proper delineation of matters 
falling within the executive versus those under administrative control.940 
 
                                                 
940 Executive Members Ethics Act 194 of 1998; Executive Ethics Code: Proclamation R 41 2000 Government 
Gazette 41 Regulation 8853. 
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Eleventh, matters concerning the appointment, career incidents, and management of discipline 
of public servants should be removed from executive control. 
 
Twelfth, mechanisms to increase the security of tenure of DGs and DDGs should be put in 
place. In this regard, consideration should be given to appointing DGs on a permanent basis in 
order to increase stability in the administration. Mechanisms to constrain the abuse of 
disciplinary processes against DGs and DDGs should be developed. This may include removal 
of this power from individual ministries. 
 
Thirteenth, all reports of the PSC should be made public. 
 
Fourteenth, the PSC should be given the power to follow up on the implementation of its 
reports. Departments which fail to implement the finding in reports must be reported to 
Parliament. 
 
Fifteenth, the implementation of programmes to address the authoritarian culture prevalent in 
the public service must be developed and implemented to transform government departments 
from within. An understanding of the Constitution and the rule of law must be fostered amongst 
public servants. 
 
Sixteenth, measures to address professionalism in the public sphere must be introduced. At the 
same time, measures to de-politicise the public administration must be prioritised This could 
include workshops and training for DGs and Ministers as outlined in the NDP.  
 
Seventeenth, the conduct of members of the executive in government departments should be 
subjected to oversight to ensure compliance with the Constitution and the law. 
 
Eighteenth, the implementation of programmes to educate public servants employed in 
employee relations units in government departments on the binding nature of legal and policy 
prescripts governing personnel practices and the importance of confidentiality in personnel 
matters. 
 
  
271 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
This study has examined complex questions surrounding the division of powers in the South 
African Constitution and the implementation of the constitutional vision for an efficient and 
accountable and administration that meets the needs of its citizens from a local government 
perspective. It acknowledges that the practice of the state over close to twenty-five years of 
democracy in South Africa has resulted in vast improvements in service delivery in many areas.  
 
This notwithstanding, the most recent survey by Statistics South Africa (STATSA) indicates 
that 75 per cent of municipal residents believe that municipalities are not doing enough to solve 
problems in their areas.941 The high levels of dissatisfaction indicated in the 2016 Community 
Survey, the increasing incidence of service delivery riots, an increase in litigation against the 
state, and the many difficulties exposed in this study are alarm bells which the state ignores at 
its own peril. It is submitted that the system for the constitutional allocation of powers is in 
urgent need of reform. It is the sincere hope of the author that this thesis has made some 
contribution towards the existing discourse on this subject that will help initiate much needed 
reform. 
 
  
                                                 
941 The state of basic service delivery in South Africa: In-depth analysis of the Community Survey 2016 data’ 
available at www.statsa.gov.za/publications/Report%2003-01-22/Report%2003-01-222016.pdf accessed on 28 
September 2017. 
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director-general-snubs-mps-9794149 
https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/damning-report-exposes-bullying-in-the-public-service-
19058290 
https://www.iol.co.za/mercury/news/ethekweni-manager-hit-by-staff-exodus-10343238 
https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/damning-report-exposes-bullying-in-the-public-service-
19058290 
 
Business Live 
https://businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-10-15-water-official-suspended-for-refusing-to-
let-unit-serve-as-honey-pot/ 
 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2018-10-20-water-deputy-fired-because-of-lack-
of-trust-and-confidence/ 
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/politics/2016-12-22-sibusiso-sithole-adked-to-leave-
position-as-ethekweni-city-manager-immediately/ 
 
Miscellaneous 
www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news/item/1652-head-of-legal-gets-his-marching-
orders 
https://groundup.org.za/article/former-social-grants-boss-accuses-minister-parallel-
decision-making/ 
 https://groundup.org.za/article/former-social-grants-boss-accuses-minister-parallel-
decision-making/ 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/south-africa/energy-minister-suspends-ddg/ 
https://mfin24.com/Tech/News/Telecoms-DG-suspended-for-60-days-20150807 
hhtps://techcentral.co.za/vilikazi-latest-ddg-out-at-telecoms/58608 
https://techcentral.co.za/another-ddg-bites-the-dust/56865/ 
SA History ‘Public Protest in Democratic South Africa’ available at 
http://sahistory.org.za/article/public-protest-democratic-south-africa 
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‘Don’t say goodbye to the NCOP yet’ available at http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/dont-
say-goodbey-ncop-yet/. 
 
Parliamentary Minutes 
Public Service and Administration, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Committee 
Meeting of 25 October 2017 available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/25324/ 
Public Accounts (SCOPA) Committee Meeting of 28 November 2018 available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/27688 
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